Oliphant v. State

Decision Date05 May 1969
Docket NumberNo. 9,9
Citation167 N.W.2d 280,381 Mich. 630
PartiesWilliam H. OLIPHANT and Gertrude K. Oliphant, his wife, Plaintiffs-Cross-Defendants-Appellants, and Thomas C. Beech and Blanche Beech, his wife, Vance Ciuchna and Virginia Ciuchna, his wife, and Edward Garbarino and Ann Garbarino, his wife, Cross-Defendants-Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan, Intervening Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Frederick M. Maddock, Detroit, for plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants, Frank I. Kennedy, Detroit, of counsel.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Nicholas V. Olds, Jerome Maslowski, Esther Newton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except ADAMS, J.

DETHMERS, Justice.

This action now involves a controversy between plaintiffs and the State of Michigan, as intervening defendant, concerning rights to property which once was part of the submerged bottom, since filled, of Lake St. Clair in Macomb county, Michigan. Although it did so at one time, the State no longer makes claim with respect to that portion of the fill lying landward of the patent line. That leaves the dispute relating solely to the filled area lakeward of the patent line.

Plaintiffs Oliphant claim title to Lot 33, Ardmore Park Subdivision, a part of which lot lies within the boundaries of a patent granted to a private party by the United States government on November 2, 1832, and a part lying lakeward thereof. After mesne conveyances title to a portion of the patented land was conveyed by deed on May 6, 1911, to one Emil A. Nelson, which parcel thereafter became Lot No. 5 of Assessor's Plat No. 21. This lot ultimately became a part of Ardmore Park Subdivision. In 1932 Nelson requested and received from the United States war department a permit to fill a portion of the lake bed extending into the lake about 1,150 feet easterly and adjacent to said Lot No. 5. He proceeded forthwith to make a fill accordingly about 865 feet into the lake. In 1941 Nelson had lost title to Lot No. 5 for failure to pay taxes and the auditor general deeded it to the State of Michigan. In 1943 Nelson applied for and received a land contract for its repurchase from the State land office board. Later, in that year, Nelson and the State joined in executing and recording a plat of Ardmore Park, a 90-lot subdivision of said Lot No. 5 of Assessor's Plat No. 21. The plat was approved by the Michigan auditor general before the recording. After that, in 1943, the State land office board conveyed to Nelson, by deed, all of the 90 lots of Ardmore Park Subdivision. The easterly or lakeward line of the mentioned patent runs through this subdivision, with 40 of the 90 lots and parts of plaintiffs Oliphants' Lot No. 33 and of Lots Nos. 32, 59 and 60, belonging to other plaintiffs later becoming parties hereto, lying lakeward and parts thereof landward of that patent line.

After the State's conveyance to Nelson, he, in turn, conveyed and plaintiffs trace title to their lots to him. Since then, sewer, water mains and street paving were installed, special assessments therefor, and regular taxes were levied on the lots, including those on the fill lakeward of the patent line, and paid by plaintiffs. Their homes and those of the other lot owners were built thereon.

This action began as a dispute between plaintiffs Oliphant and adjacent property owners about the dredging of a canal over or next to their lots. Ultimately, that contest was settled, but while the action was still pending the State applied for and was granted permission to intervene to protect the public trust and submerged lands involved under the provisions of C.L.1948, § 14.101 (Stat.Ann. § 3.211) and it filed a cross-bill of complaint accordingly.

The State claims title to all the lots lakeward of the patent line in Ardmore Park Subdivision and says it holds them in trust for the public under P.A.1899, No. 171, as amended (C.L.1948, §§ 317.291--317.297 (Stat.Ann.1967 Rev. §§ 13.1121--13.1127)). The State prays that the occupancy by plaintiffs be restrained as a trespass or that they be required to proceed under the so-called submerged lands act, P.A.1955, No. 247 (M.C.L.A. §§ 322.701--322.715 (Stat.Ann.1967 Rev. §§ 13.700(1)--13.700(15))), to purchase same from the State at prices determined by the conservation commission. At trial the State valued the 40 lakeward lots at $68,625, and its appraiser set the prices on individual lots at from $1,500 to $1,750.

In their brief plaintiffs say that the consternation in some 40 households may well be pictured when confronted with this attack by the State upon their titles, and that their reaction may equally well be imagined as having been, in layman's language:

'The State deeded our lots 17 years ago! How can they Renege on that deed now?'

'Why didn't the State stop Nelson, back in 1933, from filling the lake bottom, if he was violating the law?'

'Isn't this claim Outlawed, after all these years?'

'How come we've had to pay taxes and assessments for many years, if we don't own our property?'

Plaintiffs' reliance, particularly, is on the doctrine of estoppel against the State. The acts of the State which they urge as the basis for such estoppel are the following: (1) The State's granting a land contract to Emil Nelson covering Lot 5 of Assessor's Plat No. 21 and subsequently joining with Nelson in executing and recording a plat of Ardmore Park subdivision containing lots which were in said Lot 5 and also on the fill lying lakeward of it and of the eastern patent line; (2) the approval of the plat by the auditor general as having been made and offered for filing by the owners of the subdivision, namely, the State and Nelson, thus, in effect, certifying Nelson as an owner; and (3) execution and delivery by the State of a deed to Nelson describing and conveying all of the 90 lots of Ardmore Park Subdivision, including those located on the fill.

