Oglesby v. State
| Decision Date | 26 January 1905 |
| Citation | 49 S.E. 706,121 Ga. 602 |
| Parties | OGLESBY v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The title of an act being "An act to prohibit the sale of" liquors of a given character, in a named county "and for other purposes therein mentioned," legislation in the body of the act was authorized, providing that the prohibition against the sale of the liquors should not become effective in such county until an election was had, and the result was in favor of such prohibition. See Mayor of Macon v. Hughes, 36 S.E. 247, 110 Ga. 795; Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 40 S.E. 1004, 114 Ga 871, 57 L.R.A. 230.
2. When an act makes penal the sale of intoxicating liquors, and in a subsequent section provides that the prohibition shall not prevent practicing physicians from furnishing such liquors to their patients, it is not necessary, in an indictment for a violation of the act, to allege that the sale was not by a practicing physician. Kitchens v. State, 43 S.E 256, 116 Ga. 847; Rumph v. State, 45 S.E. 1002, 119 Ga. 121.
3. The courts will take judicial notice of the result of a prohibition election, whether the same was held under the general local option liquor law, or a local act providing for such election. Woodard v. State, 30 S.E. 522, 103 Ga. 498, and citations.
4. When in the progress of an investigation of a case by the grand jury it develops from the testimony of a witness that an offense has been committed altogether disconnected from the case under consideration, it is entirely proper for the grand jury to cause a special presentment to be preferred for such offense, and require the witness to appear and be sworn on the consideration of the presentment thus preferred. It is not only the privilege, but the duty, of the grand jury to present all offenders where the offense comes to their knowledge during the time of their service, and it is immaterial in what way the information is received.
5. Where a motion is made to continue a criminal case upon the ground that the accused is physically unable to go to trial and upon such question the testimony of medical experts introduced as witnesses is conflicting, the discretion of the trial judge in overruling the motion will not be controlled. McDaniel v. State, 30 S.E. 29, 103 Ga. 269.
6. That a person accused of crime was improperly brought into court under an order of the judge cannot properly be made a ground of a motion for new trial. McDaniel v. State, supra.
7. When a criminal case is called for trial, and a motion for a continuance is made, the judge has a discretion to either continue the case, or postpone the same until a later day in the term; and this is true whether the term lasts longer than 30 days or not. The act of 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 56) now embraced in Pen. Code 1895, § 961, does not interfere with the exercise of this discretion by the judge; that act merely providing that, where the court lasts more than 30 days, a continuance shall not be had if the ground upon which it is sought can be removed before the end of the term.
8. It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to postpone a case to a later hour in the day, in order to allow counsel time to prepare a demurrer and plea, when no reason appears why such demurrer and plea were...
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