Ocean S.S. Co. v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 23 December 1890 |
| Citation | 12 S.E. 632,86 Ga. 418 |
| Parties | OCEAN S. S. CO. v. MATTHEWS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Error from city court of Savannah; HARDEN, Judge.
Lawton & Cunningham and Edward S. Elliott, for plaintiff in error.
Garrard & Meldrim, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff while in the employment of the defendant, and in the discharge of his duty in the lower hold of a ship, was injured by a falling bale of cotton. He alleged in his declaration that he was hurt because the hooks by which the cotton was lowered from the upper part of the ship were, by the negligence and default of the defendant, unsafely constructed, in disrepair, unfit for use, of defective and improper material, in an unsafe condition, and unfit for the purpose for which they were being used, being so defective as not to securely hold the cotton, on account of their generally defective condition, and particularly because the points of the hooks, being worn smooth, and having been forced from an acute to an obtuse angle, failed to securely catch and hold the cotton. He alleged that the defendant knew or ought to have known this, and that he himself did not know, and was injured without fault on his part. The evidence for the plaintiff, (which was the sole evidence introduced in the case) showed that he was hurt, as alleged, by the slipping of the bale from hooks which were so defective as not to securely hold the cotton, the point of one of the hooks being blunt, and the point of the other bent from its proper position. These hooks were applied to the bale by another employe in another part of the ship, who testified that although "the hooks had brought down three or four bales that afternoon, and they came down all right," he "saw there was danger in one of the hooks," and that it was blunt enough to make him think the bale was going to slip. According to some of the testimony this was the first bale that came down, and the hooks had not been used before. It was also shown that the plaintiff did not know of the defective condition of the hooks, and had no opportunity to look at them when used on this occasion, and that it was not a part of his business to inspect them. Nor was this the business of the employe who applied them to the cotton, so far as appears from the evidence. According to the latter's testimony, The plaintiff was permanently injured; his leg, broken in two places between the knee and hip, being crushed between the falling bale and the edge of a wooden cask, and thereby shortened and made crooked. He was laid up in bed and confined to his house for several months. His injuries impaired his efficiency, and rendered him unable to lift heavy weights, and his general health was greatly impaired. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff a verdict for $1,000. The court overruled a motion for a new trial by the defendant based upon the grounds (1, 2) that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence, and excessive in amount and (3, 4, 5) that the court erred in certain charges to the jury, hereafter set out.
1. The verdict is not contrary to law and the evidence. Under the charge of the court, the jury were not allowed to return a verdict for the plaintiff unless they should find from the evidence that he was injured because of the negligence of the defendant, or its employes whose duty it was to look after the hooks, in failing to provide and maintain, so far as reasonable precautions, prudence, and investigation might go implements reasonably good and safe for the performance of its work; that he was without fault himself; and that the injury was not caused by the carelessness of a co-employe in and about the same line of business with the plaintiff. The verdict, therefore, amounted to a finding that these facts were established. This finding is supported by evidence uncontradicted by any evidence on the part of the defendant and is approved by the judge who tried the case. These facts being established, the defendant's liability under the law stood established. Nor was the defendant relieved from liability, as was contended by counsel, by the fact that these hooks, while in this defective condition, might have been or had been used without injury. "The fact that a servant may, by care and caution, so operate a defective and dangerous machine as not to produce injury to his fellow-servants does not exempt the master from his liability for an omission to exercise reasonable care and prudence in furnishing safe and suitable appliances." Shear. & R. Neg. § 194. Nor was the verdict excessive in amount. The evidence establishes the painful, permanent, and disabling character of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, who was a young man 24 years of age, with a reasonable expectation of many years of life before him.
2. The third, fourth, and fifth grounds of the motion, which may be considered together, complain of certain instructions of the court as to the onus of proof. These instructions were, in substance, that if the plaintiff should show that the implements employed by the defendant or furnished to its employes were not fit implements, but were in a defective and improper condition, and the defect was such as to indicate that the defendant should have known, or did know, of its existence, the presumption would be that the defendant knew, and the burden would be cast upon it to show that it did not know. It is true that the instructions complained of in the third and fourth grounds, standing alone, seem to cast this burden upon the defendant, if the condition of the implements is merely shown to have been unfit and improper; but these instructions are qualified by the instruction complained of in the fifth ground, which follows, and by which the plaintiff, in addition, required to show that this unfit and improper condition was such as to indicate that the master should have known, or did know, of it. The language is: "From the mere happening of an injury to the servant from defective appliances, there is no presumption that the master is at fault; the servant must go further, and show negligence on the part of the master, unless the defect in the appliances was such as to indicate that the master should have known, or did know, of its existence." Elsewhere in the charge the jury were given to understand that the defective condition might be so recent that the defendant could not be presumed to know of it, and that the defendant, in that event, would not be responsible; the court saying: "If these hooks were in an improper condition, and had become in an improper condition so recently that the Ocean Steam-Ship Company could not be presumed to know of it, then the Ocean Steam-Ship Company would not be responsible." Taking these...
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