Plaintiffs contend that these State acts, plus the fact that it is not Nelson who now claims and owns the lots but plaintiffs who are subsequent innocent purchasers for value, who have improved the lots, built homes and paid taxes thereon for years, will result in a great and unjust loss to plaintiffs if the State be permitted to prevail in its claim, and that these combine to constitute ground for estoppel.

In response to plaintiffs' theory of estoppel the State's position is that the State cannot be estopped by unlawful, unauthorized acts of any of its officials, boards or agents, nor is the State bound thereby, citing Sittler v. Board of Control, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W.2d 681. The State then quotes from Lawrence v. American Surety Company of New York, 264 Mich. 516, 250 N.W. 295, 88 A.L.R. 535, as follows:

'To estop the state, the acts or conduct of an officer must be within the scope of his authority.'

The State then stresses that title to the unpatented, submerged bottom lands of Lake St. Clair came to the State upon its admission to the Union, that it was and is held by the State in trust for the people for navigation, fishing, et cetera, and the State has a duty to protect that trust and may not surrender those rights of the people thereto, nor can those rights of the people be affected except by an act of the legislature, citing State v. Venice of America Land Co., 160 Mich. 680, 125 N.W. 770; People v. Silberwood, 110 Mich. 103, 67 N.W. 1087, 32 L.R.A. 694; State v. Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 127 Mich. 580, 87 N.W. 117; and Nedtweg v. Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 208 N.W. 51, 211 N.W. 647.

In this action the trial court upheld the plaintiffs' position and ordered dismissal of the State's cross-bill of complaint. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the trial court and remanded the cause for determination of the amount due the State under the submerged lands act of 1955, as amended, for the filled land in dispute.

From the holding and order of the Court of Appeals, on plaintiffs' application, leave to appeal to this Court was granted.

There can be no doubt that a controlling question as to the claimed estoppel is whether the State acts, by its officers and agents, were of a kind so authorized as to be binding on the State. Cases relied on by the State in this connection differ from the case at bar in that here the auditor general was not only authorized by law to approve plats for recording, but it was his duty so to approve or disapprove (C.L.1948, § 560.38 (Stat.Ann. § 26.468)) and approve if he found it conformed with the requirements of the plat act. Section 13 of that act (C.L.1948, § 560.13 (Stat.Ann.1953 Rev. § 26.443)) provides that the plat shall be signed by the person holding the title. The approval by the auditor general here indicated his opinion that the State and Nelson were the owners of the 90 lots of Ardmore Park Subdivision as to part of which the State had given a contract but had not yet deeded to Nelson. As for sale by the State land office board of lots to Nelson, the authority relied on by plaintiffs existed under P.A.1937, No. 155, § 9, as amended by P.A.1941, No. 363 (C.L.1948, § 211.359 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 7.959)).

In its opinion the trial court summarized the case and analyzed and applied the law applicable in language we thoroughly approve, as follows:

'The court finds in this case that the State of Michigan has by three specific acts put itself in a position which makes its position in this case completely unconscionable. First of all, it joined as a proprietor in the plat of the Ardmore Park Subdivision at a time when it knew, or should have known, full well that its...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Lyon Charter Twp. v. Petty, Docket Nos. 327685
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 13. Oktober 2016
  • Flanders Industries, Inc. v. State of Mich.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 20. Dezember 1993
    ... ... People v. Massey, 137 Mich.App. 480, 485, 358 N.W.2d 615 (1984). These lands are held, not in a proprietary capacity by the state, but in trust, in a sovereign governmental capacity, for the public. Oliphant v. Frazho, 5 Mich.App. 319, 322, 146 N.W.2d 685 (1966), rev'd on other grounds 381 Mich. 630, 167 N.W.2d 280 (1969) ...         Title to the submerged bottom lands came to the state upon its admission to the union. Oliphant v. Frazho, 381 Mich. 630, 634, 167 N.W.2d 280 (1969). See ... ...
  • Twp. of Rose v. Devoted Friends Animal Soc'y
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 21. April 2022
    ... ... et seq., vacated in part on other grounds 500 Mich ... 1010 (2017). "To achieve these goals, [i]t is the policy ... of this state and a goal of zoning that uses of property not ... conforming to municipal zoning ordinances be gradually ... eliminated." Id. at 488 ... completion of a specialized building constructed on the basis ... of an erroneous permit); Oliphant v State, 381 Mich ... 630, 637; 167 N.W.2d 280 (1969) (claim initiated by state ... after seventeen years, during which the property ... ...
  • People ex rel. Gazlay v. Murray
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 13. August 1974
    ...221 N.W.2d 604 ... 54 Mich.App. 685 ... PEOPLE of the State of Michigan ex rel. A. Gene GAZLAY, ... Director of the Michigan Department of Natural ... Resources, Plaintiff-Appellee, ... Peter G. MURRAY, ...         Relying on Oliphant v. Frazho, 381 Mich. 630, 167 N.W.2d 280 (1969), defendant contends that the state is estopped from claiming title to the land in question ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT