Ocean City Taxpayers for Soc. Justice v. Mayor
| Decision Date | 25 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. RDB-15-1947 |
| Parties | OCEAN CITY TAXPAYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF OCEAN CITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This action involves a petition (the "Petition") to force a public vote on a ballot initiative related to property taxes in Ocean City, Maryland. On July 1, 2015, the Plaintiffs, Anthony Christ ("Christ"), John Medlin ("Medlin"), Joseph Hall ("Hall"), and Herbert Pawlukewicz ("Pawlukewicz") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), titling themselves "Ocean City Taxpayers for Social Justice"1 ("OCTSJ"), and proceeding pro se, filed suit in this Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiffs name the Mayor, Council, & Town of Ocean City ("Ocean City") as Defendant, and claim violationsunder the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. I, the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, and the Due Process clause, U.S. Const. amend. V.2
On July 8, 2015, the Town of Ocean City ("Defendant") filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the present Plaintiff Christ in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, Maryland.3 On July 24th, Christ filed a Notice of Removal for this action.4 This Court consolidated it with the first case filed with this Court.
Pending before this Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11); and Defendant's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 22) the complaint for declaratory judgment.5 The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).
For the reasons that follow, Ocean City's Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11), construed as a motion to dismiss, is GRANTED; and Ocean City's Motion to Remand the declaratory judgment action to the Circuit Court for Worcester County (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED.
This case arises out of the Plaintiffs' submission of a charter amendment resolution petition to the Town of Ocean City, Maryland.6 The Petition sought to allow Ocean City residents to vote on the Plaintiffs' proposal to alter the property tax rate in Ocean City.7
In 2014, the Plaintiffs began collecting signatures in support of their Petition. They submitted their Petition after obtaining the requisite signatures to initiate a proposed charter amendment, and the Petition was certified by the Board of Election Supervisors on June 1, 2015. Ocean City sought to quash the Petition. Subsequently, Christ and his co-Plaintiffs, who are all residents of Ocean City, Maryland, filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on July 1, 2015. The Plaintiffs believe that their desired relief—forcing Ocean City to submit the charter amendment to public vote—was unobtainable in a Maryland state court based on unfavorable law and state court precedent. Hence, they sought relief in this Court.8
In their effort to quash the Petition, Ocean City filed a request for declaratory relief against federal Plaintiff Christ, a resident of Falls Church, Virginia, in Circuit Court of Worcester County, Maryland on July 18, 2015.
On July 24, 2015, the Plaintiffs submitted a "Request for Emergency Removal" (ECF No. 10) for the state court declaratory action based on supplemental jurisdiction. This Court construed the request as a Notice for Removal, and on August 4, 2015, ordered the state and federal actions consolidated.
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over two kinds of civil actions: 1) those founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States; and 2) those where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different States. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a) (2006).
To maintain federal court jurisdiction over an action based on diversity, complete diversity between the plaintiffs and the defendants must exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. When an action is removed based on diversity, complete diversity of citizenship must be established at the time of removal. Cox-Stewart v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 566, 567 (D. Md. 2003). The party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of "demonstrat[ing] that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist," and "a federal court isobliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is "to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court's opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), "require that complaints in civil actions be alleged with greater specificity than previously was required." Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In Twombly, the Supreme Court articulated "[t]wo working principles" that courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
First, while a court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not afforded such deference. Id. (). In thecontext of pro se litigants, however, pleadings are "to be liberally construed," and are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted); accord Brown v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 2010). Second, even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "a plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also O'Neil v. Ponzi, 394 F. App'x. 795, 796 (2d Cir. 2010).
The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party seeking removal. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Removal jurisdiction raises "significant federalism concerns," and therefore must be strictly construed. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). "If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary." Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 (citations omitted). This strict policy against removal and for remand protects the sovereignty of state governments and state judicial power. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Additionally, even if the court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, the court nevertheless has discretion to remand a case to state court if, among other things, "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Remand is favored in cases turning primarily on questions of state law, because "[n]eedless decisions of state law [by federal courts] should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966). Consequently, in a case where federal claims are eliminated before trial, "the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988).
However, the federal remand statute provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise...." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In other words, "a district court should be cautious in denying defendants access to a federal forum because remand orders are generally unreviewable." Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (D.Md. 1997); see also In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) ().
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the Order of Removal (ECF No. 17) consolidated the two present cases. "Although consolidation 'is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, [it] . . . does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties inone suit parties in another.'" Intown Properties Mgmt., Inc. v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 271 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933)). This Court will accordingly treat the two actions as separate for purposes of analysis.
Plaintiffs admit that they seek to avoid unfavorable state precedent, Bd. of Sup'rs of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220 (1992) by filing this action in this Court. Specifically, they filed in this Court "in order to escape the expected adverse ruling in Maryland." Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 2, ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs fail to recognize that the potential for an undesirable end to their cause of action in state court does not create...
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