Oehl v. Amana Colonies Land Use Dist. Bd. of Trs.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-1154 / 13-0328,3-1154 / 13-0328 |
| Parties | CATHERINE OEHL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMANA COLONIES LAND USE DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Patrick R. Grady, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a ruling dismissing their declaratory judgment action. AFFIRMED.
Wallace L. Taylor, Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Laura E. Bergus and John W. Hayek of Hayek, Brown, Moreland & Smith, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
Appellants are aggrieved residents of the Amana Colonies who challenge a decision of the Amana Colonies Land Use District Board of Trustees to allow the construction of hotel, convention center, and banquet complex within the Amana Colonies. The district court concluded that the exclusive remedy to challenge the Board of Trustees' decision was by certiorari and that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellants' declaratory judgment action. The district court also concluded, in the alternative, that the Board of Trustees did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in approving the development project. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
The Amana Colonies are unincorporated villages in Iowa County. In 1932, the Amana Society, a private corporation, owned the 26,000 acres in which the Amana Colonies are located. Development within the Amana Colonies was effectively managed by deed restrictions and covenants. In 1982, our supreme court held that land use restrictions in the deeds were invalid and unenforceable. See Amana Soc. v. Colony Inn, Inc., 315 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa 1982). The decision effectively vitiated the informal land use control system governing development within the Amana Colonies. In response, the legislature authorized the creation of special land use districts for the purpose of preserving the "distinctive historical and cultural character" of the districts so created. See Iowa Code § 303.41 (2011). Although the statutory language authorizing the creation of land use districts is phrased in general terms, the definition of eligible districts andlegislative history make clear that the statute was created for the particular purpose of allowing the residents of the Amana Colonies, collectively, to manage development in this historically and culturally significant community in a manner consistent with community traditions and values.
Pursuant to the land use statute, voters in the Amana Colonies approved the creation of the Amana Colonies Land Use District (hereinafter "ACLUD"), and elected a seven-member Board of Trustees (hereinafter "the Board"). The Board adopted a Land Use Plan, effective March 1, 1986, which emphasizes historic preservation. The Land Use Plan provides for the creation of Historic Preservation Districts (hereinafter "HPD"). The Land Use Plan also establishes a Historic Preservation Committee (hereinafter "HPC") tasked with consideration of applications for Certificates of Approval (hereinafter "COA") for "[a]ny construction, alteration, demolition, or removal affecting a significant exterior architectural feature of any structure within an HPD." The Board may issue a COA for construction of a structure in a HPD after review and recommendation by the HPC.
David and Yana Cutler own and operate the Ronneburg Restaurant in Amana within a HPD. In May 2010, the Cutlers applied for a COA to construct an addition to their restaurant. The proposed addition included a hotel, convention center, and banquet complex. The Cutlers' application was forwarded to the HPC for review. The HPC approved by a vote of 4-0 the Cutlers' proposal and sent it to the Board, which took no immediate action and tabled it. Over the course of the next twelve months, multiple hearings were heldon the Cutlers' application for a COA. Many of the Appellants in this case, including lead Appellant Oehl, were allowed to present their views on the Cutlers' application. The Cutlers submitted different versions of their proposal for consideration to address the concerns of residents raised during the hearings on the application.
In the spring of 2011, the HPC received an updated application from the Cutlers and forwarded it to the Board without a recommendation. The proposal came before the Board on June 6, 2011, and the Board initially split 3-3 on whether to approve the application. At the same meeting, the Board asked the Cutlers if they would be willing to make some final changes to the proposed addition. The Cutlers agreed to the proposed changes, and a second vote was taken on the modified proposal. The Board voted 4-2 in favor of the application as modified, and a COA was issued.
All of the Appellants except one appealed the issuance of the COA to the ACLUD Board of Adjustment. The Board of Adjustment consists of five members appointed by the Board of Trustees with authority to make special exceptions to the terms of the land use plan and with responsibility to hear certain appeals of property owners aggrieved by the Board of Trustees' action. See Iowa Code § 303.54. The Board of Adjustment determined that it did not have authority "to review and overturn the essentially legislative decision of the Board of Trustees to grant applications such as that of the Cutlers." Approximately 70 days after the Board of Adjustments' decision and 105 days after the Board of Trustees' decision, the Appellants challenged the issuance of the COA by filing thisdeclaratory judgment action. The case was tried to the district court, and the district court held the petition was improper and untimely and the claims failed on the merits.
Appellants contend the district court erred in concluding their challenge to the COA was required to be made in a certiorari action, that the petition was untimely filed, and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction over the claim. We review rulings on subject matter jurisdiction for correction of errors at law. See State v. Erdman, 727 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Iowa 2007).
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401 provides "[a] party may commence a certiorari action when authorized by statute or when the party claims an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, or a judicial magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally." "The term 'judicial functions' is not here construed in a strict or technical sense." Buechele v. Ray, 219 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1974). Thus, "certiorari will lie if the act in question is [also] quasi-judicial in nature." Id. "[W]hen an activity appears to be judicial in nature, but in reality is not, it is termed quasi-judicial." Id.
The Board's issuance of the COA was a quasi-judicial function subject to challenge by a certiorari action. A tribunal not a court exercises judicial or quasi-judicial authority when (1) "the questioned act involves a proceeding in which notice and an opportunity to be heard are required"; (2) "a determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of discretion in finding facts andapplying the law thereto"; or (3) "the challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of which is the peculiar office of the courts." Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 754 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 2008). While there was notice and opportunity to be heard on the merits of the Cutlers' application, the Board was not required to provide notice and hearing prior to deciding whether to issue the COA. Therefore, the challenged action does not fall within the first part of the above-stated test. However, it is clear that the determination of the Cutlers' rights required the exercise of discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto.
We first note, "[i]t is the nature of an act, not identity of the board or tribunal charged with its performance, which determines whether or not a function is judicial or quasi-judicial." Id. Thus, although the Land Use Plan states that "approval or disapproval of a Certificate of Approval is declared to be a legislative policy determination," that language is not dispositive of the question. We must look to the nature of the act regardless of the label applied to it. Here, the Board's action was akin to a zoning decision and was therefore quasi-judicial in nature. See Montgomery v. Bremer Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 299 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 1980) (); Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Iowa 1968) ().
The conclusion that the Board's action was quasi-judicial in nature is bolstered by the very nature of Appellants' challenges to the Board's decision. For example, Appellants contend the decision was improper because the proposal did not contain a yard as required by the Land Use Plan. Further, they contend, if the proposal contained a yard, it was not of the minimum size required by the Land Use Plan. They also contend the Board violated the "zoning ordinance" because a hotel is not consistent with historical structures. Appellants also argue "there are not enough parking spaces on the . . . lot to comply with the zoning ordinance." Appellants also note Reynold Moessner, who was instrumental in creating the ACLUD, testified why the application violated the Land Use Plan. These are all complaints that the Board's findings of fact were incorrect and/or the Board did not apply the facts properly to the zoning ordinance—complaints arising out of the Board's quasi-judicial functions and not its legislative functions.
Not only is certiorari available to challenge judicial and quasi-judicial action, it is the exclusive remedy to challenge this...
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