Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollock

• Decision Date: 19 October 1937
• Docket Number: 24897.
• Citation: 73 P.2d 427,181 Okla. 266,1937 OK 592
• Parties: OKLAHOMA PORTLAND CEMENT CO. v. POLLOCK.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

73 P.2d 427

181 Okla. 266, 1937 OK 592

OKLAHOMA PORTLAND CEMENT CO. v. POLLOCK.

No. 24897.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

October 19, 1937

Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1937.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. An action for damages for breach of a contract of employment where the employee in consideration of such contract refrained from prosecuting a claim before the Industrial Commission, is an action for recovery of money, and is properly triable in the district court.

2. Where an employee, engaged in a hazardous employment under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law (St.1931, § 13348 et seq., 85 Okl.St.Ann. § 1 et seq.), is injured, and in consideration of an agreement for a lifetime position refrains from filing his claim before the Industrial Commission, and works for more than 13 years pursuant to such agreement until the time has expired within which, under the statute, he can file his claim, the employer cannot discharge the employee without cause and defeat liability for breach of the contract of employment on the ground that the agreement is illegal by reason of the workmen's compensation statutes enacted for the benefit of the employee, when it would produce a harmful effect on the party for whose protection the law making the bargain illegal exists.

3. Where plaintiff has fully performed a contract on his part even though he could not have been compelled to do so, the defendant cannot avoid liability for his breach thereof on the ground of want of mutuality.

4. A contract, whereby the defendant "agreed to furnish plaintiff employment for the rest of his natural life, of such kind as he would be capable of performing, and would not require strenuous manual labor," in compromise of a claim the plaintiff, an employee, had against the defendant, his employer, under the circumstances of this case, is not so indefinite as to be invalid and to prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages for its breach.

5. The courts look with disfavor upon destruction of contracts on account of uncertainty, and, when possible, will so construe them as to carry into effect the reasonable intent of the parties.

6. Held, that under the evidence the jury was justified in finding that the contract made by the general manager was ratified by the corporation.

Appeal from District Court, Pontotoc County; George C. Crump, Judge.

Action by P. A. Pollock against the Oklahoma Portland Cement Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

BAYLESS, V. C.J., and GIBSON, J., dissenting.

Warren B. Kice, of Ada (Clark & Gilbreath, of Ada, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Wimbish & Wimbish, of Ada, for defendant in error.

HURST Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment, rendered on the verdict of a jury, for $3,000, in favor of P. A. Pollock, plaintiff, and against Oklahoma Portland Cement Company, defendant, in an action to recover damages for breach of an oral contract of employment.

The plaintiff, in his petition, alleged in substance: That in April, 1918, while he was employed by the defendant in its cement mill, in a hazardous employment, he sustained an injury resulting in temporary total and partial permanent disability; that he entered into an oral contract with the defendant, through its general manager, whereby, in consideration of his refraining from prosecuting his claim before the State Industrial Commission, the defendant "agreed to furnish him employment for the rest of his natural life, of such kind as he would be capable of performing, and would not require strenuous manual labor"; that both parties performed said agreement for a period of more than twelve years, when, in July, 1931, the defendant, without cause, breached said contract and discharged the plaintiff, to his damage in the sum of $12,921, for which he prayed judgment.

The defendant raised the sufficiency of the petition by demurrer, which was overruled. The defendant then filed an answer containing a general denial, and further alleged that the contract, if made, was void and in violation of law; and that the district court was without jurisdiction; the industrial court alone having jurisdiction. The plaintiff by his reply denied generally the allegation of the answer, and alleged that the defendant had ratified the contract, and that it was estopped from denying liability for the reason that he had refrained from presenting his claim to the State Industrial Commission in reliance upon said agreement.

