Oglesby v. Smith
| Decision Date | 17 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:19-cv-29 |
| Parties | DARRIYON L. OGLESBY, Plaintiff, v. SGT. ALLEN SMITH, OFFICER KYLE BRILEY, and CITY OF STATESBORO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 7). Plaintiff Darriyon Oglesby, who is proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Allen Smith, Kyle Briley, and the City of Statesboro, seeking damages for a 2011 warrantless arrest that led to his incarceration. (Doc. 1.) In response, Defendants filed the at-issue Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 7), to which Plaintiff filed a Response, (doc. 8), and Defendants thereafter filed a Reply, (doc. 10). For the reasons explained more fully below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 7), and DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter an appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case.
This action arises out of an incident that took place in a Walmart parking lot in Bulloch County, Georgia. (Doc. 1-2, pp. 6-7.) On August 7, 2011, Defendants Smith and Briley—officers with the Statesboro Police Department—responded to reports of a potential theft at the local Walmart. (Id. at pp. 5-6; doc. 1-1, pp. 5-6.) When he arrived at the Walmart, Smith spoke with the victim, Ms. Ward, reviewed store security footage, and called in a description of the suspect and the vehicle that he had driven away from the scene. (Doc. 1-2, pp. 6-7.)
Officer Briley, who was in the vicinity of the incident, was dispatched the description of the male suspect and the vehicle. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6.) Briley remembers that he was told to look out for an African-American male wearing a black shirt and red shorts and driving a blue Ford Explorer. (Id. at p. 6.) He was also advised that a vehicle matching the description had reportedly turned onto Harville Road. (Id.) As Briley's supervisor, Smith remained in radio contact with Briley while he looked for the suspect. (Doc. 1, p. 3). After investigating further, Briley observed a blue Ford Explorer parked outside a house at 6046 Harville Road and he reported this to the police department. (Doc. 1-1, p. 7.) At this point, Briley saw a man—later identified as Plaintiff—who, according to Briley, was wearing a black shirt and red shorts, matching the description of the suspect who fled the Walmart parking lot. (Id.) When he learned that Briley had located an individual and vehicle matching the descriptions from his investigation, Smith told Briley to placethe individual under arrest. (Id. at p. 9; doc. 1-2, pp. 7-8.) Briley complied with Smith's instruction and arrested Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-2, pp. 7-8.)
While Plaintiff provides no specific details about the charges against him or his alleged "illegal conviction," (doc. 1, p. 2), he does include portions of a transcript entitled "Trial Before a Jury," which states that it is a "[t]ranscript of proceedings heard before the Honorable F. Gates Peed, . . . on the 19th day of April, 2012, in Statesboro, Georgia, in the case State of Georgia v. Darriyon Lamar Oglesby, Case No. 1B11CR597 (Bulloch County Superior Court)." (Doc. 1-1, pp. 2-4; doc. 1-2, pp. 2-4.) While the excerpts filed by Plaintiff are focused on the testimonies of Smith and Briley, Plaintiff did include the transcript's index, which indicates that there was a "Verdict of the Jury." (Doc. 1-1, p. 4; doc. 1-2, p. 4.) According to the transcript, the proceedings, which would include the jury's reaching a verdict, occurred on April 19, 2012. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1; doc. 1-2, p. 1.) According to Plaintiff's own Complaint, he served a five-year sentence after being convicted.2 (Doc. 1, pp.6-7.)
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on April 18, 2019. (Doc. 1.) According to his Complaint, he is proceeding "pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 . . . for [] deprivation of [his] Fourth Amendment Rights and for the deprivation of 'due process' and 'equal protection,' thereof, under, the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." (Doc. 1, p. 1.) In his Complaint, he repeatedly alleges that Defendant Briley and his supervisor, Defendant Smith, deprived him of his Fourth Amendment Rights by arresting him "illegally" and "without any warrants," entitling him to damages. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) Relatedly, he alleges that the City of Statesboro failed to properly train Smith and Briley, and thereby "participated in the illegal seizure and arrest without an arrest warrant." (Id. at p. 5.) In the "Relief Sought" section of his Complaint, in addition to damages,Plaintiff seeks "expunge[ment of] his conviction from the records." (Id. at pp. 6-8.) Defendants collectively move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), alleging that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 7, p. 1.)
A motion to dismiss on the ground that a suit or claim was untimely filed falls within the purview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering such a motion, the Court must "accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)). Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (). And where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the "complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, courts are not "bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), and the Court "may not serve as de facto counsel for a [pro se] party, or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Ausar-El v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 448 F. App'x 1, 2 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As for Defendants' specific contention that Plaintiffs' suit was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, such a claim is "'an affirmative defense, and plaintiffs are not required to [anticipate or] negate an affirmative defense in their complaint[s].'" La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993)). Dismissal on limitations grounds is only appropriate "if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred." Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845). "A statute of limitations defense can support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is clear . . . the statute of limitations has run, and it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that toll the statute." Valencia v. Universal City Studios LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00528-RWS, 2014 WL 7240526, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2014) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff filed the present action on April 18, 2019. (Doc. 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their respective roles in his alleged unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeks damages for his subsequent conviction and incarceration.3 (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Briley is liablefor "arresting him without an arrest warrant" and that Briley "act[ed] in concert" with and at the direction of Smith (his supervisor) to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff contends this deprivation was also caused by the City of Statesboro's failure to train its officers on Fourth Amendment compliance. (Id. at p. 7.)
In their Motion, Defendants argue that any Fourth Amendment claims arising from Plaintiff's arrest are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 7, pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends his claims are timely because he filed his Complaint within two years of the expiration of his sentence. (Doc. 1, p. 2; doc. 8, p. 5.) As his conviction was based on the same evidence that precipitated his arrest, Plaintiff argues the "continuing wrong doctrine" and the "doctrine of adverse consequences" provide bases for his claims to remain before the Court. (Id.) However, for the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants and finds that Plaintiff's Complaint is untimely and subject to dismissal.
As noted above, Defendants argue that any claim arising from the arrest is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and they move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint as untimely. (Doc. 7.) Constitutional claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 "are tort actions, subject to the statuteof limitations [for] personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action [was filed]." Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Georgia's statute of limitations period "for injuries to the person," O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, which provides that such actions "shall be brought within two years" of a claim's accrual, governs this case. See Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d...
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