Ohio Ass'n of Public School Employees, Chapter No. 471 v. City of Twinsburg

• Decision Date: 27 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-165,87-165
• Citation: 522 N.E.2d 532,36 Ohio St.3d 180
• Parties: , 46 Ed. Law Rep. 714 OHIO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, CHAPTER NO. 471, et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF TWINSBURG et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 180

36 Ohio St.3d 180

522 N.E.2d 532, 46 Ed. Law Rep. 714

OHIO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, CHAPTER NO. 471, et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF TWINSBURG et al., Appellants.

No. 87-165.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 27, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

A chartered municipality, under its home-rule authority, may enact an ordinance limiting the jurisdiction of its civil service commission to only city employees notwithstanding R.C. 124.011(A). (State, ex rel. Stough, v. Bd. of Edn. [1977], 50 Ohio St.2d 47, 4 O.O.3d 116, 362 N.E.2d 266, overruled to the extent inconsistent herewith.)

On March 1, 1983, the Twinsburg City Council (hereinafter "council") enacted Ordinance No. 13-1983, which limits the constituency to be served by the city's civil service commission by excluding the Twinsburg City School District, a multi-city district, and its employees from the services provided by the commission. The council passed the ordinance because "the Twinsburg City School District * * * has refused to appropriate and pay its share of the cost of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Twinsburg * * * as permitted in SECTION 124.54 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE¹." Plaintiffs-appellees, Ohio Association of Public School Employees, Chapter No. 471 ("OAPSE") and two of its members, then filed a complaint, later amended, in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the city from enforcing, and proceeding in accord with the provisions of, the ordinance.

The trial court found for the appellees, ruling that the ordinance was in direct conflict with the general laws of the state. Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinance "must yield to the overriding law of statewide concern." Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Robert G. Byrom, Niles, for appellees.

William A. LeFaiver, City Law Director, Twinsburg, for appellants City of Twinsburg et al.

Hahn, Loeser & Parks and John A. Hallbauer, Cleveland, for appellant Twinsburg City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the city of Twinsburg, a chartered municipality, may enact an ordinance limiting the constituency to be served by its local civil service commission in view of R.C. 124.011(A), which directs the city's civil service commission to serve as the commission for the local multi-city school district. As noted above, the trial court and appellate court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional enactment in direct conflict with the prevailing law of the state and, as such, must yield to the overriding law of statewide concern. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the city may enact such an ordinance.

R.C. 124.011(A) provides:

"When the territory of a city school district is not located in more than one city, the civil service commission of the city in which the district has territory shall serve as the commission for the school district. When the territory of a city school district is located in more than one city, the commission of the city that shall serve as the commission for the school district shall be the commission of the city that is the residence of the greatest number of pupils of the district."

Resolution of the issue in this case turns on whether the city's ordinance is an exercise of a power of local self-government with which the state cannot interfere. Section 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides:

"Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."

Section 3, Article XVIII provides:

"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."

In State, ex rel. Canada, v. Phillips (1958), 168 Ohio St. 191, 5 O.O.2d 481, 151 N.E.2d 722, this court held that under Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII, municipal charter and ordinance provisions enacted under the power of local self-government prevail over state statutes, and only municipal regulations enacted pursuant to a city's police powers are subject to the general laws of the state.

"As we view it, this constitutional provision [Section 3, Article XVIII] first gives municipalities 'authority to exercise all powers of local self-government,' and then, with respect to some of those powers, i.e., the power 'to adopt and enforce * * * local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,' it limits the powers to adopt such regulations to such 'as are not in conflict with general laws.' However, the limitation is only such a limited limitation." Id. at 197, 5 O.O.2d at 485, 151 N.E.2d at 727.

See, also, State Personnel Bd. of Review v. Bay Village Civil Service Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 214, 217, 28 OBR 298, 302, 503 N.E.2d 518, 521; Kettering v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 50, 60, 26 OBR 42, 51, 496 N.E.2d 983, 991 (Locher, J., dissenting); State, ex rel. Allison v. Jones (1960), 170 Ohio St. 323, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417; State, ex rel. Petit, v. Wagner (1960), 170 Ohio St. 297, 300-301, 10 O.O.2d 344, 346, 164 N.E.2d 574, 576-577. As Justice Wilkin stated in his concurring opinion in Fitzgerald v. Cleveland (1913), 88 Ohio St. 338, 380, 103 N.E. 512, 523: "If all powers of municipal self-government must be subject to general laws, then clearly cities do not have home rule; they have only such powers of local self-government as the legislature of the state allows to them, and cities of Ohio will still remain under the domination of the state legislature."

It is well-settled in Ohio that regulation of city civil service is within the powers of local self-government. State, ex rel. Lentz, v. Edwards (1914), 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768; State, ex rel. Vogt, v. Donahey (1923), 108 Ohio St. 440, 140 N.E. 609; Hile v. Cleveland (1928), 118 Ohio St. 99, 160 N.E. 621; State, ex rel. Canada, v. Phillips, supra; State Personnel Bd. of Review v. Bay Village Civil Service Comm., supra. As this court, in State, ex rel. Lentz, v. Edwards, supra, 90 Ohio St. at 309-310, 107 N.E. at 769, said:

"The manner of regulating the civil service of a city is peculiarly a matter of municipal concern. One of the powers of local self-government is the power of legislating with reference to the local government within the limitations of the * * * [constitution]. As long as the provisions made in the charter of any municipality with reference to its civil service * * * do not conflict with any * * * [provision] of the constitution, they are valid and * * * discontinue the general law on the subject as to that municipality. That provisions adopted by a city might differ from the general laws within the limits defined was not only expected by the very purpose of the amendment was to permit such differences and make them effective."

It follows from the authorities cited that the ordinance enacted in the case sub judice is a proper exercise of the city's powers of local self-government. The regulation solely concerns the jurisdiction of the city's civil service commission; it was not adopted pursuant to the city's police powers. Therefore, the ordinance supersedes the state statute.

The appellees argue, and the lower courts agreed, that the ordinance is a matter of statewide concern. Appellant city of Twinsburg contends that the formation and regulation of its local civil service commission is a matter of purely internal municipal affairs. As such, the city argues, it may exercise its powers of local self-government by limiting the jurisdiction of its civil service commission.

The test to determine whether an act of a municipality is a proper exercise of the power of local self-government is found in Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Painesville (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 125, 129, 44 O.O.2d 121, 123, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78, quoting Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cty. (1958), 167 Ohio St. 369, 371, 5 O.O.2d 6, 7-8, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923:

" 'To determine whether legislation is such as falls within the area of local self-government, the result of such legislation or the result of the proceedings thereunder must be considered. If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no extraterritorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local self-government and is a matter for the determination of the municipality. However, if the result is not so confined it becomes a matter for the General Assembly.'

"Thus, even if there is a matter of local concern involved, if the regulation of the subject matter affects the general public of the state as a whole more than it does the local inhabitants the matter passes from what was a matter for local government to a matter of general state interest." (Emphasis added.)

The appellate court below cited this court's decision in State, ex rel. Stough, v. Bd. of Edn. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 47, 49, 4 O.O.3d 116, 117, 362 N.E.2d 266, 268, a per curiam opinion, wherein the court, in two sentences, disposed of the issue, stating that: "Jurisdiction [of municipal civil service commissions] over city school district employees is granted and directed to be exercised by statute in accordance with the state's authority over public education under Section 3, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. A city charter has no effect upon this statutory grant of jurisdiction." Section 3, Article VI, ² however, is a broad provision concerning the organization, administration, and control of public schools. It does not require, either explicitly or implicitly, that public school employees be covered by the civil service laws. Nor is there such a requirement in SECTION 10, ARTICLE XV OF THE CONSTITUTION³, which...