Olds v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club

Decision Date04 October 1938
Docket NumberNo. 24863.,24863.
Citation119 S.W.2d 1000
PartiesOLDS v. ST. LOUIS NAT. BASEBALL CLUB.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Thomas L. Anderson, Judge.

"Not to be published in State Reports".

Action by Rose Olds against the St. Louis National Baseball Club for injuries sustained by plaintiff who was struck by a baseball fouled into the grandstand from the playing field while plaintiff was in attendance at a professional baseball game. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

John L. Harlan and Wilton D. Chapman, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

Woodward & Evans, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BENNICK, Commissioner.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, Rose Olds, as the result of being struck in the face by a baseball fouled into the grandstand from the playing field while she was in attendance at a professional baseball game being played at Sportsman's Park, in the City of St. Louis, on August 26, 1932. The defendant is the St. Louis National Baseball Club, which, while but a lessee of the park for the games played by its team, the St. Louis Cardinals, was concededly in full charge and control of the same on the day in question. Upon a trial to a jury, a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff, and against defendant, in the sum of $4,000. Judgment was rendered accordingly, and defendant's appeal to this court has followed in the usual course.

Plaintiff was injured while attempting to leave the park during the last inning of the game, and the chief question at issue is that of whether defendant may be said to have been negligent, under the particular circumstances of the case, in having failed to provide her with reasonably safe protection against foul balls driven into the stand at or near the point of egress to which she was making her way at the moment of the accident.

This, incidentally, is the second appeal in the case. The first appeal was by plaintiff from a judgment for defendant which was rendered upon an involuntary nonsuit taken by plaintiff after the court had peremptorily instructed the jury to find for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case. In a carefully considered opinion, to be found reported as Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, Mo.App., 104 S.W.2d 746, it was held by this court that there was a case for the determination of the jury, whereupon the case was tried anew, resulting, as we have already pointed out, in a verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor.

The grandstand in Sportsman's Park is built in semicircular fashion, extending from the pavilion wall at the end of the right field foul line around to the bleacher wall at the end of the left field foul line. The seats for the patrons are divided into sections identified by letters of the alphabet, with sections J, K, and L being located generally behind home plate, which is placed at a point about seventy or eighty feet out in front of the grandstand wall. In conformity with the practice customarily prevailing in the construction of major league ball parks, the area immediately back of home plate is protected by a screen which, in this instance, is forty-six feet seven inches in width, and reaches from the ground up to the top of the second deck of the stand. This means that sections J, K, and L are located within the screened area, with the consequence that patrons seated in those sections are fully protected from foul balls, which, because of the nearness of home plate, are driven back in that direction with greater frequency than is the case in other parts of the park.

Just back of the grandstand wall are two tiers of boxes, and then behind these are the rows of grandstand seats proper, beginning with row 1, and running up consecutively to row 18 at the rear or top of the stand. Flights of concrete steps separate the several sections, connecting at both top and bottom of each deck with aisleways which run practically all the way around the entire distance of the stand.

Entrance to or exit from the stand is either through chutes or passageways opening out from underneath the stand at the foot of the deck upon the aisleway running between the tiers of boxes, or else by means of ramps or inclines which lead from the lower levels up to the very top of the deck. Patrons at the park may use either the chutes or the ramps at their election, though the stand has been designed with the idea that those patrons having seats in the lower rows shall enter through the chutes and then ascend the concrete steps to their seats, while those having seats in the upper rows shall enter over the ramps and then descend the concrete steps to their seats. Such arrangement obviously tends to eliminate unnecessary crowding and confusion, and lends itself to the personal comfort and convenience of those in attendance at the game.

The day in question was Ladies' Day, by which is meant that women were admitted to the park free of charge on that day so far as general admission was concerned, and if reserved seats were desired, the same could be purchased for a small charge at a ticket booth conveniently located inside the park for the women's accommodation.

Plaintiff was accompanied to the park by her sister, and after entering the park purchased two reserved seats at the ticket booth in question, being given stubs for seats 3 and 4 in row 5 of section L in the screened area. Though plaintiff herself was somewhat of a fan and had been at the park on prior occasions, she did not know where her seats were located, and upon inquiring of the young woman in the ticket booth was directed to one of the chutes leading into the aisleway at the foot of the grandstand. Subsequently an usher examined her stubs, and pointed out to her the exact location of her seats.

Incidentally it appears that the chute to which plaintiff was directed opened out upon the aisleway just outside and to the east of section J at a point thirteen feet nine inches beyond the edge of the screen which had been erected as a means of protection against foul balls driven back in that direction. Though situated some little distance from section L, it was nevertheless the chute in the most direct route to the main entrance into the park, and therefore, in such respect, the one most conveniently located for plaintiff's use in going to or leaving the seats which she had purchased. There was also a chute to the west at the extreme corner of section L approximately three and one-half feet beyond the west edge of the screen, but leading in a somewhat less direct route to the main entrance into the park from the point where plaintiff's seats were located.

There is something said in the briefs about a ramp located at the top and rear of the screened area, which plaintiff might have used as a means of ingress and egress, and which, if she had used it, would have taken her beyond the range of foul balls batted back into the stand. It is true that she might have used the ramp, but only at the inconvenience of descending and ascending a flight of thirteen steps to or from the point where her seats were located, whereas by using the chute as she had been directed, it was necessary that she ascend only five steps in order to reach row 5. As we have already pointed out, the different means of ingress and egress were purposely provided by those in charge of the park, not only for the convenience of the patrons, but also (we have no doubt) with a view to the avoidance and elimination of confusion among patrons upon the steps and in the aisleways. Indeed defendant's own secretary testified that an usher coming upon a patron holding a stub for a seat in the fifth row "would naturally have that patron enter through one of these lower openings instead of sending them up to the top", the obvious reason being that the fifth row is nearer to the chute than it is to the top of the ramp.

There is a practice (of which defendant was aware) for patrons both to enter and leave the stand during the progress of the game, and on this occasion plaintiff left her seat during the first half of the ninth inning and started down the aisleway towards the chute through which she had been directed to enter in coming into the stand. Her explanation for leaving short of the conclusion of the game was that it was necessary for her to be home to prepare an early evening meal on account of her husband's employment, and with this in view she was endeavoring to take the most convenient route to Grand Avenue where she might board a street car for her home. Before she reached the chute, and while she was in that portion of the aisleway lying beyond and outside of the protection of the screen, she was struck in the face by a foul ball driven back into the stand from the bat of...

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