Oddy v. Gonyea
| Decision Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 9:18-cv-00425-JKS,9:18-cv-00425-JKS |
| Parties | RICHARD ODDY II, Petitioner, v. PAUL GONYEA, Superintendent, Mohawk Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Richard Oddy II, a New York state prisoner represented by counsel, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Oddy is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") and incarcerated at Mohawk Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered the Petition, and Oddy has not replied.
On August 13, 2012, Oddy was charged with 14 sex offenses in an indictment alleging that Oddy committed various criminal sexual acts with four female children ages nine, ten, twelve, and fourteen. In satisfaction of all counts, the People offered Oddy a negotiated plea to first-degree criminal sexual act with a determinate term of 14 years' incarceration to be followed by post-release supervision of between 10 and 25 years. The plea offer also required Oddy to execute a written Waiver of Appeal.
On May 7, 2013, Oddy appeared before the court with counsel to accept the negotiated plea agreement and enter a change of plea. Prior to accepting his guilty plea, the trial court confirmed that Oddy understood the plea agreement and had adequately discussed the agreement with his attorney. Oddy acknowledged that he had not been threatened or pressured into pleading guilty, nor had he been made promises, other than the agreed-upon sentence, in exchange for the plea. When asked whether he was "on any kind of drugs or medications, or . . . suffering from any kind of illness that would make it difficult for [him] to understand what [wa]s being said" during the change-of-plea proceedings, Oddy answered in the negative.
The court also explained that the plea agreement would require Oddy to waive his right to appeal and that "the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights that are given up when a plea of guilty is entered," and confirmed that Oddy's attorney had explained the waiver of appeal to Oddy and that Oddy understood it. Oddy also signed a written waiver of right to appeal.
The court concluded that Oddy was "aware of his statutory and constitutional rights with regards to this proceeding; that he [wa]s cognizant of his waiver and giving up of those rights by the proposed plea . . . ." The court then recited the facts underlying the first-degree criminal sexual act charge, and Oddy admitted that his tongue came in contact with the minor victim's vagina. The court subsequently sentenced Oddy, consistent with the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, to a determinate term of 14 years' imprisonment and 20 years of post-release supervision.
Oddy then moved pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, arguing that: 1) his plea was involuntarily and unintelligently made; 2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements to law enforcement; 3) plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and 4) the imposed sentence washarsh and excessive. County court denied the motion in a reasoned, unpublished opinion issued on November 9, 2015, finding that the claims were all "record-based, or alternatively [Oddy] failed to provide an explanation for his failure to raise the issues when they were known prior to sentencing."
Through counsel, Oddy also appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal; 2) his guilty plea was involuntarily obtained; 3) his involuntary confession should have been suppressed; 4) plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and 5) his sentence is harsh and excessive. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court granted Oddy's application for leave to appeal the denial of his § 440.10 motion and considered the combined appeals on direct review. The appellate court unanimously affirmed Oddy's judgment of conviction and affirmed the § 440.10 denial in a reasoned opinion issued on November 17, 2016. People v. Oddy, 41 N.Y.S.3d 316, 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). Oddy sought leave to appeal on all claims raised in the Appellate Division. The New York Court of Appeals summarily denied leave on August 24, 2017. People v. Oddy, 86 N.E.3d 573, 573 (N.Y. 2017). His conviction became final 90 days later, on November 22, 2017, the conclusion of the period during which Oddy could have sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. See Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2001).
Again proceeding through counsel, Oddy then timely filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on April 8, 2018. Docket No. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Upon this Court's order, counsel filed an Amended Petition shortly thereafter that removed thevictims' identifying information. Docket No. 3 ("Petition"). Briefing is now complete, and the Petition is before the undersigned judge for adjudication.
In his counseled Petition before this Court, Oddy argues that: 1) his guilty plea was involuntarily procured; 2) his confession should have been suppressed as involuntarily procured; 3) trial counsel rendered ineffective service; and 4) his sentence is harsh and excessive.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearly established federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ( ).
To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist for not addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it. See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) ( the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it wouldgive a reasoned decision of the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 145-46. Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
Oddy has not replied to Respondent's answer. The relevant statute provides that "[t]he allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true." 28 U.S.C. § 2248; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 530 (1952). Where, as here, there is no traverse filed and no evidence offered to contradict the allegations of the return, the court must accept those allegations as true. United States ex rel. Catalano v. Shaughnessy, 197 F.2d 65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam).
Oddy first argues that his plea was involuntarily obtained. When a guilty plea is not ...
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