Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Santino

• Decision Date: 31 May 1932
• Docket Number: 23281.
• Parties: OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. SANTINO et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

12 P.2d 221

158 Okla. 70, 1932 OK 430

OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. SANTINO et al.

No. 23281.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

May 31, 1932

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1932.

Syllabus by the Court.

The question of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is one of fact to be determined by the Industrial Commission under the circumstances of each particular case, and, where there is any testimony reasonably tending to support its finding, it will not be disturbed on an application to vacate the award.

Original proceedings by the Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company and another to review an order of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation to James M. Santino.

Petition to vacate denied.

H. C Thurman and B. A. Bowman, both of Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

Anglin & Stevenson, of Holdenville, and B. P. Bodard, of Oklahoma City, for respondents.

HEFNER J.

This is an original proceeding in this court by the Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company and Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York to review an order of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation to James M. Santino.

Claimant alleges that, while in the employ of petitioner gas and electric company, he sustained an injury consisting of a broken leg received while moving a motorcycle out of space necessary for use in parking cars which belonged to his employer. The commission found that he sustained an accidental injury as claimed, and that by reason thereof he was temporarily disabled for a period of 20 weeks, and awarded him compensation therefor at the rate of $18 per week; and also found that, by reason of the injury, he sustained a 30 per cent. permanent partial loss of the use of his right leg and awarded him additional compensation at the rate of $18 per week for a period of 45 weeks.

Petitioners assert that the award is contrary to law because there is no evidence which reasonably tends to prove that claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.

The evidence on behalf of claimant is that he was employed by petitioner electric company as a mechanic; he sustained a broken leg between 8:30 and 9 o'clock on the night of May 30, 1930; his duties at that time, to use his language, were to "keep things going"; he was in charge of the business of his employer at that time; immediately prior to the injury, he took a car which he had serviced from the garage and parked it on the outside and was about to take another car into the garage; Mr. McCord, an employee of the company, had placed a motorcycle in the space...