Oliver v. Gilmore
Decision Date | 14 September 1892 |
Docket Number | 3,387. |
Citation | 52 F. 562 |
Parties | OLIVER et al. v. GILMORE. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
The contract in question, marked 'Exhibit A,' was as follows:
By R. A. NEAL, President.
AETNA NUT CO.,
By R. A. NEAL, President.
SARGENT & CO.,
J. B. SARGENT, President.'
The declaration was in two counts, as follows:
'First Count. The plaintiffs say the defendant made a contract with them, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked 'A,' whereby, in consideration of the agreements therein made by the plaintiff, the defendant promised to pay to the plaintiffs, on or before the fifteenth day of each month, except January, in the year 1887, a sum of money equal to three and one half per cent. of the net sales of strap and T hinges made by him during the month preceding, and the defendant further promised to make a report of said sales, signed and sworn to, as provided in said agreement, and send the same to the Wheeling Hinge Company; and the plaintiffs have done all things which they agreed to do in said contract. And the plaintiffs say that three and one half per centum of the net sales made by the defendant during the first eleven months of 1887 amounted to the sum of three thousand dollars during each of said months, but the defendant has neglected and refused to pay said sum of three thousand dollars, and has neglected and refused to make reports as aforesaid, though demand was made upon him so to do on the fifteenth day of each of said months; wherefore the defendant owes the plaintiffs said sum of three thousand dollars, and interest thereon from each of said fifteenth days.
M. F. Dickinson, Jr., and Samuel Williston, for plaintiffs.
Francis L. Hayes, for defendant.
Plaintiffs concede that the second count is invalid. The important and difficult questions in the case turn on the first count, and the contract which is made a part of it by its tenor. We desire at the outset to dispose of two or three minor considerations. It is clear that the point of nonjoinder of other parties is not well taken, because it is plain that each subscriber to the contract is holden only for his own payment. Also, on the matter of ultra vires, inasmuch as a corporation instituted for private trading or manufacturing purposes, and owing no special duty to the public, can ordinarily limit or entirely omit the exercise of its corporate powers, and is no more holden than an individual to proceed at a pecuniary loss with its intended operations, no question of that sort can be raised on a declaration alleging unqualifiedly that a contract was made. In a declaration of this character, all questions of ultra vires, authority of officers of the corporation, and formalities of execution are covered in; and objections in reference thereto can only be made to appear by subsequent pleadings, or by the facts as developed at the trial. The proposition of the plaintiffs that, as they had fully performed, the defendant is liable, even if the contract could not be enforced while it was executory on both parts, is not sufficiently sustained by the authorities cited by them, and is controverted by Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469, 16 N.E. 299; Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558; Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 9 S.Ct. 553; and Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 11 S.Ct. 478. Also, the plaintiffs' proposition that what is sought to be accomplished by this contract indirectly might have been, under the law, accomplished directly, by the defendant's purchasing the works and closing them, does not aid us in coming to a conclusion in this case. There are many matters which the law cannot prevent, but which it refuses to aid when in an executory form. This is singularly illustrated by many of the expressions in the house of lords in Steamship Co. v. McGregor, (1892) App. Cas. 25. Also the decisions quite uniformly recognize the distinction, in actions for the price of manufacturing plants sold, between cases where the vendor merely has knowledge of the purpose of the purchaser to create a monopoly, and those where the vendor becomes an active participant in that purpose. If we were to accept the law without modification, as one branch of it was left by the court of king's bench in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, (A.D. 1711,) and as the other was stated in 4 Bl.Comm.pp. 156-159, concerning forestalling and engrossing, there would seem to be no doubt that the demurrer would necessarily be sustained. So far as the latter branch is concerned, the contract would seem to be in violation of the old rules of the common...
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