Oliver v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 31 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H–12–2568.
• Citation: 891 F.Supp.2d 839
• Parties: Lloyd Wayne OLIVER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Lane LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

891 F.Supp.2d 839

Lloyd Wayne OLIVER, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Lane LEWIS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H–12–2568.

United States District Court,
S.D. Texas,
Houston Division.

Aug. 31, 2012.

[891 F.Supp.2d 840]

Keith A. Gross, Attorney at Law, League City, TX, Joseph D. Libby, Dyer & Libby, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Chad W. Dunn, Brazil & Dunn, Vincent Reed Ryan, Jr., Houston, TX, Kathlyn Claire Wilson, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.

Lloyd Wayne Oliver is running for Harris County District Attorney. He won the May 29, 2012 Democratic Party primary election for that position and intends to run in the November general election as the Democratic Party's candidate. Officials of the Harris County Democratic Party have notified Oliver that they will not place his name on the general-election ballot as the Party's nominee on the basis that public statements he made, including praising his primary opponent as well as the incumbent (Republican) district attorney, violated Texas Democratic Party rules. The Democratic Party does not intend to offer any nominee for the office of District Attorney in the general election.

On August 24, 2012, Oliver and two individuals who voted in the Democratic Party primary in Harris County filed suit in state court against several Texas state public officials and Democratic Party officers, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Party's rules did not support this action. Oliver also seeks an injunction under the Texas Election Code requiring his name to be placed on the general-election ballot as the Democratic Party's nominee. Oliver alleges that he will be harmed absent such relief because he will be off the

[891 F.Supp.2d 841]

ballot and unable to campaign or raise funds. The two individual-voter plaintiffs, who asserted that they were suing on behalf of all other Democrats who voted in the Party's May primary, alleged that “[t]hey have been disenfranchised and had their voting rights nullified and supplanted” by the defendants' actions.

On August 26, two of the defendants, Lane Lewis, Chair of the Harris County Democratic Party, and Gilberto Hinojosa, Chair of the Texas Democratic Party, removed this suit to federal court. On August 27, the plaintiffs moved to remand. The only issue addressed in this opinion is whether this case will stay in federal court or remanded to state court.

This court held a hearing on August 28 and counsel argued. Based on a careful review of the pleadings, the notice of removal and motion to remand, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, this court grants Oliver's motion to remand to state court. The reasons are explained below.

I. Background

On May 29, 2012, Harris County District Attorney candidate Lloyd Wayne Oliver prevailed in the Democratic Party primary election for Harris County District Attorney. His victory was short-lived. On August 10 and 22, 2012, Oliver received two letters from the Harris County Democratic Chairman, stating that Oliver had violated Democratic Party rules by making favorable public statements about Republican Party officials and candidates. The letters told Oliver that the Democratic Party would remove his name from the general election ballot and would not field a candidate for District Attorney in the general election.

On August 24, Oliver and two Democratic Party primary voters, David B. Wilson and Woody S. Monica, Jr., filed suit in Texas state court against Lewis and Hinojosa. The plaintiffs also sued Stan Stanart, the Harris County Clerk; Ed Emmett, the Harris County Judge; and Hope Andrade, the Texas Secretary of State. (Docket Entry No. 2, Ex. 1). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants acted improperly by removing, or permitting the removal of, Oliver's name from the general-election ballot as the Democratic Party's District Attorney nominee and by failing to follow § 145.039 ¹ of the Tex. Elec.Code as well as internal Texas Democratic Party rules. ( Id. at 5). David B. Wilson and Woody S. Monica, the individual voter plaintiffs, also claim that they were “disenfranchised” by the defendants' actions, which “nullified” their voting rights. ( Id.). The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief under § 273.081 of the Texas Election Code, which states that “[a] person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of this code is entitled to appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring.” Tex. Elec.Code § 273.081.²

[891 F.Supp.2d 842]

The defendants' notice of removal cited 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446(a) and asserted the following grounds for federal-question removal jurisdiction:

(1) The plaintiffs' state court petition stated two federal causes of action, a 14th Amendment claim by the individual voters, who alleged in paragraph 6(m) of the petition that they had been “disenfranchised” and “had their voting rights nullified and supplanted by the Defendants,” and a substantive due process claim by Oliver, who alleged in paragraph 6(n) that the Texas Election Code did not permit a candidate's name to be removed for violating Party rules if he was not otherwise ineligible (or deceased or had withdrawn his name), and that the defendants' decision to have no candidate for the office “refut[ed] the people's choice.” (Docket Entry No. 1 at 2).

(2) The relief the plaintiffs seek would violate the Harris County Democratic Party's First Amendment right to select its nominee for elected office, free of court intervention. (As a result, any state-law claim would raise the constitutionality of a state-law basis for requiring a political party to proceed with a party nominee when it does not wish to do so. ( Id. at 2–4).

On August 27, the plaintiffs filed an “emergency” motion to remand, asserting that removal was improper because their state-court petition alleged solely state-law claims. (Docket Entry No. 2 at 3). The court held the hearing the following day, after notice was provided to the defendants.

II. The Applicable Legal Standard

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the removing party has the burden of proof on a motion to remand. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir.1988), appeal after remand,915 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1990), aff'd,503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 178 n. 25 (5th Cir.2000); see also Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir.1996) ( “[T]here is a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal court.”). To determine whether federal jurisdiction exists, the court looks to the record in the state court at the time of removal. Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir.1995). Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir.2002), if there is any doubt that a right to removal exists, “ambiguities are to be construed against removal.” Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723;De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.1995).

III. Did Federal Jurisdiction Exist at the Time of Removal?

Whether a cause of action presents a federal question depends on the allegations contained in a plaintiff's complaint. See Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). As the “master of his complaint,” Elam v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir.2011), a plaintiff who has a choice between federal- and state-law claims may elect to proceed in state court on the exclusive basis of state law, defeating the defendant's opportunity to remove but taking the risk that any federal claims will be precluded. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 & n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (noting that, because the plaintiff is the “master of the claim,” “he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law”) (footnote omitted).

[891 F.Supp.2d 843]

But if a plaintiff's pleading presents a federal question, removal is proper.

Federal-question removal jurisdiction is present in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the plaintiffs' state-court petition alleges at least one federal claim. The two individual voters allege that the defendants' actions “disenfranchised” them and others who voted in the Democratic Party's May 2012 primary and “nullified” their voting rights. (Docket Entry No. 2, Ex. 1 at 5). This allegation states a claim for a violation of the individual-voter plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights. Recognizing this, at the August 28 hearing, counsel for plaintiffs nonsuited the individual voters, leaving Oliver as the sole plaintiff.

A plaintiff may not defeat a federal court's jurisdiction over a properly removed case merely by amending the complaint to omit the federal-law claims. See Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir.1994); Jones v. Houston Independent School District, 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir.1992); Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 487–88 (7th Cir.1997). “[A] post-removal amendment to a petition that deletes all federal claims, leaving only pendent state claims, does not divest the district court of its properly triggered subject matter jurisdiction.” Hook, 38 F.3d at 780;see also Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir.1990); In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir.1980). But if a postremoval pleading amendment eliminates the only federal claim and leaves only state-law claims, a court must determine whether to remand those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). That statute provides:

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2)...