Wright v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 25 November 1992
• Citation: 611 So.2d 300
• Parties: Ottis J. WRIGHT, as administrator of the Estate of Nina S. Wright, deceased v. Melvin BAILEY, et al. 1911162.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 300

611 So.2d 300

Ottis J. WRIGHT, as administrator of the Estate of Nina S. Wright, deceased v. Melvin BAILEY, et al.

1911162.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 25, 1992.

Ralph E. Coleman, Birmingham, for appellant.

Terry McElheny of Dominick, Fletcher, Yeilding, Wood & Lloyd, P.A., Birmingham, for appellees.

HORNSBY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Ottis J. Wright, appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants, Sheriff Melvin Bailey and Deputy Sheriffs Reginald Turner and Quincy Davis, in a wrongful death action. We affirm.

On the morning of May 24, 1987, Deputies Turner and Davis were patrolling U.S. Highway 78 near the Jefferson-Walker County line. The Booby Trap Lounge, a nightclub, is located in this area. At approximately 4:00 a.m. that morning, Jeffery Lynn Townley, while intoxicated, drove his automobile out of the parking lot of the Booby Trap Lounge. He turned right and proceeded to drive his car west in the eastbound lane of U.S. Highway 78. Turner and Davis saw Townley leaving the parking lot and pursued him, but they were unable to stop him before his car struck a car driven by Nina Sue Wright. Mrs. Wright was killed in the collision.

On February 21, 1989, Ottis J. Wright, as administrator of his wife Nina's estate, brought a wrongful death action against Townley, Deputies Turner and Davis, Sheriff Bailey, Jefferson County, and Wesley Chappell d/b/a Wesley's Booby Trap Lounge. This appeal concerns only Wright's claims against Bailey, Turner, and Davis. Wright alleged that Turner and Davis negligently permitted Townley to enter his car and drive when they knew he was intoxicated. Wright further alleged that Turner and Davis were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because, he said, they violated Mrs. Wright's Fourteenth Amendment right to life; specifically, he said, they had intentionally and recklessly allowed an intoxicated individual to enter his car and drive. Finally, Wright alleged that Bailey was liable under § 1983 because, he said, as sheriff, Bailey had a practice of encouraging his deputies to permit intoxicated individuals to enter their cars and drive in order to enhance charges against them from public intoxication to driving while intoxicated.

On April 6, 1989, Bailey, Turner, and Davis moved to dismiss Wright's complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to the wrongful death action against Bailey, but not as to the § 1983 claim against him, but denied the motion as to the negligence claims and the § 1983 claims against Turner and Davis. On December 17, 1990, Bailey, Turner, and Davis moved for a summary judgment. On March 16, 1992, the trial court entered a summary judgment for Bailey, Turner, and Davis on all claims that had not been previously dismissed. The court made the summary judgment final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. Wright appeals the summary judgment as to his negligence claims against Turner and Davis and as to his § 1983 claims against Bailey, Turner, and Davis.

"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact" and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860 862 (Ala.1988) (citing Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So.2d 872 (Ala.1979)); Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. When the movant has carried the burden of making a prima facie showing, by admissible evidence, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the party opposing the summary judgment has the burden of presenting substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); Ogle v. Long, 551 So.2d 914, 915 (Ala.1989). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, resolving all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990); Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Ala.1986).

I. Negligence of Deputies Turner and Davis

Wright argues that the summary judgment for Turner and Davis was improper as to his negligence claims, because, he says, Turner and Davis do not have sovereign immunity and the evidence against them would support a jury's finding that Turner and Davis breached a duty of care to Mrs. Wright by failing to arrest Townley before he left the parking lot of the Booby Trap Lounge.

We must first determine whether Turner and Davis are entitled to sovereign immunity. In Oliver v. Townsend, 534 So.2d 1038 (Ala.1988), we held that a sheriff is an employee of the state and, as such, is immune from suit, in his official capacity, for negligent performance of his statutory duties. See Ala. Const., art. 1, § 14. In Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209 (Ala.1991), we held that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs. In Hereford, we relied upon Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 450, 17 So.2d 536, 537 (1944), stating: "In general, the acts of the deputy sheriff are the acts of the sheriff. The deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff." We also relied upon Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir.1990), stating: "[Under Alabama law, a] deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff. If the deputy's acts are generally considered the acts of the sheriff, it is logical that those acts should enjoy the same immunity covering the sheriff's own acts." See also White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085 (Ala.1991).

In this case, Wright alleged that Turner and Davis were negligent in failing to arrest Townley, because, he says, they knew or should have known that Townley was intoxicated and, he says, they had an opportunity to restrain him before he drove out of the club's parking lot. Because a sheriff would have immunity in a suit alleging negligent failure to perform an arrest, we conclude that Turner and Davis are entitled to immunity.

The summary judgment for Turner and Davis was proper on the ground that they have immunity; thus, we find no need to address the sufficiency of Wright's evidence of negligence against Turner and Davis.

II. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Wright argues that the summary judgment for Bailey, Turner, and Davis was improper as to his § 1983 action. Wright says Turner and Davis acted with deliberate indifference toward his wife's safety as a driver on Highway 78, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, by intentionally or recklessly permitting Townley to drive while intoxicated. Wright also says that Bailey instituted a practice or policy among his deputies of permitting intoxicated individuals to enter their cars and drive in order to charge them with driving while intoxicated instead of the lesser offense of public intoxication, and he says this practice constituted deliberate indifference to his wife's safety, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

"Section 1983 alone creates no substantive rights; rather it provides a remedy for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws." Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, Alabama, 880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066, 110 S.Ct. 1784, 108 L.Ed.2d 785 (1990).

A. Turner and Davis

Wright asserts that Turner and Davis deprived his wife of her life, without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they failed to protect her from an intoxicated driver. The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), the Supreme Court held:

"[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, or property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.... [I]ts language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that [substantive due process] interests do not come to harm through other means.

"....

"[Therefore], as a general matter, ... a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause."

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that state officials may have a duty to protect an individual's substantive due process interests from private acts of violence where a special relationship exists between the state and the victim or between the state and the aggressor. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Generally, the...