Ogle v. Long
Decision Date | 28 April 1989 |
Citation | 551 So.2d 914 |
Parties | Ernest B. OGLE and Patricia Evans v. Jeffrey K. LONG and Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company. 87-1376. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
David A. Kimberley of Floyd, Keener, Cusimano & Roberts, Gadsden, for appellants.
J. Bentley Owens III of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellees.
Ernest B. Ogle and Patricia Evans appeal from the denial of their motion for new trial after the trial court entered judgment on a directed verdict in favor of Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company on Ogle and Evans's claim, following an automobile accident in Etowah County, against Preferred Risk for payment of uninsured motorist benefits.
Ogle, while driving an automobile owned by his common-law wife Evans (who was a passenger), collided with a tractor-trailer truck driven by Jeffrey K. Long on U.S. Highway 431 near Attalla. After filing a complaint in circuit court against Long and fictitious defendants, alleging negligence in causing the accident, Ogle and Evans attempted service on Long at a post office box in Stantonville, Tennessee. The complaint was returned, however, marked "unclaimed," and Ogle and Evans made service by publication pursuant to Rule 4.2(b)(1)(C) and Rule 4.3, A.R.Civ.P. Long subsequently failed to answer the complaint, and a default judgment was entered against him on July 15, 1987.
Preferred Risk moved to intervene in the lawsuit and to set aside the default judgment after Evans notified it of her intention to file a claim for uninsured motorist coverage under the terms of her insurance policy. The trial court granted Preferred Risk's motion, set aside the default judgment, and joined Preferred Risk as a party defendant. On October 21, 1987, Preferred Risk filed its cross-claim against Long, demanding judgment for any amount recovered against it by Ogle and Evans; service was attempted at Long's Stantonville, Tennessee, post office box (the record does not indicate whether this service was successful.) After discovery, the lawsuit moved to trial on April 4, 1988, without Long appearing.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, Preferred Risk moved for a directed verdict on grounds that Ogle and Evans had failed to prove that Long was uninsured at the time of the accident. The trial court denied the motion before hearing Preferred Risk's evidence, but granted the motion when it was renewed by Preferred Risk at the close of the evidence, and after hearing argument from both parties. Ogle and Evans's motion for new trial, based on grounds that evidence existed to infer that Long was uninsured at the time of the accident, was denied. The issue for our review is whether the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial after entering judgment on a directed verdict for Preferred Risk.
Although Ogle and Evans challenge by motion for new trial the weight of the evidence as considered by the trial court in making its determination that they failed to prove Long's status as uninsured, we must return to the directed verdict to test the sufficiency of the evidence surrounding Long's status. The standard of appellate review applicable to a motion for directed verdict is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying the motion initially. Thus, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion, we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to produce a conflict warranting jury consideration. And, like the trial court, we must view any evidence most favorably to the nonmovant. Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860 (Ala.1988).
The threshold question is who--Ogle and Evans or Preferred Risk--bore the burden of proving the uninsured status of Long. Preferred Risk argues that the burden of proof lies with Ogle and Evans, and that they failed to present any evidence of Long's status; Ogle and Evans argue that the cumulative effect of Long's failure to answer the complaint, to respond to discovery, and to appear for trial; their attempts to investigate Long's status as uninsured; and Preferred Risk's failure to present any evidence contradicting their allegation that Long was uninsured, raise a presumption of uninsured status that Preferred Risk must rebut.
Although Ala.Code 1975, § 32-7-23 () is silent on this point, the plaintiff generally has the burden of proving that the tort-feasor was uninsured. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5087 (1981). This burden of proof is recognized in Alabama. Barnes v. Tarver, 360 So.2d 953 (Ala.1978) (). (Citations omitted.) See, also, Lefeve v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 527 F.Supp. 492 (N.D.Ala.1981) () .
An exception is recognized, however, if the plaintiff used reasonable diligence to ascertain the uninsured status of the tort-feasor and such information was unobtainable. The burden of going forward with the evidence is then cast upon the defendant. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, supra. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Matlock, 462 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.1970), the Texas Supreme Court held that where an insured claiming benefits under uninsured motorist coverage presents proof that all reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the insured status of the tort-feasor and that such efforts have proven fruitless, in the absence of affirmative proof by the insurer an inference may be drawn that there is in fact no insurance policy covering the tort-feasor. This exception was applied by the Court of Civil Appeals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala.App. 426, 286 So.2d 302 (1973).
Consequently, our review shifts to the question of what actions constitute "reasonable diligence" by the insured to ascertain the insured status of the tort-feasor:
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 5087.15, 5087.25, and 5087.35 (1981).
The record reflects that Ogle and Evans unsuccessfully attempted to serve Long at a Stantonville, Tennessee, post office box and took a default judgment against him after he failed to answer the complaint following service by publication. It appears from the record that after intervention by Preferred Risk and the focusing of the lawsuit on the insured status of Long, Ogle and Evans undertook no further investigation of Long to determine his status. In fact, at trial, counsel for Ogle and Evans argued,
We do not believe that merely filing the lawsuit and taking a default judgment against the tort-feasor after he fails to answer the complaint and respond to discovery is sufficient to demonstrate "reasonable diligence" in ascertaining and proving the tort-feasor's status as uninsured. The claimant must go further to meet his burden. For...
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