Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Employees v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Edn.
| Decision Date | 25 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-1791,AFL-CIO,90-1792,s. 90-1791 |
| Citation | 587 N.E.2d 293,63 Ohio St.3d 300 |
| Parties | , 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1009 OHIO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, AFSCME/, et al., Appellants, v. STARK COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. OHIO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, AFSCME/, et al., Appellants, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
A county board of education may adopt criteria for the issuance or revocation o f certificates for bus drivers employed by school districts in its county pursu ant to R.C. 3327.10 and 3313.20.
In September 1987, the Stark County Board of Education revised its policy concerning the qualification of school bus drivers employed by local school districts in Stark County. The revised policy states:
On March 1, 1989, appellants, Ohio Association of Public School Employees, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, and its local Chapter 187, filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Stark County Board of Education's policy for certification of school bus drivers is invalid and beyond the authority of the Stark County Board of Education. Motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. The court of common pleas held that the board had the authority to adopt and enforce its policy regarding school bus drivers' qualifications and sustained the board's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.
In May 1989, the Montgomery County Board of Education adopted a bus-driver-certification policy for bus drivers employed by local school districts in Montgomery County. The policy provides that:
On June 16, 1989, appellants, Ohio Association of Public School Employees, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, its local Chapter 342 and Beatrice Thies, a bus driver employed by the Mad River Local School District, filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Montgomery County Board of Education's bus-driver-certification policy is invalid and requesting preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The court of common pleas declared that the Montgomery County Board of Education lacked authority to adopt the bus-driver-certificate policy and declared the policy invalid. However, appellants' request for a permanent injunction was denied. The Montgomery County Court of Appeals reversed the court of common pleas' judgment, holding that the board had the lawful authority to adopt policies relating to school bus drivers.
The causes are now before this court pursuant to the allowance of motions to certify the records. Case Nos. 90-1791 and 90-1792 have been consolidated for purposes of appeal.
Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman, Robert J. Walter and Robert M. Greggo, Cleveland, for appellants.
Robert D. Horowitz, Pros. Atty., and Deborah A. Dawson, for appellee Stark County Bd. of Educ.
Young, Pryor, Lynn & Jerardi, and Michael J. Burdge, Dayton, for appellee Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.
Appellants contend that appellee boards of education lack the authority to adopt a school-bus-driver-certificate policy. Appellants argue that the criteria for issuing a bus-driver certificate are set out by the General Assembly in R.C. 3327.10 and by the Ohio Department of Education in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-06, and that a county board of education may not alter these criteria for issuance or revocation of a bus-driver certificate. We are unpersuaded by appellants' argument.
A county board of education may adopt criteria for the issuance or revocation of certificates for bus drivers employed by school districts in its county pursuant to R.C. 3327.10 and 3313.20.
R.C. 3327.10 requires the certification of bus drivers. The statute states:
"(A) No person shall be employed as a driver of a school bus or motor van, owned and operated by any school district or privately owned and operated under contract with any school district in this state, who has not received a certificate from the county board of education of the county in which he is to be employed, in case such person is employed by a school district under the supervision of the county board, or by the superintendent of schools, in case such person is employed by the board of a city or exempted village school district, certifying that such person is at least eighteen years of age and is of good moral character and is qualified physically and otherwise for such position. * * *"
County boards of education have supervisory authority over school districts employing bus drivers. Certificates for bus drivers in those districts must be sought and obtained from the county boards of education. The General Assembly has directed county boards of education to determine whether a person desiring to operate a school bus "is at least eighteen years of age and is of good moral character and is qualified physically and otherwise for such position." Because a county board of education is required to certify such facts when it issues a certificate to a bus driver, it necessarily and implicitly has the power to determine whether such facts are indeed true. As this court stated in Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, at paragraph three of the syllabus: "It is no violation of the constitutional inhibition against the delegation of legislative power for the General Assembly to establish a policy and fix standards for the guidance of administrative agencies of government while leaving to such agencies the making of subordinate rules within those fixed standards and the determination of facts to which the legislative policy applies."
The rationale for delegating power to bodies such as county boards of education was explained in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 248-249, 79 L.Ed. 446, 459: ...
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