Office Depot Inc. v. the Dist. At Howell Mill

Decision Date06 May 2011
Docket NumberNo. A11A0383.,A11A0383.
Citation710 S.E.2d 685,309 Ga.App. 525
PartiesOFFICE DEPOT, INC.v.The DISTRICT AT HOWELL MILL, LLC et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Shapiro, Fussell, Wedge & Martin, Robert B. Wedge, Atlanta, for appellant.Eric Charles Lang, Atlanta, Patricia Fortune Ammari, William J. Dawkins, for appellees.McFADDEN, Judge.

Office Depot, Inc. sued its landlords, The District at Howell Mill, LLC (the “District”) and ELPF Howell Mill, LLC (“ELPF”) (collectively, “landlords”), for breach of the exclusive-use provision of a commercial lease agreement. It also asked for a declaratory judgment regarding its obligation to pay rent under the lease and/or its authority to terminate the agreement. The landlords counterclaimed for past-due rent, attorney fees, and a declaration that they did not breach the lease. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the landlords on all claims.

Office Depot appeals, asserting that questions of fact remain as to breach, that regardless of whether a breach occurred, it is entitled to terminate the lease, and that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees. Office Depot is precluded from claiming a breach by the terms of an estoppel certificate, which it executed at the time the District sold the shopping center to ELPF and upon which the landlords reasonably relied. Because the landlords did not breach the agreement, Office Depot is not entitled to exercise the lease's termination clause. Because the lease provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees to the party prevailing in litigation, the trial court did not err in awarding attorney fees to the landlords. Accordingly, we affirm.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed favorably to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See OCGA § 9–11–56(c). Many of the underlying facts in this case are undisputed. On December 27, 2005, Office Depot leased commercial space in a shopping center located on Howell Mill Road in Atlanta. Pursuant to the lease agreement, which at that point was between Office Depot as tenant and the District as landlord, the District agreed to an exclusive-use provision or “Landlord's Leasing Covenant” that prohibited it from entering into another “lease and/or operating agreement with any person or entity whose primary business, at the time of such lease or operating agreement is executed is the sale, leasing, distribution or display of ... school supplies.”

Approximately 18 months later, the District leased other property in the shopping center to The School Box. According to its lease, The School Box was to use the premises for

[t]he display and sale at retail of educational supplies for school and home, including, but not limited to student workbook, teacher resource books, home school curriculum, children's literature, teaching materials in all subjects, classroom decorations, educational toys and games, art and crafts supplies, school supplies, children's music and videos, software, classroom furniture, inspirational teaching materials and other products normally purchased by schools, teachers and parents of school age children, and for no other use.

The School Box store opened in November 2006 directly across the parking lot from Office Depot.

In May 2007, ELPF agreed to purchase a majority interest in the shopping center from the District. Before entering into that agreement, ELPF asked for an “estoppel certificate” from each shopping center tenant regarding the tenant's current lease. Office Depot executed its certificate on April 24, 2007, stating, among other things, that [t]o Tenant's knowledge, Landlord is not in default in the performance or observance of any of its obligations under any terms or provisions of the Lease.” The purchase transaction closed in June 2007, and the District assigned ELPF a portion of its interest in the tenant leases.

Office Depot subsequently informed the District that the lease to The School Box violated the exclusive-use provision of its lease agreement. By letter dated December 6, 2007, Office Depot gave notice that within 60 days it would commence paying reduced “Alternative Rent” as defined under the lease. Neither the District nor ELPF responded, and Office Depot began paying reduced rent in February 2008.

Over one year later, in May 2009, Office Depot filed its petition for declaratory relief and damages against the District and ELPF. Office Depot sought a declaration that the landlords had breached the exclusive-use provision in the lease agreement, authorizing it to pay reduced rent or terminate the lease. It also requested damages flowing from the breach. The landlords counterclaimed for nonpayment of rent and attorney fees, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment for the landlords. It found that, as a matter of law, Office Depot was estopped by its April 2007 estoppel certificate from claiming breach. Concluding that the landlords were not in default, it awarded them past-due rent, interest, attorney fees, and litigation expenses. This appeal followed.

1. The trial court first determined that the April 24, 2007 estoppel certificate precluded Office Depot's breach of contract claim. We agree. Georgia law recognizes “on grounds of public policy and good faith, the potential estoppel effect that can result from a tenant's execution of [an estoppel] certificate.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Virginia Highland Assoc. v. Allen, 174 Ga.App. 706, 709(2), 330 S.E.2d 892 (1985). As we have explained, [a]dmissions which have been acted on by others[ ] are conclusive against the party making them, in all cases, between him and the person whose conduct he has thus influenced.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 708, 330 S.E.2d 892.

At the time Office Depot executed its certificate, The School Box had been in operation for several months, and Office Depot officials had considered whether presence of the store violated its lease. Nevertheless, Office Depot represented to the landlords that no default had occurred. The record further shows that the landlords—and in particular, ELPF—relied on the estoppel certificate in closing the purchase transaction. On appeal, Office Depot notes that ELPF's investment committee approved the acquisition in late April 2007, before receiving the certificate. A representative from ELPF's investment advisor testified, however, that the advisor required an estoppel certificate from every major tenant in the shopping center. As part of the advisor's due diligence, the representative also spoke with the Office Depot store manager, who stated that the store had no problems with the lease or landlord. The investment committee approved the acquisition based on that representation, then sought the estoppel certificate to confirm that there were, in fact, no issues with the lease. Testimony also established that if the estoppel certificate had revealed a possible violation of the Office Depot lease, the sales transaction would not have proceeded as planned. Office Depot has not offered any evidence contradicting this testimony that the transaction closed in reliance on the estoppel certificate.

Alternatively, Office Depot argues that any reliance was unreasonable because the landlords knew that The School Box lease violated Office Depot's exclusive-use provision. The record, however, shows otherwise.

Prior to the sale, a representative from ELPF's investment advisor visited The School Box store, spoke with its manager, and reviewed The School Box lease, which listed the display and sale of school supplies as just one of many ways in which The School Box was to use the space. As noted above, an interview with Office Depot's store manager also revealed no complaints about The School Box. Based on this investigation, ELPF determined that The School Box was not in the “primary business” of displaying or selling school supplies and that its presence in the shopping center did not violate Office Depot's exclusive-use provision. The District reached a similar conclusion when it originally entered The School Box lease.

Office Depot has pointed to no evidence that the landlords' judgment in this regard was unreasonable or that the landlords knew Office Depot's lease had been breached. Accordingly, no issues of fact remain as to the reasonableness of the reliance here. Compare Mark–It Place Foods v. New Plan Excel Realty Trust, 156 Ohio App.3d 65, 804 N.E.2d...

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