Oldham v. Scofield & Welch

• Decision Date: 07 April 1936
• Docket Number: 43342.
• Parties: OLDHAM v. SCOFIELD & WELCH et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

266 N.W. 480

222 Iowa 764

OLDHAM v. SCOFIELD & WELCH et al.

No. 43342.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 7, 1936

Appeal from District Court, Floyd County; Joseph J. Clark, Judge.

An action to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compensation was allowed by the industrial commissioner. An appeal was taken to the district court, which confirmed the industrial commissioner, and from such ruling appeal is taken to this court.

Affirmed.

Carl F. Jordan, of Cedar Rapids, and Charles W. M. Randall, of Waterloo, for appellants.

R. W Zastrow and W. G. Henke, both of Charles City, for appellee.

ALBERT, Justice.

A statement of the general fact situation in this case is necessary to an understanding of the question involved.

The claimant, James Oldham, was in the employ of Scofield & Welch. Scofield & Welch were engaged in the hardware and implement business in 1932. On the 8th of October of that year, Oldham suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. He was cranking an automobile slipped, fell, and sprained his back. On the 29th of October following, he was doing some work in connection with an oil stove, and burned the inside of his nose. On November 14 1932, he was lifting some granite pails, and slipped and fell, but he says this did not affect his back. On the 14th of January, 1933, he was assisting in moving a heating stove and again sprained his back.

After the accident occurring on the 8th of October, 1932, an agreement was reached between the employer and the employee, which was approved by the industrial commissioner, and the employee was allowed $14.40 per week for 4 2/3 weeks, ending December 10, 1932, amounting in all to $67.20. This memorandum of agreement was filed on December 10, 1932, and later approved by the industrial commissioner. This agreement covers only the accident of October 8, 1932. On the 24th of March, 1933, the claimant filed with the industrial commissioner an application for the reopening of the settlement heretofore made, under the provisions of section 1457 of the Code. He states in his application that he received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on October 8, 1932, and on January 7, 1933; that he received compensation amounting to approximately $66, etc. He prays " that the above-named defendant (Scofield & Welch) be required to answer this application for re-opening and that a time and place be fixed," etc. Both parties appeared to this application, and the deputy industrial commissioner decided: " Upon the record made in this case in re-opening proceeding it is held that the claimant is 25% permanently disabled as a result of injury sustained by him October 8, 1932, * * * he has received from the defendants four and two-thirds weeks compensation at $14.40 a week, such payment being for disability up to December 10, 1932. Wherefore, the defendants are hereby ordered to pay the claimant ninety-five and and one-third weeks of compensation, payment starting as of December 10, 1932." The order also provides for the payment of medical, surgical, and hopital benefit, etc. This was rendered by the deputy industrial commissioner on the 11th of June, 1934. Appeal was taken to the district court where the action of the deputy commissioner was affirmed. Hence this appeal.

It will be noted at this point that the ruling of the deputy commissioner is based wholly upon the accident occurring on October 8, 1932. In other words, the deputy commissioner allowed nothing for the injury which occurred to the claimant after that date. If this ruling of the deputy commissioner is to stand, it must be confirmed on the ground that the claimant did not get full compensation for the injury which occurred on that date. The right to have this matter reinvestigated is by virtue of the aforesaid section 1457 of the Code, which provides for such review, and authorizes the commissioner, on a hearing on said matter, with a proper showing, to end, diminish, or increase the compensation so ordered or agreed upon.

In such a proceeding the burden of proof is on the claimant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disability resulted from the original injury and not from an intervening cause. As heretofore stated, there were three accidents that happened to this claimant after the one that occurred on the 8th of October, 1932. The burden of proof, therefore, is upon the claimant to show that the grounds on which he bases his application for rehearing or reopening of the case were not caused by one of the three later accidents. In other words the evidence submitted to the deputy commissioner on...