Old Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Holley

• Decision Date: 07 January 1949
• Docket Number: No. 15001.,15001.
• Citation: 216 S.W.2d 676
• Parties: OLD NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HOLLEY.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 676

216 S.W.2d 676

OLD NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HOLLEY.

No. 15001.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

January 7, 1949.

Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; R. B. Young, Judge.

Suit by Ruby Nina Holley against Old National Life Insurance Company for face value recovery of accident policy issued by defendant to plaintiff's husband, now deceased. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Paul J. McClung and Joe Spurlock, both of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Mays & Mays, Dave Miller and Chas. Mays, all of Fort Worth, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

A district court of Tarrant County, Texas entered judgment in this case on August 18, 1948 for appellee, Ruby Nina Holley, who had sued appellant, Old National Life Insurance Company, for face value recovery of an accident insurance policy issued by appellant, insuring appellee's husband, Lon Holley, now deceased, against death resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries during the term of said policy. The case was tried to the court who decreed in substance, among other things, that the late Lon Holley met his death through purely accidental means on the 7th of March, 1948 as a result of gunshot wounds, which death resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries while said policy, written by appellant in the sum of $1,000, naming appellee as beneficiary, was in force and effect; therefore, judgment was entered for the sum of $1,000 in favor of appellee and against appellant, together with six per cent interest from date.

The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The appellant brings this appeal based upon five points.

No. 1. The court erred in finding as a matter of fact and of law that the deceased met his death through purely accidental means because there is no evidence to support the same.

No. 2. The trial court erred in finding as a fact that the insured committed no acts of aggression at the time of his death and that his death was not occasioned by any act, association or misconduct on his part, because there is no evidence to support such finding.

No. 3. The trial court erred in rendering judgment for appellee because the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence reveals the insured could have reasonably foreseen and anticipated the probable consequences of his act in going to meet known killers and thieves at a lonely rendezvous at night; that he did foresee and anticipate his death because he left a note prior to his departure from home indicating that he anticipated being killed and that he was himself armed with a revolver.

No. 4. The trial court erred in admitting the record and contents of the coroner's inquest on the report of the death of Lon Holley, in which the coroner found that Holley was murdered, over the appellant's objection.

No. 5. The concealment of Lon Holley's occupation of robbery, theft and liquor store operations, coupled with the misrepresentation that he was a speculator employed by "Silo," was material and false and voided the accident policy, made the basis of this suit.

We will proceed to discuss the last point first. We need not comment on No. 5 other than to say there is testimony to support the representation made by the insured in his application as being a speculator and employed by Silo. His wife testified in detail about these matters, sufficient for the court to make a finding.

We sustain appellant's point No. 4 to the effect that the coroner's inquest should not have been introduced in evidence over his objection; since the case was tried before the...