Okeke v. Comm'r Of Pub. Health, No. 31054.
Decision Date | 06 July 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 31054. |
Citation | 122 Conn.App. 373,999 A.2d 808 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Edward C. OKEKEv.COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH. |
Edward C. Okeke, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).
Daniel Shapiro, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
BISHOP, ALVORD and BORDEN, Js.
The plaintiff, Edward C. Okeke, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of the commissioner of public health (commissioner) denying his request to amend his son's birth certificate. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly determined that the commissioner correctly interpreted General Statutes § 19a-42(d)(1). We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and, therefore, we affirm the judgment.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff's appeal. On May 25, 2000, a male child was born to the plaintiff and Tamara A. Shockley. The parties were not married at the time of the birth of the child and have never been married to each other. The parties executed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-172. Shockley affirmed the acknowledgement of paternity on May 26, 2000, and the plaintiff affirmed the acknowledgement on June 1, 2000. The name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement is stated as “Nnamdi Ikwunne Okeke.”
While in the hospital, at some time after the child's birth, Shockley also completed a birth certificate worksheet. Initially, she entered the child's name on the worksheet as “Nnamdi Ikwunne Okeke.” On May 30, 2000, however, Shockley called the hospital and requested that the child's name on the birth certificate worksheet be changed to “Nnamdi Okeke Shockley.” In response, a hospital staff person changed the name on the acknowledgement of paternity form to “Nnamdi Okeke Shockley.” On June 5, 2000, Shockley again called the hospital and requested that her son's name be changed on the birth certificate worksheet to “Nnamdi Ikwunne Shockley-Okeke.” In response, a hospital staff person changed the name on the birth certificate worksheet to “Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley-Okeke.” 1 The acknowledgement of paternity indicating the child's name as “Nnamdi Okeke Shockley,” and the certificate of live birth indicating the child's name as “Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley-Okeke,” were filed with the department of public health (department). The official birth certificate of the child lists his name as “Nnamdi Ikwanne Shockley-Okeke.”
On April 13, 2007, the plaintiff filed with the department an “[a]pplication for [a]mendment of [m]y [s]on's [b]irth [c]ertificate.” Pursuant to § 19a-42(d)(1), the plaintiff sought to amend the name on his son's birth certificate by removing the mother's name, Shockley, in accordance with the previously executed acknowledgement of paternity.2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer denied the plaintiff's application, concluding that, pursuant to § 19a-41-9(a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies,3 the plaintiff is permitted to ask a registrar of vital statistics to make a change to his son's name only if he has a certified court order allowing the change. Because the plaintiff did not present such a court order, he failed to meet this requirement. The hearing officer also concluded that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of § 19a-41-9(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies because more than thirty days had passed since the child's birth, the plaintiff was not a custodial parent and he was not seeking to rectify a typographical or clerical error.4
In response to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the hearing officer addressed the plaintiff's claim that he made pursuant to § 19a-42(d)(1). The hearing officer concluded that the statute permits a change of a child's name on a birth certificate on the basis of an acknowledgement form only “if such paternity is not already shown on the birth certificate.” Because paternity was already indicated on the birth certificate, the department's receipt of the acknowledgement of paternity form did not trigger an amendment to the birth certificate. The hearing officer accordingly denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the plaintiff timely filed an administrative appeal with the Superior Court. The plaintiff did not take issue with any of the factual findings of the hearing officer but challenged the interpretation and application of § 19a-42(d)(1), claiming that the commissioner must change the name on the birth certificate to the name indicated on the acknowledgement of paternity form.5 Following a hearing, the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review is well established. “Ordinarily, [o]ur resolution of [administrative appeals] is guided by the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.; to the determinations made by an administrative agency. [W]e must decide, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.... Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law ... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement. ...
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Groton Police Dept. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 104 Conn.App. 150, 156, 931 A.2d 989 (2007).
“The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Renaissance Management Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 281 Conn. 227, 231, 915 A.2d 290 (2007). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Amaro, 293 Conn. 1, 8-9, 976 A.2d 668 (2009).
Accordingly, our interpretation of § 19a-42(d)(1) begins with an examination of the relevant language of the statute. Section 19a-42(d)(1) provides: “Upon receipt of (A) an acknowledgment of paternity executed in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of section 46b-172 by both parents of a child born out of wedlock, or (B) a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock, the commissioner shall include on or amend, as appropriate, such child's birth certificate to show such paternity if paternity is not already shown on such birth certificate and to change the name of the child if so indicated on the acknowledgment of paternity form or within the certified court order as part of the paternity action.” (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff contends that the phrase “to change the name of the child if so indicated on the acknowledgement of paternity form” essentially directs the commissioner to ensure that the name on the birth certificate corresponds to the name on the acknowledgement of paternity form. When read in its entirety, however, we conclude that the plaintiff's contention is misplaced because the plaintiff ignores the triggering language that allows the commissioner to amend a birth certificate pursuant to § 19a-42(d)(1): “ if paternity is not already shown on such birth certificate ....” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 19a-42(d)(1). The unambiguous language of the statute involves determinations of paternity and changing a child's name when it is determined that the biological father of the child is not listed, or is incorrectly listed, on the birth certificate. Here, paternity is already shown on the birth certificate and there has never been a question regarding the identity of the biological father. The plaintiff's argument is further belied by the acknowledgement of paternity form itself, which provides for changing...
To continue reading
Request your trial- State Of Conn. v. Dawes, No. 30292.
-
Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. 18677.
...Appellate Court. The undisputed facts of this case were fully set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion, Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 122 Conn.App. 373, 999 A.2d 808 (2010). “On May 25, 2000, a male child was born to the plaintiff and Tamara A. Shockley. The parties were not mar......
-
Comptroller v. State Elections Enforcement Comm'n
...given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 122 Conn.App. 373, 378, 999 A.2d 808 (2010). The CEP is complex 5 and necessarily requires agency interpretation in its application, especially during t......
-
Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health
...Court. The undisputed facts of this case were fully set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion, Okeke v. Commissioner of Public Health, 122 Conn. App. 373, 999 A.2d 808 (2010). "On May 25, 2000, a male child was born to the plaintiff and Tamara A. Shockley. The parties were not married at t......
-
2010 Appellate Review
...298 Conn. 914, 4 A.3d 833 (2010). 93. 119 Conn. App. 194, 986 A.2d 1119, cert. granted, 295 Conn. 916, 990 A.2d 868 (2010). 94. 122 Conn. App. 373, 999 A.2d 808, cert. granted, 298 Conn. 915, 4 A.3d 832 (2010). 95. Id. at 381 (Borden, J., dissenting). 96. 120 Conn. App. 390, 992 A.2d 331, c......