Oken v. National Chain Co., 78-343-A

Citation424 A.2d 234
Decision Date07 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 78-343-A,78-343-A
PartiesJoslin OKEN v. NATIONAL CHAIN CO. ppeal.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is a jury-waived Superior Court civil action in which the plaintiff, Joslin Oken (Oken), seeks an accounting and payment of commissions allegedly withheld from him by his employer, the defendant, National Chain Co. (National). National manufactures chain which is used in the costume jewelry industry. The crucial issue in this controversy concerns the amount of money due Oken, and a brief resume of the relevant facts will bring the nub of the controversy into sharp focus.

On June 1, 1970, National's president, Ralph Cipolla, hired Oken as a manufacturer's representative. Oken's territory was Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Initially, he was paid a weekly salary, but within four months his compensation was shifted to a commission basis. If "an account came into" National from Oken's territory, Oken would receive a commission even though he might have done nothing to obtain the account. Oken received the commission when the goods ordered were shipped. From this time until May 7, 1974, National agreed to pay Oken commissions on the following terms:

"Five (5%) percent of the sales price of items of gold-filled, sterling silver, brass and steel which were shipped by National to Oken's customers. Two-and-a-half (21/2%) percent of the sales price of 14 Karat gold items which were shipped by National to Oken's customers."

This commission schedule remained in effect until May 7, 1974, when National, citing the increased price of gold and silver, modified the commission structure. In brief, National retained the former commission rates but only up until the point at which Oken's earnings reached $25,000. Thereafter, commissions were to be computed by a sliding scale. For instance, once the $25,000 figure was reached, the commission rate for so-called semiprecious metals was reduced from 5 to 3 percent and the commission due for 14 karat gold items was reduced a full percentage point to 11/2 percent. The bottom line in the structure called for a 1 percent commission on either line once Oken's earnings reached $45,000.

Oken and National were in disagreement about the meaning of the new commission structure and when it was to become effective. Oken insisted that he was entitled to his commission the moment when one of his customers placed an order with National even though payment was deferred until shipment. The lag time between the receipt of the order and its shipment could be as much as six months. On the other hand, National maintained that no commission was earned until the goods ordered were shipped to the customer. This difference in viewpoints became important because Oken was demanding payments for orders received prior to his firing in late October 1974 but delivered to the customer sometime after Oken and National had gone their separate ways.

The trial justice depicted the respective positions of the litigants in the following fashion:

"Either he's entitled to be paid for goods shipped while he was in their employment or he's entitled to be paid for goods shipped pursuant to orders taken by him while he was in their employment, one or the other * * *."

The trial justice opted for the latter.

As a general rule a person employed on a commission basis to solicit sales orders earns or is entitled to his commission when the order is accepted by his employer. The entitlement to commissions is not affected by the fact that payment may be delayed, as in the present case, to the accounting period in which shipment is made. Richer v. Khoury Bros., Inc., 341 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1965); Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co., 134 Colo. 283, 303 P.2d 685 (1956); Diana v. Burnside Motors, Inc., 30 Conn.Sup. 561, 304 A.2d 222 (1973); Kowal v. Sportswear By Revere, Inc., 351 Mass. 541, 222 N.E.2d 778 (1967); Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Mfg. Co., 288 Minn. 98, 179 N.W.2d 73 (1970); Elliott v. Clyde Garfield Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 107 N.H. 363, 222 A.2d 215 (1966); Williston, Contracts § 1017(c) at 181-82 (3d ed. 1967). Here, Oken's understanding of the employment agreement was that he was entitled to commissions on items when they were ordered even though payment was deferred until shipment. Specifically, he testified that he expected to be paid for those orders made prior to his firing on October 25, 1974, but shipped to customers after this date.

The general rule that a commission is earned when the order is placed is not absolute; it may be altered by a written agreement by, or the conduct of, the parties which clearly demonstrates a different compensation scheme. If National desired to make Oken's claim to a commission depend solely upon shipment, thus cutting off any commissions subsequent to termination of employment, it could have provided for such a contingency in clear and unambiguous language. Here, Oken conceded that he was not paid his commissions until the goods were shipped by National, but such a concession is not clear proof that he was in agreement that his commissions were not earned until shipment was made. Rather, this arrangement was but a manifestation of National's accounting procedures in regard to when commissions would be paid. See Weick v. Rickenbaugh, 134 Colo. at 288-89, 303 P.2d at 688.

A look at National's business picture demonstrates that this was the only sound accounting practice. As noted earlier, there could be a substantial time lag between receipt of an order and shipment of goods. Thus, National would have had a problem paying its salesmen at the time of the order since the cash did not come in until shipment. In addition, the amount of the commissions could be more accurately computed at the time of shipment because of fluctuations in the price of gold and silver. 1 Thus, National's practice of paying its salesmen upon shipment appears to reflect sound accounting practice rather than an agreement that a commission was not earned until shipment. It is the nature of commissions that payment be delayed until the goods are shipped. See Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Mfg. Co., 288 Minn. at 101, 179 N.W.2d at 75. The general rule concerning commissions, which we have cited above, reflects the principle that commissions are earned when orders are placed but payments will be deferred until shipment. Otherwise, National would have received the value of Oken's procurements and servicing of accounts without fully compensating him for his labor. See Lundeen v. Cozy Cab Mfg. Co., 288 Minn. at 101, 179 N.W.2d at 75.

National contends that certain previous payments to Oken compel a contrary result. Specifically, Oken's first commission check included commissions on shipments made pursuant to orders entered while he was a salaried employee, as well as on accounts existing before his employment. National argues that this course of dealing indicates that it was the intent of the parties that the right to compensation would arise only if the goods ordered were shipped. Since Oken took commissions on accounts procured by...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 83-0585S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • March 19, 1984
    ...is terminable by either party at will. Rotondo v. Seaboard Foundry, Inc., 440 A.2d 751, 752 (R.I.S.Ct.1981); Oken v. National Chain Co., 424 A.2d 234, 237 (R.I.S.Ct. 1981); School Committee of Providence v. Board of Regents for Education 112 R.I. 288, 308 A.2d 788, 790 (R.I.S.Ct.1973)." Id.......
  • Russell v. Salve Regina College
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • November 17, 1986
    ...at any time at the will of either party." Rotondo v. Seaboard Foundry, Inc., 440 A.2d 751, 752 (R.I.1981). See also Oken v. National Chain Co., 424 A.2d 234, 237 (R.I. 1981). Put another way, an at-will employment relationship "creates no executory obligations." Dudzik v. Lessona Corp., 473......
  • Adkins v. Am. Mine Research, Inc.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 30, 2014
    ...183, 932 A.2d 1197, 1207 (2007) (“Whether an employee has earned a commission depends on the terms of employment.”); Oken v. Nat'l Chain Co., 424 A.2d 234, 235 (R.I.1981) (“The general rule that a commission is earned when the order is placed is not absolute; it may be altered by a written ......
  • Britto v. Prospect Chartercare Sjhsri, LLC, 18-1422
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • November 30, 2018
    ...(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 1985) (" D. Miguel," for simplicity)—our judge relied on a Rhode Island Supreme Court case, Oken v. Nat'l Chain Co., 424 A.2d 234, 237 (R.I. 1981), in holding that Britto's agreement "to continue to work in exchange for [d]efendants' promise to continue to employ a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT