Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. 18677.

• Decision Date: 10 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18677.
• Citation: 304 Conn. 317,39 A.3d 1095
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Edward C. OKEKE v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH.

304 Conn. 317

39 A.3d 1095

Edward C. OKEKE

v.COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH.

No. 18677.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 4, 2012.Decided April 10, 2012.

Edward C. Okeke, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Daniel Shapiro, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 19a–42 (d)(1),¹ the defendant, the commissioner of public health (commissioner), has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate, where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form.

The plaintiff, Edward C. Okeke, appeals, following our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing his administrative appeal. We conclude that the commissioner does not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The undisputed facts of this case were fully set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion, Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 122 Conn.App. 373, 999 A.2d 808 (2010). “On May 25, 2000, a male child was born to the plaintiff and Tamara A. Shockley. The parties were not married at the time of the birth of the child and have never been married to each other. The parties executed an acknowledgement of paternity pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–172. ² Shockley affirmed the acknowledgement of paternity on May 26, 2000, and the plaintiff affirmed the acknowledgement on June 1, 2000. The name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement is stated as ‘Nnamdi Ikwunne Okeke.’

“While in the hospital, at some time after the child's birth, Shockley also completed a birth certificate worksheet. Initially, she entered the child's name on the worksheet as ‘Nnamdi Ikwunne Okeke.’ On May 30, 2000, however, Shockley called the hospital and requested that the child's name on the birth certificate worksheet be changed to ‘Nnamdi Okeke Shockley.’ In response, a hospital staff person changed the name on the acknowledgement of paternity form to ‘Nnamdi Okeke Shockley.’ On June 5, 2000, Shockley again called the hospital and requested that her son's name be changed on the birth certificate worksheet to ‘Nnamdi Ikwunne Shockley–Okeke.’ In response, a hospital staff person changed the name on the birth certificate worksheet to ‘Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley–Okeke.’ ³ The acknowledgement of paternity indicating the child's name as ‘Nnamdi Okeke Shockley,’ and the certificate of live birth indicating the child's name as ‘Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley–Okeke,’ were filed with the department of public health (department). The official birth certificate of the child lists his name as ‘Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley–Okeke.’

“On April 13, 2007, the plaintiff filed with the department an ‘[a]pplication for [a]mendment of [m]y [s]on's birth certificate.’ Pursuant to § 19a–42 (d)(1),⁴ the plaintiff sought to amend the name on his son's birth certificate by removing the mother's name, Shockley, in accordance with the previously executed acknowledgement of paternity.⁵ Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer denied the plaintiff's application, concluding that, pursuant to § 19a–41–9 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies,⁶ the plaintiff is permitted to ask a registrar of vital statistics to make a change to his son's name only if he has a certified court order allowing the change. Because the plaintiff did not present such a court order, he [had] failed to meet this requirement. The hearing officer also concluded that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of § 19a–41–9 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies because more than thirty days had passed since the child's birth, the plaintiff was not a custodial parent, and he was not seeking to rectify a typographical or clerical error.⁷

“In response to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the hearing officer addressed the plaintiff's claim that he made pursuant to § 19a–42 (d)(1). The hearing officer concluded that the statute permits a change of a child's name on a birth certificate on the basis of an acknowledgement form only ‘if such paternity is not already shown on the birth certificate.’ Because paternity was already indicated on the birth certificate, the department's receipt of the acknowledgement of paternity form did not trigger an amendment to the birth certificate. The hearing officer accordingly denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

“Thereafter, the plaintiff timely filed an administrative appeal with the Superior Court. The plaintiff did not take issue with any of the factual findings of the hearing officer but challenged the interpretation and application of § 19a–42 (d)(1), claiming that the commissioner must change the name on the birth certificate to the name indicated on the acknowledgement of paternity form.⁸ Following a hearing, the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.” Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 122 Conn.App. at 375–77, 999 A.2d 808. The plaintiff then appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff asserted that the phrase in § 19a–42 (b)(1) “ ‘to change the name of the child if so indicated on the acknowledg[e]ment of paternity form,’ essentially directs the commissioner to ensure that the name on the birth certificate corresponds to the name on the acknowledgement of paternity form.” Id., at 379–80, 999 A.2d 808. The Appellate Court disagreed and concluded as follows: “When read in its entirety ... we conclude that the plaintiff's contention is misplaced because the plaintiff ignores the triggering language that allows the commissioner to amend a birth certificate pursuant to § 19a–42 (d)(1): if paternity is not already shown on such birth certificate .... General Statutes § 19a–4 (d)(1). The unambiguous language of the statute involves determinations of paternity and changing a child's name when it is determined that the biological father of the child is not listed, or is incorrectly listed, on the birth certificate. Here, paternity is already shown on the birth certificate and there has never been a question regarding the identity of the biological father.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 122 Conn.App. at 380, 999 A.2d 808. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court sustaining the commissioner's denial of the plaintiff's application to amend his son's birth certificate. Id., at 381, 999 A.2d 808.

Thereafter, the plaintiff sought certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court. We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that under ... § 19a–42 (d)(1), the [commissioner] had neither the duty nor the authority to amend the child's birth certificate, where the name on the birth certificate differed from that agreed by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form?” Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 298 Conn. 915, 915–16, 4 A.3d 832 (2010).

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff contends that, pursuant to § 19a–42 (d)(1), the commissioner has both the authority and the duty to amend the child's birth certificate when the nature of the amendment is needed to protect the integrity and accuracy of the vital record. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that, to give effect to the legislature's intent to protect the integrity and accuracy of vital records, it is imperative that the child's birth certificate be amended. The plaintiff also contends that the legislative history of the statute supports the interpretation that the commissioner is authorized and required to amend the child's birth certificate even if the child's paternity had already been determined on his birth certificate.

In response, the commissioner asserts that the plaintiff ignores the triggering language of § 19a–42 (d)(1), which provides that the commissioner shall amend a birth certificate to show paternity “if paternity is not already shown on such birth certificate....” The commissioner further asserts that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the “unambiguous language of the statute involves determinations of paternity and changing a child's name when it is determined that the biological father of the child is not listed, or is incorrectly listed, on the birth certificate.” Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 122 Conn.App. at 380, 999 A.2d 808. The commissioner contends that, because paternity is already listed on the birth certificate in this case, the department's authority under § 19a–42 (d)(1) is not triggered. We agree with the commissioner.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review and guiding principles. “[J]udicial review of the commissioner's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [ (UAPA), General Statutes §§ 4–166 through 4–189], and the scope of that review is very restricted.... [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact.... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably,...