Appeal
From Pickens County William J. Wylie, Jr., Family Court Judge
PER
CURIAM
Carlos
Aguirre (Husband) appeals the family court's final
divorce order, arguing the family court erred (1) by awarding
Elizabeth Okamura (Wife) $1, 500 per month in permanent
periodic alimony, (2) in its imputation of Husband's
income, (3) in its valuation of the marital business for
purposes of dividing the marital property, and (4) by
awarding Wife attorney's fees and costs. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As
to whether the family court erred in its analysis and award
of permanent periodic alimony to Wife: Stoney v
Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018)
("[T]he proper standard of review in family court
matters is de novo . . . ."); McMillan v
McMillan, 417 S.C. 583, 590, 790 S.E.2d 216, 220 (Ct.
App. 2016) ("[T]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find
facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of
the evidence; however, this broad scope of review does not
require the [c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family
court, which is in a superior position to make credibility
determinations." (second and third alteration by
McMillan court) (quoting Crossland v.
Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423
(2014))); Buist v. Buist, 410 S.C. 569, 574, 766
S.E.2d 381, 383 (2014) ("The appellant retains the
burden to demonstrate the error in the family court's
findings of fact."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C.
381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) ("[T]he family
court's factual findings will be affirmed unless
'appellant satisfies [the appellate] court that the
preponderance of the evidence is against [such
findings].'" (quoting Finley v. Cartwright,
55 S.C. 198, 202, 33 S.E. 359, 360-61 (1899))); Butler v.
Butler, 385 S.C. 328, 336, 684 S.E.2d 191, 195 (Ct. App.
2009) ("Permanent[] periodic alimony is a substitute for
support [that] is normally incidental to the marital
relationship."); Hinson v. Hinson, 341 S.C.
574, 577, 535 S.E.2d 143, 144 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Alimony
should ordinarily place the supported spouse, as nearly as is
practical, in the same position he or she enjoyed during the
marriage."); Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C. 177, 184,
554 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating the family court
has a duty to formulate an alimony award that is "fit,
equitable, and just if the claim is well-founded"); S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (2014) (requiring the family
court to consider the following statutory factors in making
an alimony award: (1) the duration of the marriage; (2) the
physical and emotional health of the parties; (3) the
educational background of the parties; (4) the employment
history and earning potential of the parties; (5) the
standard of living established during the marriage; (6) the
current and reasonably anticipated earnings of the parties;
(7) the current and reasonably anticipated expenses and needs
of the parties; (8) the marital and nonmarital properties of
the parties; (9) custody of children; (10) marital misconduct
or fault; (11) tax consequences; (12) prior support
obligations; and (13) any other factors the court considers
relevant); Allen, 347 S.C. at 184, 554 S.E.2d at 425
(providing "[n]o one factor is dispositive" in
making an alimony award.)
2. As
to whether the family court erred in its imputation of
Husband's income: McMillan, 417 S.C. at 590, 790
S.E.2d at 220 ("In appeals from the family court, this
[c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."
(alteration in original) (quoting Crossland, 408
S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at 423)); Susan R. v. Donald
R., 389 S.C. 107, 114, 697 S.E.2d 634, 638 (Ct. App.
2010) ("Generally, the family court determines gross
income for purposes of calculating [support awards] based
upon the financial declarations submitted by the
parties."); id. ("When income reflected on
the financial declaration is at issue, the family court may
rely on suitable documentation to verify income, such as pay
stubs, employer statements, receipts, or expenses covering at
least one month."); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 391
S.C. 249, 255, 705 S.E.2d 65, 68 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he
family court has the discretion to impute income to a party
with respect to awards of alimony or child support.");
Messer v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 629, 598 S.E.2d 310,
318 (Ct. App. 2004) ("It is well-settled in South
Carolina that an award of alimony should be based on the
payor spouse's earning potential rather than merely his
current, reported earnings."); Gartside v.
Gartside, 383 S.C. 35, 44, 677 S.E.2d 621, 626 (Ct. App.
2009) ("Whether termed voluntary underemployment,
imputation of income, or the failure to reach earning
potential, the case law is clear that when a payor spouse
seeks to reduce support obligations based on his diminished
income, a court should consider the payor spouse's
earning capacity."); Susan R., 389 S.C. at 114,
697 S.E.2d at 638 (stating it was proper for the family court
to consider invoices from the husband's business for
purposes of calculating his child support obligation and
impute additional income to him when his financial
declaration nor his income tax return reflected any income
from the business or his rental property); Abercrombie v.
Abercrombie, 372 S.C. 643 n.4, 649, 643 S.E.2d 697, 700
(Ct. App. 2007) ("Husband failed to even file a
financial declaration with the family court as required by
the family court rules. Therefore, he cannot now complain
that the family court improperly relied on Wife's
testimony in awarding alimony.").
3. As
to whether the family court erred in its valuation of the
marital business: McMillan, 417 S.C. at 590, 790
S.E.2d at 220 ("In appeals from the family court, this
[c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."
(quoting Crossland, 408 S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at
423)); Browder v. Browder, 382 S.C. 512, 522, 675
S.E.2d 820, 825 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In making an equitable
distribution of marital property, the court must: (1)
identify the marital property to be divided between the
parties; (2) determine the fair market value of the property
(3) apportion the marital estate according to the
contributions, both direct and indirect, of each party to the
acquisition of the property during the marriage, their
respective assets and incomes, and any special equities they
may have in marital assets; and (4) provide for an equitable
division of the marital estate, including the manner in which
the distribution is to take place."); id. at
522-23, 675 S.E.2d at 825 (stating the family "court has
broad discretion in valuing marital property"); King
v. King, 384 S.C. 134, 144, 681 S.E.2d 609, 614 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("A family court may accept the valuation of
one party over...
