Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 12 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. A14-83-052CV,A14-83-052CV
• Citation: 668 S.W.2d 903
• Parties: OIL COUNTRY HAULERS, INC., Appellant, v. John E. GRIFFIN and Doris Griffin, Appellees. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 903

668 S.W.2d 903

OIL COUNTRY HAULERS, INC., Appellant, v. John E. GRIFFIN and Doris Griffin, Appellees.

No. A14-83-052CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

April 12, 1984.

Richard Parker, Richard Parkers & Associates, Houston, for appellant.

Larry Dowell, Houston, for appellee.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C.J., and DRAUGHN and ELLIS, JJ.

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.

This is a suit to recover medical insurance benefits. The trial court found that appellant, Oil Country Haulers, Inc., withheld monies from the paycheck of appellee, John Griffin, for medical insurance for appellee and his family, despite the fact the insurance company had cancelled the policy. The court found these acts constituted deceptive trade practices pursuant to TEX.BUS. & COMM.CODE ANN. § 17.50. Appellee, Doris Griffin, wife of John Griffin, was hospitalized twice. The trial court did not accept proof of the expenses relating to the first hospitalization, but the court did accept proof of expenses incurred during the second hospitalization which amounted to $4,715.56. Since the action was brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter referred to as the Act), the judge trebled the amount of actual damages for a total of $14,146.68. Attorney's fees amounting to $2,500.00 were also awarded. Appellant argues three points of error. We affirm.

In its first point of error, appellant argues that Doris Griffin's medical bills were not properly authenticated pursuant to the business records exception, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp.1982). However, appellant ignores the fact that Article 3737e is not the only manner in which medical bills may be properly admitted. Medical bills may be admitted upon (1) a party's testimony that he did, in fact, receive such bills and (2) testimony of a person with knowledge that the services performed were reasonable and necessary and the charges were usual and customary in the community. At trial, Dr. Howard Smith testified that Mrs. Griffin had been his patient for eight years. He further testified that the charges incurred by Mrs. Griffin for the medical services performed were the usual and customary charges in the Houston area, and were reasonable and necessary to treat Mrs. Griffin. In addition, both Doris and John Griffin testified that they had received the hospital bills in issue, and that the bills represented services which were actually performed for Mrs. Griffin.

Appellant contends the court erred in allowing Dr. Smith to testify as to the reasonableness and necessity of all the hospital and medical bills because most of the charges were not his. We disagree. Dr. Smith qualified as an expert witness, and, as such, was permitted to testify regarding the charge to Mrs. Griffin for medical services. We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Appellant's second point of error concerns the award of actual damages for the hospital and medical bills incurred. Appellant argues that since the medical bills of Doris Griffin have remained unpaid, appellees have suffered no pecuniary loss. We do not agree. Even though the medical bills have not been paid, appellants do, in fact, owe money to the doctors and hospital. This constitutes actual damages. Further, their actual damages are a direct result of their lack of medical insurance.

Where medical services are provided gratuitously to a plaintiff, he still may recover the cost of the services from the tortfeasor. Texas Power & Light Co. v. Jacobs, 323 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The "collateral source" rule is strongly established in Texas. American Cooperage Co. v. Clemons, 364 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Civ.App.--Ft. Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Edmondson v. Keller, 401 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1966, no writ); Sparks v. Dalton, 458 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Civ.App.--Ft. Worth 1970, no writ). If a plaintiff is permitted to recover his medical expenses even though his expenses have been paid by a third party, certainly a party must be allowed to recover expenses where he or she has incurred a liability and will not be reimbursed by a third party. We overrule point of error two.

By its third point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding damages to appellees because appellees' demand letter failed to specify the amount of actual damages and expenses, including attorney's fees. Appellant also alleges that neither the pleadings nor the issues support a finding that they violated the Act. Finally, appellant contends that attorney's fees should not have been awarded under TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. § 2226 (Vernon Supp.--1982-1983) because there was no finding of an oral or written contract between appellant and appellees.

We do not find appellees' demand letter...