Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley
Decision Date | 01 October 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 01-96-00575-CV,01-96-00575-CV |
Citation | 984 S.W.2d 654 |
Parties | OFFSHORE PIPELINES, INC. and OPI International, Inc., Appellants, v. Edward Lamar SCHOOLEY, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Chris A. Lorenzen, Jr., Houston, for Appellants.
Robert D. Rapp, Houston, for Appellee.
Before MIRABAL, TAFT, JJ. and FRANK G. EVANS, J. 1
Edward Lamar Schooley sued Offshore Pipelines, Inc. and OPI International, Inc. (collectively referred to as "OPI"), alleging negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 688 (1994)) and unseaworthiness under general maritime law, and seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained while employed by OPI as an electrician onboard the Derrick Barge II (the "DB II"). A jury, finding OPI negligent and that its barge was unseaworthy, assessed damages against OPI in the amount of $840,000. The trial court entered judgment for Schooley in that amount, plus prejudgment interest. OPI brings this appeal, asserting eight points of error. We modify the trial court's judgment, and as modified, affirm.
We first consider OPI's points of error one and two, which assert "no evidence" complaints to the jury's findings on the liability issues. In essence, OPI argues under these points that Schooley failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to show either "medical causation under the Jones Act or general maritime law," or that "any alleged acts of negligence or conditions of seaworthiness caused Schooley's injuries." In our review of these points, we will also consider OPI's sixth point of error in which it argues that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that "if a party fails to produce evidence which is under its control and reasonably available to it and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then [the jury] may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and did not."
A claim of negligence under the Jones Act and a claim of unseaworthiness under general maritime law are two separate and distinct claims. See Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1992). The Texas Supreme Court in Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.1998) speaking through Justice Baker, recently outlined the nature of the Jones Act:
The Jones Act provides a cause of action for maritime workers injured by an employer's negligence. Federal law provides that a party asserting an admiralty action may bring the action in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). When a state court hears an admiralty case, that court occupies essentially the same position occupied by a federal court sitting in diversity: the state court must apply substantive federal maritime law but follow state procedure. See Texaco Ref. & Mkt., Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex.1991); see also General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex.1993).
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), a related statute, the causation burden is not the common law proximate cause standard. Rather, the causation burden is "whether the proof justifies with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury for which the claimant seeks damages." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957); Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1984). This burden has been termed "featherweight." See Johnson v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir.1988); see also Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109-10, 80 S.Ct. 173, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959). The Jones Act expressly incorporates FELA and the case law developing that statute. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 457, 1 L.Ed.2d 511 (1957). Thus, the causation standard under the Jones Act is the same as that under FELA. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. Wade, 510 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, quoting the United States Supreme Court's language in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523, 77 S.Ct. 457, 1 L.Ed.2d 511 (1957), recently confirmed that the proper standard for reviewing a jury's finding of causation in a Jones Act case is "simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335, 339 (5th Cir.1997) ( ). Id. at 339.
To prove that a vessel is unseaworthy under general maritime law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant provided a vessel (including its appurtenances, gear, and equipment) not reasonably fit for its intended purpose. Phillips, 953 F.2d at 928. Because the defendant's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is completely independent of its duty to exercise reasonable care, the plaintiff does not have to prove the defendant was negligent. Id. However, the plaintiff is required to meet a more demanding standard of proximate causation than is applicable to Jones Act claims. Id. The plaintiff must show that the "unseaworthy condition played a 'substantial part' in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the vessel's unseaworthiness." Id.
In our review of the points challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of evidence, we have considered the jury's verdict on the evidence in light of the court's charge to the jury. The court instructed the jury as follows:
Jones Act--Negligence
Under the Jones Act, the plaintiff Edward Lamar Schooley must prove that his employer was negligent. Negligence is the doing of an act that a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something that a reasonably prudent person would do, under the same or similar circumstances. The occurrence of an accident, standing alone, does not mean that anyone's negligence caused the accident.
In a Jones Act claim, the word "negligence" is given a liberal interpretation. It includes any breach of duty that an employer owes to his employees who are seamen, including the duty of providing for the safety of the crew.
Under the Jones Act, if the employer's negligent act or omission played any part, no matter how small, in actually causing the plaintiff Edward Lamar Schooley's injury, then you must find that the employer is liable under the Jones Act.
Negligence under the Jones Act may consist of a failure to comply with a duty required by law. Employers of seamen have a duty to provide their employees with a reasonably safe place to work. If you find that the plaintiff Edward Lamar Schooley was injured because the defendants failed to furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work, and that the plaintiff's working conditions could have been made safe through the exercise of reasonable care, then you must find that the defendants were negligent.
The fact that the defendants conducted their operations in a manner similar to that of other companies is not conclusive as to whether the defendants were negligent or not.
You must determine if the operation in question was reasonably safe under the circumstances. The fact that a certain practice has been continued for a long period of time does not necessarily mean that it is reasonably safe under all circumstances. A long accepted practice may be an unsafe practice. However, a practice is not necessarily unsafe or unreasonable merely because it injures someone.
A seaman's employer is legally responsible for the negligence of its employees while that employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment.
The plaintiff Edward Lamar Schooley seeks damages for personal injury that he claims was caused by the unseaworthiness of the defendants' vessel, the DB II.
A shipowner owes to every member of the crew employed on its vessel the absolute duty to keep and maintain the ship, and all decks and passageways, appliances gear, tools, parts, and equipment of the vessel in a seaworthy condition at all times.
A seaworthy vessel is one that is reasonably fit for its intended use. The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute because the owner may not delegate that duty to anyone. Liability for an unseaworthy condition does not in any way depend upon negligence or fault or blame. If an owner does not provide a seaworthy vessel, a vessel that is reasonably fit for its intended use, no amount of care or prudence excuses the owner.
The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel includes a duty to supply an adequate and competent crew. A vessel may be unseaworthy even though it has a numerically adequate crew, if too few persons are assigned to a given task.
However, the owner of a vessel is not required to furnish an accident free ship. He need only furnish a vessel and its appurtenances that are reasonably adequate for their assigned tasks.
The shipowner is not required to provide the best appliances and equipment, or the finest of crews, on his vessel. He is only required to provide gear that is reasonably proper and suitable for its intended use, and a crew that is reasonably adequate.
In summary, if you find that the owner of the vessel did not provide an adequate crew of sufficient manpower to perform the tasks required, or if you find that the vessel was in any manner unfit in...
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