Odom v. Raypress Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-CA-0976,89-CA-0976 |
| Parties | Jimmy L. ODOM a/k/a Jim Odom Individually and Jim Odom & Associates, Inc. v. RAYPRESS CORPORATION. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Joe R. Odom, Orlando, Fla., for appellant.
John G. Compton, Witherspoon & Compton, Meridian, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and McRAE, JJ.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves a contract through which Jimmy L. Odom of Jim Odom & Associates, Inc. agreed to construct a "flexographic label press" for Raypress Corporation in exchange for $65,000 in consideration. Odom allegedly breached his contractual obligation by failure to deliver the press by the contracted deadline. This event prompted Raypress to attach or seize the partially-constructed press under authority of Mississippi's so-called replevin statute. In the Lauderdale Circuit Court, Odom challenged the replevin statute as unconstitutional and sought as his remedy repossession of the press. The circuit court judge agreed that the statute failed the test of constitutionality but awarded Raypress possession of the press. Odom appealed. This Court affirms.
In November 1986, Raypress Corporation and Jimmy L. Odom of Jim Odom & Associates, Inc., entered into a contract. Pursuant to this contract, Odom agreed to manufacture a "custom-built, 16-inch, 2-color, flexographic label press" in exchange for $65,000 in consideration. The contract called for completion and delivery of the press by June 1, 1987.
By June 1, 1987, Odom had not completed the press and Raypress had paid Odom $85,000--$20,000 more than the contract price. Raypress learned that Odom had "virtually completed" the press, so Raypress demanded that Odom deliver it--completed or not. Odom refused and demanded more money.
In December 1988, Raypress filed a complaint and a replevin bond in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court--seeking the immediate seizure of the press under authority of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 11-37-101 (1972). 1 Judge Larry E. Roberts approved the bond and ordered the circuit clerk to issue the writ.
On December 16, the Lauderdale County sheriff served Odom with a summons. About a week later, the sheriff seized the press.
In April 1989, Odom filed a motion for summary judgment and contended that the press should be returned to him because it was seized under a statute (Sec. 11-37-101) which had been declared unconstitutional by a federal district court. See Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.Miss.1989). Raypress countered: (1) that the federal district court's decision was not "binding" on the state circuit court, and alternatively (2) that the federal district court's decision was erroneous as a matter of constitutional law.
In June 1989--upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, briefs, and oral arguments--Judge Roberts issued his judgment on Odom's motion: "The Court ... will reserve ... ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment until this civil action has been tried on its merits."
In July 1989, Judge Roberts held trial. Upon completion of the trial, Judge Roberts issued his judgment:
THE COURT FINDS, ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that it has full jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties hereto and may properly proceed at this time; that the Defendants were lawfully issued service of process for the statutory time; that Section 11-37-101 of the Mississippi Code, 1972, Annotated be and the same is hereby declared unconstitutional for failure to leave any discretion to the trial Judge in his decision as to whether or not a WRIT OF REPLEVIN should be issued for the immediate seizure of personal property; that for the reasons hereinafter set out the constitutional issues raised by the Defendants are hereby determined to be moot; that this Court continues to have jurisdiction of the subject matter of this civil action pursuant to Section 11-37-131 et seq. of the Mississippi Code, 1971, Annotated; 2 that the Plaintiff has fully and completely paid to the Defendants all sums necessary for the possession of the 16 inch, 2 color flexographic label press and is accordingly entitled and hereby granted the immediate possession of the aforedescribed personal property; that the REPLEVIN BONDS posted by the Plaintiff, Raypress Corporation as Principal, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company as Surety, be and said REPLEVIN BONDS are hereby fully and finally discharged and cancelled; and, that the Defendants suffered no compensable damages as the result of the seizure of the 16 inch, 2 color flexographic label press, said Defendants having no legal, equitable, or constitutional right of possession to such personal property.
Odom appealed and presented four issues for analysis. These issues are addressed in the next Section.
II. ANALYSIS
Through the first issue, Odom asks this Court:
Was the Trial Court in error in taking the Motion for Summary Judgement [sic] under advisement and reserving his ruling until a trial on the merits?
As discussed, Odom filed a motion for summary judgment, and the judge "reserve[d] ... ruling on the Motion ... until this civil action [w]as ... tried on its merits." Odom now contends that the judge's decision to "reserve ... ruling" was "clearly in violation of Rule 56." Restated, Odom contends that the judge should have rendered his ruling immediately as opposed to waiting until later. Odom's brief analysis of this issue is devoid of specification of the relief he hopes to receive in the event this Court were to agree with him. See Appellant's Brief at 4.
This issue is deemed moot for obvious reasons. This Court therefore affirms to this extent.
Odom consolidated the following three issues because, he says, "they are so closely related":
Was the Trial Court in error in holding that his finding that the Code Section, namely Section 11-37-101 MCA was and is un-constitutional, was moot?
Was the Trial Court in error in awarding its judgement [sic] based on a Code Section, namely 11-37-101 MCA that was pled and relied on by the Appellee?
The Trial Court was in error in not ordering the Appellee to restore the property to Appellant when it made the ruling that the Code Section 11-37-101 MCA being the Code Section pled and relied on by Appellee was un-constitutional.
The gist of Odom's contention is simple: The judge should have ordered the return of the press because the sheriff executed the seizure under authority of an unconstitutional statute.
Raypress counters that "[t]here were no damages sustained by [Odom] and therefore [he] had no standing to question ... the constitutionality of the statute."
This Court's decision in Underwood v. Foremost Financial Servs. Corp., 563 So.2d 1387 (Miss.1990), is dispositive of this issue. In Underwood, a creditor seized a mobile home under the replevin statute--Sec. 11-37-101--after the debtors had become delinquent in their monthly payments. The debtors then filed a complaint against the creditor--alleging that the pre-notice/pre-hearing seizure violated their constitutional rights to due process and that they sustained damages as a consequence. The debtors filed their complaint under authority of a federal statute--42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. 3 The circuit court judge entered judgment against the debtors--reasoning that the creditor was not liable for damages since it had acted in accord with a presumptively valid, albeit unconstitutional, state statute. Id. at 1390-91. On appeal, this Court held: (1) that the statute was indeed unconstitutional; 4 (2) that liability may be imposed upon a creditor who violates, under color of law, a debtor's constitutional rights; but (3) that liability may not be imposed upon a creditor who seized property in good-faith reliance on a statute later adjudged as unconstitutional. Id. at 1391; see generally Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir.1976). This Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issues of: (1) whether the creditor seized the mobile home in good-faith reliance on the unconstitutional statute and, if so (2) whether the debtor sustained any injury or damages for which liability should be imposed on the creditor. See also Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.1988). 5 This Court did not order the return of the home to the debtors because it agreed with the trial judge's determination that the creditor was entitled to possession in view of the undisputed delinquency of monthly payments. Id. at 1392.
As discussed, Odom contends that the judge should have ordered the return of the press since it was seized under authority of an unconstitutional statute. But as Underwood instructs, the remedy for the unconstitutional seizure in the case sub judice is not a judgment which permanently voids the seizure of the press; rather, the remedy is compensatory as provided under authority of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. 6 See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 & 264, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047-49 & 1052, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, 259-61 & 265 (1978) (). As an analogy, consider the case of a student who is suspended for smoking marijuana without first being provided an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. Absent evidence of injury, the student cannot expect to recover either compensatory or permanent injunctive relief. Accord id. (). 7 Compensation must be based on "provable injury"--not on some "subjective perception of the importance of constitutional rights as an abstract matter." Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307-08, ...
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