1. The first contention of the defendant is that the district court was without jurisdiction of this action, and that the State Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction. This position is untenable. It is an action to recover damages for breach of contract of employment, not to enforce rights under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

2. The second contention is that the agreement is prohibited by the Workmen's Compensation Law and is void and unenforceable for want of mutuality under sections 13371 and 13372, O.S.1931 (85 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 47, 48), which provide as follows:

Section 13371. "No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this Act shall be valid."

Section 13372. "Claims for compensation or benefits due under this Act shall not be assigned, released or commuted except as provided by this Act."

It is not contended that the evidence does not justify the verdict of the jury in finding that the contract was made as alleged, or that the plaintiff had fully performed the services required of him under the contract until he was discharged, or that the amount of the judgment is excessive. The argument merely goes to the consideration for the contract of employment sued on.

The proper analysis of this contention presents several questions.

First, what was the consideration? Plaintiff had the right to file his claim with the Industrial Commission and on the strength of the promise for lifetime employment he promised not to exercise that right. This is a legal detriment to him, and constitutes a valuable consideration. 5 C.J. 890; 18 R.C.L. 510; 39 C.J. 41.

Second, is the consideration illegal, or invalid by reason of sections 13371 and 13372? The defendant relies upon United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State Industrial Comm. (1926) 125 Okl. 131, 256 P. 892, and Shawnee Morning News v. Thomas (1927) 125 Okl. 155, 256 P. 937, for the proposition that the settlement in question is "void." We are well aware of the familiar statement that where a contract is illegal it is void and cannot be enforced by either party. But such loose language is criticised in Williston Contract, § 1630, wherein it is said: "To go farther and assert that all unlawful agreements are ipso facto no contracts and void is opposed to many decisions and unfortunate in its consequences, for it may protect a guilty defendant from paying damages to an innocent plaintiff. Doubtless a statute may and sometimes does make an agreement absolutely void, but even though a statute so states in terms, void has sometimes been held to mean voidable, and unless no other conclusion is possible from the words of a statute it should not be held to make agreements contravening it totally void."

The statutes in the case at bar do not, in express terms, make such agreements "void," and the cases cited refer to the agreements or receipts therein relied on as "invalid" and not binding upon the claimant on application for additional award on change of condition. For cases of similar import not referred to by defendant, see Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Morrison (1931) 148 Okl. 205, 298 P. 270, and Bartlett-Collins Glass Co. v. Washabaugh (1933) 166 Okl. 90, 26 P.2d 420 (agreement to be binding must be approved by commission); G. S. & C. Drilling Co. v. Pennington (1931) 151 Okl. 61, 1 P.2d 764, 7 P.2d 474; Rucks-Brandt Const. Co. v. Price (1933) 165 Okl. 178, 23 P.2d 690; and St. Joseph Mining Co. v. Pettitt (1923) 90 Okl. 242, 216 P. 657 (settlement not binding on change of condition). Assuming that these authorities render the agreement "invalid" and "not binding upon the claimant," they do not hold the agreement void in the sense of no contract. We hold that the statutes do not render the contract void in the strict sense, but we do not here pass upon its legality in any other respect. However, the plaintiff earnestly insists that the statutes quoted do not render the contract illegal in any sense, and rely upon the cases of T-B Gasoline Company v. Boring (1924) 99 Okl. 61, 225 P. 902; Brigham Young University v. Industrial Commission (1929) 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152; Jenkins v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n (Tex.Civ.App.1919) 211 S.W. 349.

It is stated in 13 C.J. 492, that "no principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out." But this general rule has no application where the illegality arises from statutory restrictions and the granting of the relief sought will not defeat the purpose of the enactment. The instant case falls within this latter type, and under this view we are not required to enter the argument of the parties as to whether the sections quoted render the contract illegal. Such determination, under the facts of this case, would be purely academic.

Assuming without deciding, that the contract is illegal by force of the statutes, we must consider briefly the purpose of the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Law. By the enactment of this law there was effected a substantial change in the relation of master and servant to each other and to the public, to the end that an employee engaged in one of the enumerated occupations who has been injured should receive such compensation as would prevent...