Olive v. State
| Decision Date | 24 July 1894 |
| Citation | 34 Fla. 203,15 So. 925 |
| Parties | OLIVE v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Jackson county; W. D. Barnes, Judge.
Jerry Olive was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Jurors stated that they had formed opinions of the guilt or innocence of the accused from having heard what purported to be a detailed statement of the facts of the killing, but not from the witnesses, and, if taken into the jury box, would carry in their minds the opinions they had formed; and assuming the evidence to be as detailed to them, they were then ready to render a verdict, but that they could readily and unhesitatingly render a verdict according to the evidence in the case if taken on the jury, notwithstanding the opinions they then entertained. Held, that they were competent jurors.
2. Jurors stated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict according to the evidence; that they had no conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment, but that they would not find a man guilty on circumstantial evidence only in cases where the penalty was death. The court excused the jurors on peremptory challenge of the state. Held, not to be error.
3. It is not error for the court to charge the jury that the statement of the prisoner is evidence before them, to be allowed such weight, and such only, as they saw fit to give it.
4. The trial court has the power, during the term of court, to amend its record made at the former term so as to speak the truth as to what actually transpired at that term.
5. Evidence in this case considered sufficient to sustain the verdict.
D. L. McKinnon, for plaintiff in error.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted in Jackson county for the murder of Molly Olive, and has sued out a writ of error from the judgment of the court imposing the death sentence upon him.
The first error assigned is that the court erred in overruing defendant's challenge to three jurors named. The record recites that in impaneling the jury three jurors (giving their names) stated on their voir dire that they had formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant from having heard what purported to be a detailed statement of the facts and circumstances of the killing, but did not hear said statement from the witnesses. They further stated that, if taken into the jury box, they would carry on their minds the opinions they had formed, and, assuming the evidence to be as detailed to them, they were then ready to render a verdict but that they could readily and unhesitatingly render a verdict according to the evidence in the case if taken upon the jury, notwithstanding the opinions they then entertained. The defendant challenged the jurors for cause, and, his challenge being overruled, took an exception. It further appears that defendant used nine peremptory challenges before the panel was completed, and only one of the three jurors challenged by him sat upon the jury.
In O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, a juror was declared competent who stated that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, but that such opinion was based upon mere rumor; that he had not heard the witnesses or any one speak of the matter by detailing any of the facts or circumstances connected with the killing as of their own knowledge; that it would require evidence to remove the opinion so formed upon rumor, but that, if taken upon the jury, he could readily and without hesitation find a verdict according to the evidence, although that verdict might be contrary to the opinion so formed on rumor. The principle announced in O'Connor's Case, that where a juror's conceptions are not fixed and settled, nor warped by prejudice, but are only such as would naturally spring from public rumor or newspaper report, and his mind is open to the impressions it may receive on the trial, so as to be convinced according to the law and the testimony, he is not incompetent, was approved in the case of Montague v State, 17 Fla. 662.
In Andrews v. State, 21 Fla. 598, a juror was held competent who stated that he had formed and expressed an opinion from rumor, and had not conversed with the witnesses that his opinion would yield readily to evidence; but stated further that he would rather not have heard what he did hear, if he had to go into the jury box. In the same case another juror stated that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but such opinion was not formed from hearing or conversing with the witnesses in the case; that, if he went into the jury box, he would give a verdict according to the evidence; that it would take a reasonable amount of evidence; that it would take conclusive evidence to change his mind. He was held incompetent.
In English v. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689, the juror stated that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, but that his opinion was not of a fixed nature, and that he would be governed by the evidence. He further stated that it would require evidence to change his opinion, and, being asked if he would be influenced by the opinion he had, or would be guided entirely by the evidence which would be allowed to go to the jury, said he would be governed by the evidence allowed to go to the jury by the court. He was held competent.
The fixedness or strength of the existing opinion is the essential test of a juror's competency, and the court should look specially to such state of mind in passing upon the question of qualification. 'If such impressions become fixed, and ripen into decided opinions, they will influence a man's conduct, and will create, necessarily a prejudice for or against the party towards whom they are directed, and should disqualify him as a juror; but if, in obedience to the laws of his organization, his mind receives impressions from the reports he hears, which have not become opinions, fixed and decided, he would not be disqualified.' O'Connor v. State, supra. It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, and correctly, too, that the statement of a juror that he can readily render a verdict according to the evidence, notwithstanding an opinion entertained, will not alone render him competent if it otherwise appears that his formed opinion is of such a fixed and settled nature as not readily to yield to the evidence. The second juror referred to in the Andrews Case had formed an opinion, not from talking with the witnesses, and said he could render a verdict according to the evidence; but he also stated that it would take conclusive evidence to change his mind. If his opinion was so fixed as to require conclusive evidence to change it, it could not, in the nature of things, be such as to readily yield to the evidence in the case. The jurors in the case before us had formed opinions from hearing what purported to be a detailed statement of the killing, but did not hear it from the witnesses; and they said that they would carry such opinions into the jury box, if accepted as jurors. They also stated that they could readily and unhesitatingly render a verdict according to the evidence in the case, notwithstanding the opinions they then entertained. If the above was all the evidence on the question of the jurors' competency, it is entirely clear that, according to the rule announced in the decisions referred to, they would not be disqualified. There would be nothing to show that the opinions formed from sources other than the witnesses were of such a character as would not readily yield to the evidence in the case, as...
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Singer v. State
...Andrews v. State, 1885, 21 Fla. 598; Denham v. State, 1886, 22 Fla. 664; English v. State, 1893, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689; Olive v. State, 1894, 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. 925; Brown v. State, 1898, 40 Fla. 459, 25 So. 63; Melbourne v. State, 1906, 51 Fla. 69, 40 So. 189; Lamb v. State, 1926, 90 Fl......
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...have been settled in this State since the year 1881, in the cases of Metzger v. The State, 18 Fla. 481, and Olive v. The State of Florida, 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. 925, 927. In the latter case the Court '* * * The jurors were challenged by the state for cause, and excused by the court. They stat......
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... ... Supreme Court of Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United ... States held them qualified. O'Connor v. State, 9 ... Fla. 215; Montague v. State, 17 Fla. 662; Denham ... v. State, 22 Fla. 664; English v. State, 12 So ... 689, 31 Fla. 340; Olive v. State, 15 So. 925, 34 ... Fla. 203; Brown v. State, 25 So. 63, 40 Fla. 459; ... Marlow v. State, 38 So. 653, 49 Fla. 7; ... Melbourne v. State, 40 So. 189, 51 Fla. 69 ... Petition ... for rehearing denied ... BROWN, ... C.J., and WHITFIELD, ELLIS, and STRUM, ... ...
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Paramore v. State, 37178
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