Of v. M.H.

• Citation: 426 S.W.3d 7
• Decision Date: 29 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. SC93677.,SC93677.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Parties: In the Interest of Q.A.H., Juvenile Officer, and C.W.M. and C.D.M., Respondents, v. M.H. (Mother), Appellant.

426 S.W.3d 7

In the Interest of Q.A.H.,

Juvenile Officer, and C.W.M. and C.D.M., Respondents,

v.M.H. (Mother), Appellant.

No. SC93677.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

March 25, 2014.

Rehearing Denied April 29, 2014.

Casey P. Murray and Sandra J. Wirtel, Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP, Kansas City, for Mother.

James M. Smart Jr., an attorney in Kansas City, James A. Waits, Sarah S. Johnston, Waits, Brownlee, Berger & Dewoskin, Kansas City, for the foster parents.

Marina E. Bell, Kansas City, for the juvenile office.

Mary Shemane Mann, Kansas City, guardian ad litem.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Chief Justice.

The issue in this case is whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to terminate M.H.'s (“Mother”) parental rights over Q.A.H. (“Child”). The trial court determined that Mother had abused or neglected Child in that she had a mental condition that rendered her unable to provide Child the necessary care, custody and control and that she failed to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or education to Child although she had the financial resources to do so. See section 211.447.5(2). ¹ It further found that she failed to rectify the conditions that led the court to assume jurisdiction. See section 211.447.5(3).

Mother argues that the trial court's determination was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to consider evidence from her psychiatrist and therapist regarding her mental condition at the time of the termination hearing, did not connect her mental condition to the potential for future harm, and disregarded evidence that she was parenting another child and had attempted to make support payments. This Court granted transfer pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. Because a trial court is free to disregard testimony in making credibility determinations and weighing evidence, it was not error for the trial court to discredit the testimony from Mother's psychiatrist and therapist or find Mother's custody of another child did not show Mother could provide the necessary care, control or custody to Child. Additionally, the trial court did not err in finding that Mother's de minimis financial contributions did not show that she provided adequate support to Child before the termination hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

I. Factual Background

In August 2009, Mother suffered from a delusional episode and brought five-month-old Child to a hospital. Hospital records reflect that Mother stated that both she and Child had been sexually molested in their sleep by unknown perpetrators and that this was possible because sedatives were being pumped into their home through the heating vents. She further stated that someone placed a listening device inside Child's vagina and requested that Child be circumcised and that her vagina be sewn closed. At the termination hearing, Mother denied making many of these statements but stated that she still believed it was possible that she and Child were drugged through the heating vents in their home.

After the hospital visit, Child was placed in foster care and Mother began psychiatric support and weekly supervised visits with Child. These weekly visits continued until March 2010, when Mother regained custody of Child for four months. Mother again lost custody of Child in July 2010, when she refused to allow Child's father to have court-ordered supervised visits with Child due to her continued belief that he had raped Mother.² The trial court found that there was no evidence to support this allegation but that Mother's delusion was consistent with her mental health diagnosis. It further found that this continuing belief would likely be communicated to Child at some point and that this was “a serious risk of emotional harm to the child.” Child was approximately one year old when this happened. Child is now five years old and has resided with the same foster parents since Mother lost custody in 2010. ³

After Mother lost custody of Child the second time, she gave birth to a son in Kansas. Mother was in a relationship with the father of this child for five months, despite knowing he had a violent history. On one occasion, she called the police while visiting with her son and his father because she feared for her safety. Mother acknowledged to her therapist that she had feared for her safety on at least two prior occasions. Records from the mental health facility where Mother received psychiatric and therapy support indicated that, as of three months prior to the hearing, Mother was still interested in pursuing a relationship with her son's father. Mother also testified that she had previously been in a relationship with Child's father, despite her belief that he was sexually violent towards her because she needed a place to live and did not want to stay in a shelter.

Although a Kansas court assumed jurisdiction over her son when he was born, it subsequently granted Mother full custody. The Missouri trial court noted that Kansas service providers who testified at the termination hearing did not communicate with or receive information from service providers in Missouri. It concluded that the Kansas court may not have been aware of the circumstances in the instant case.

In early 2012, Mother moved from Kansas to Missouri. She testified that she reconnected through the Internet with a man whom she had known since her childhood. He began supporting her financially by giving her as much as $1,000 per month. After several months, Mother moved in with the man against her psychiatrist's advice. From this time through the termination hearing in September 2012, Mother was unemployed but did obtain her associate's degree online. She lived on welfare benefits and the support of the man with whom she lived.

The trial court found that Mother only provided de minimis financial support to Child for the time that Child was not in Mother's custody. Mother stated she could have provided up to $100 per month in child support, and she could have used some of the money she received from the man with whom she lived for child support as well. However, she did not provide any financial support while Child was not in her custody aside from a few small gifts of clothes and small toys. Although she testified that a children's division caseworker told her she did not need to provide support for the child, the caseworker disputed this testimony and the trial court found that Mother's testimony was not credible.

Mother had been under psychiatric care for approximately three years before the termination hearing. Shortly after the 2009 hospital incident, a licensed psychologist conducted a court-ordered evaluation and diagnosed Mother with psychotic disorder and possible post-partum psychosis. He noted that she presented a narrative that seemed delusional but that she was intelligent enough to adjust her statements. While various different diagnoses have been posited since then, the trial court determined that Mother has delusions that become her reality and that this presents a clear danger to Child.

Mother's psychiatrist stated that Mother's present diagnosis is posttraumatic stress disorder, but with a possible generalized anxiety disorder, mild depression and mild delusional disorder. He saw Mother 10–12 times in the three-year period between the episode at the hospital and the termination proceeding, for usually 15–20 minutes each time. He did not read assessments from other therapists working with Mother but rather relied on self-reports from Mother. While he testified that Mother was capable of caring for Child, the trial court did not find him “particularly credible.”

Similarly, Mother's therapist began meeting with Mother in June 2011 and continued to see her through the termination hearing. She testified that Mother had a positive long-term prognosis and was capable of caring for Child. The trial court did not find the therapist credible because she did not consider information from parent aides who had been meeting with and supervising Mother. Instead, she relied on self-reports from Mother, which “undercut” the therapist's testimony.

In contrast to Mother's professionals, a parent aide report from two months prior to the hearing indicated that it “is often not clear if what [Mother] is saying is always the truth.” Parent aide reports indicated that Mother continued to have “adult” conversations with Child and continued to have inappropriate developmental expectations for Child, such as giving too-detailed instructions to manage Child's behavior, causing Child to become confused and cry. Two months prior to the hearing, Mother was still working on her treatment goals of obtaining employment and a stable living environment and engaging with Child in a developmentally appropriate manner. Her treatment plans from four months prior to the hearing indicate that she continued to experience unstable moods and reactivity to life stressors. They also indicate that she was still working toward establishing and maintaining safe personal boundaries, given her history of engaging in unhealthy relationships. Further, Mother's caseworker from the children's division testified he did not believe that Mother and Child could be reunited in the foreseeable future. Child's guardian ad litem also supported terminating Mother's rights.

Based on the above evidence, the trial court determined there were three statutory grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights under section 211.447. It found that Mother abused or neglected Child in that her mental condition was such that it rendered her unable to knowingly provide Child with the necessary care, custody and control under section 211.447.5(2)(a). Additionally, it found that Mother abused or neglected Child by failing to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or education despite having the financial resources to do so, pursuant to section 211.447.5(2)(d). The trial court further found, under section 211.447.5(3),...