Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION

• Decision Date: 08 January 2004
• Citation: 808 NE 2d 257,441 Mass. 632
• Parties: OCEAN SPRAY CRANBERRIES, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

441 Mass. 632

808 NE 2d 257

OCEAN SPRAY CRANBERRIES, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 8, 2004.

May 12, 2004.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

Kay H. Hodge for the plaintiff.

Michael M. Kramer for Richard Rapoza.

Steven S. Locke (Wendy A. Cassidy with him) for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

CORDY, J.

This case requires us to decide whether and how the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to an action alleging that an employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation to a handicapped employee in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

1. Procedural history. On September 15, 1995, Richard Rapoza filed charges of discrimination against his former employer, Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. (Ocean Spray), with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD or commission). The charges included an allegation that Ocean Spray failed to accommodate Rapoza's impaired vision despite his requests for accommodate beginning in May, 1993. The commission found probable cause to credit some of Rapoza's allegations and certified the case for a public hearing.²

A commissioner conducted the hearing over four days in April and June, 1997, after which he issued a written decision including detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. He concluded that Rapoza's impaired vision qualified him as a "handicapped person" under G. L. c. 151B, §§ 1 and 4, and that Ocean Spray had failed to accommodate his handicap, "completely disregard[ing his] requests for help." The commissioner awarded Rapoza $50,000 for emotional distress incurred from the time he first requested accommodation in May, 1993, until his termination from Ocean Spray in June, 1995. The commissioner also ordered Ocean Spray to design an antidiscrimination policy and implementation plan, and to retain a commission-approved antidiscrimination trainer.

Ocean Spray appealed from the commissioner's decision to the commission, arguing that Rapoza's complaint was not filed timely and that he was not a "handicapped person." The commission affirmed the commissioner's order, concluding that Rapoza's complaint was timely under the "continuing violation doctrine," and that Rapoza's visual impairment substantially limited both his ability to see and his ability to work, thus qualifying him as a "handicapped person."³

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, Ocean Spray appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court, where it was affirmed in all respects except with regard to its remedial order. The Superior Court judge concluded that the order requiring Ocean Spray to develop an antidiscrimination policy and to hire a trainer was not reasonably tailored to the violations found and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion. After the judge modified the order accordingly, Ocean Spray appealed, and we granted its petition for direct appellate review. We remand the case to the commission for a recalculation of damages incurred by Rapoza within the six-month period preceding the filing of his charge of discrimination with the commission.

2. Background. The hearing commissioner found the following facts. Ocean Spray employed Rapoza from 1987 until 1995. For most of that time, Rapoza worked as a maintenance mechanic in the "brik pak" department,⁴ performing repairs on very small parts inside certain machinery in poorly lit areas of the plant.

For most of his lifetime, Rapoza had no vision in his left eye as the result of a childhood accident. In March, 1992, Rapoza underwent lens implant surgery, which restored vision in his left eye somewhat, but left him with a depth perception problem that caused him to have difficulties seeing small objects. This vision problem made it difficult for Rapoza to work with small machine parts and affected his performance at work.

Rapoza discussed his vision problem and its impact on his performance with his direct supervisor, Dan Kanaley, on several occasions beginning in May, 1993. During one such discussion, Rapoza specifically requested more lighting in the brik pak area, but no additional lighting materialized. Kanaley asked Rapoza to provide written documentation of his vision problem, and Rapoza complied by submitting a letter from his eye doctor to Ocean Spray's human resources manager, Barbara Denker, on June 17, 1993. The letter stated that Rapoza "has difficulties with depth perception" that may cause "difficulties with fine tolerance measurements and close work"; additionally the letter requested "[a]ny help you are able to provide for him in modifying his workplace . . . ." In subsequent conversations with Kanaley and Denker, Rapoza suggested that he might work in a different area of the plant, where the parts were larger and therefore easier for him to see.⁵ Nothing came of this suggestion.

In November, 1994, one and one-half years after first seeking some accommodation for his impaired vision, Rapoza left work to undergo heart surgery. Both during his recovery period and after returning to work in April, 1995, Rapoza provided Denker with letters from doctors referring to his vision problems. The first, a letter from Rapoza's psychologist dated March 29, 1995, explained that Rapoza would not be able to return to work before April 17 and described Rapoza as "exhibiting physical and psychological characteristics of an Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety and Depressed Mood" as a result of the "pressures, demands and requirements of his job where the performance and effectiveness expected of him exceed the physical capabilities placed on him as a result of his limited vision in his left eye." The psychologist's letter also included a copy of the June 17, 1993, letter from Rapoza's eye doctor. Rapoza's cardiologist supplied a second letter, dated April 14, 1995. That letter indicated that Rapoza's vision problem was causing "considerable stress which could aggravate his cardiac status" and recommended "that he function in an environment where this physical limitation would be minimally aggravating." Finally, in response to another Ocean Spray request for an update on his vision problem, Rapoza submitted a letter from his eye doctor dated May 17, 1995, stating that he "has limited depth perception and difficulties with close work" and again requesting "[a]ny help which you could provide him in modifying his work place . . . ." Ocean Spray took no action in response to any of these letters, and subsequently terminated Rapoza's employment on June 22, 1995, for falsifying his time card.

3. Discussion. We will "affirm a decision and order of the MCAD unless the findings and conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law." Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 676 (1993). We first discuss whether Rapoza's physical impairment qualified him as a handicapped person, then assess whether the "continuing violation" doctrine brought Rapoza's action within the statute of limitations, and finally, address whether Ocean Spray met its obligation of reasonable accommodation.

a. "Handicap." General Laws c. 151B, § 4 (16), prohibits discrimination against "a qualified handicapped person." The statute defines a "handicapped person" as "any person who has a handicap," G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (19), and in turn defines a "handicap" as: "(a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person; (b) a record of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17). "[M]ajor life activities" are "functions, including, but not limited to, . . . seeing . . . and working." G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (20).

"The statute draws a distinction between persons who have a physical or mental impairment, and those whose impairment `substantially limits' a `major life' activity. . . . Only the latter are protected by the Massachusetts statute." Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 237 (2001). Ocean Spray contends that the commissioner and the commission erred when they determined that Rapoza's vision impairment substantially limited a major life activity. "Our review is limited to determining whether the commissioner's findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, and whether there was an error of law." College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 170 (1987), citing G. L. c. 151B, § 6, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

General Laws c. 151B anticipates that determining whether a person is a "handicapped person" will be an individualized inquiry. See G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17) (defining "handicap" as "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person" [emphasis added]). Accord Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("whether a person has a disability under the [Americans with Disabilities Act] is an individualized inquiry")⁶; Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Guidelines: Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Chapter 151B, § II.A.6 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines) ("determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity depends on the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact of the impairment"). As such, per se rules are to be avoided. In this case, Rapoza has asserted that he is handicapped because problems with his vision substantially limit two major life activities: working and seeing. See G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (20). Notwithstanding that Rapoza himself, the commission, and the judge in the Superior Court who affirmed the commission's decision all combined and conflated the "working" and the "seeing" claims, each claim is separate and distinct, and must be assessed...