Marshall v. MarOpCo, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 February 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16–CV–3236–G
• Citation: 223 F.Supp.3d 562
• Parties: Preston MARSHALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAROPCO, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

223 F.Supp.3d 562

Preston MARSHALL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
MAROPCO, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16–CV–3236–G

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed February 22, 2017

223 F.Supp.3d 565

J. Max L. Tribble, John Lahad, Neal Stuart Manne, Susman Godfrey LLP, Akilah F. Craig, C. Davis Bradford, Paul J. Dobrowski, Dobrowski Larkin & Johnson LLP, Jeffrey W. Chambers, Ware Jackson Lee Chambers LLP, Mark S. Siurek, Patricia Haylon, Warren & Siurek LLP, Houston, TX, Richard A. Sayles, William S. Snyder, Robert L. Sayles, Sayles Werbner PC, Dallas, TX, Tamar Lusztig, Susman Godfrey LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher J. Akin, Kent D. Krabill, John T. Cox, III, Russell G. Herman, Lynn Tillotson Pinker & Cox LLP, Jon G. Shepherd, Holland & Knight, Linda R. Stahl, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada Mockler, PLLC, Dallas, TX, Christopher David Johnsen, Lawrence Bradley Hancock, Holland & Knight LLP, Ashish Mahendru, Darren Andrew Braun, Mahendru PC, R. Paul Yetter, Bryce L. Callahan, Robert K. Ellis, Yetter Coleman LLP, David J. Beck, Jeff M. Golub, Beck Redden & Secrest LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A. JOE FISH, Senior United States District Judge

Before the court are the plaintiffs' motions (1) for leave to file an amended complaint (docket entry 9) and (2) to remand the case to the state court from which it was previously removed (docket entry 8). For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs commenced this action in the 11th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas on June 22, 2015, asserting various claims under Texas law relating to Preston Marshall ("Marshall")'s employment with the defendant, MAROPCO , Inc. ("MarOpCo"). Defendants' Notice of Removal ("Notice") (docket entry 1). On August 12, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a sixth amended petition, which added a federal claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA").¹ Notice at 2, Appendix at 1752, Plaintiffs' Sixth Amended Petition ("Amended Petition") at 39–40 (docket entry 1–4). On September 9, 2016, the defendants removed the case to federal court in the Southern District of Texas on the basis of federal question jurisdiction for the CFAA claim and supplemental jurisdiction for the state law claims. Notice at 3–4. On November 17, 2016, the case was transferred to the Northern District

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of Texas and assigned to this court. See Order to Transfer Case (docket entry 50).

Prior to the transfer, the plaintiffs filed the instant motions for leave to amend their complaint and omit the federal claim and to remand the case to state court. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend") (docket entry 9); Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand ("Motion to Remand") (docket entry 8). The motions are now ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs the amendment of pleadings. Under Rule 15(a)(2), leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." This and the other federal rules "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This issue was before the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), where the Court explained:

Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires'; this mandate is to be heeded.... In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’

Id. at 182.

In Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corporation , 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals held:

‘Discretion’ may be a misleading term, for rule 15(a) severely restricts the judge's freedom, directing that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires'. It evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend. The policy of the federal rules is to permit liberal amendment to facilitate determination of claims on the merits and to prevent litigation from becoming a technical exercise in the fine points of pleading.

Id. at 597–98.

Since Dussouy , the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that Rule 15(a) evinces a liberal amendment policy. See, e.g. , Lowrey v. Texas A & M University System , 117 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1997) (" Rule 15(a) expresses a strong presumption in favor of liberal pleading"); Nance v. Gulf Oil Corporation , 817 F.2d 1176, 1180 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Federal Rule 15(a) counsels a liberal amendment policy"); Youmans v. Simon , 791 F.2d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The policy underlying Rule 15(a) is one in favor of liberal amendment."); Foster v. Daon Corporation , 713 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1983) (the purpose of Rule 15(a)"is to assist the disposition of the case on its merits, and to prevent pleadings from becoming ends in themselves"); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Company, Inc. , 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982) (district courts should err on the side of allowing amendments), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983). A motion to amend, therefore, should not be denied unless there is a substantial reason to do so. Jacobsen v. Osborne , 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District , 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) ).

Here, the plaintiffs contend that the court should grant leave to amend

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because the defendants will not be prejudiced, the amendment is not done in bad faith, and the amendment will not cause undue delay. See Motion to Amend at 1–10. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' amendment is sought in bad faith because it amounts to forum manipulation, and that it will cause undue delay. See Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("Response to Motion to Amend") at 4–11 (docket entry 21). Accordingly, the court will address the Rule 15 factors below.

1. Whether the Plaintiffs' Amendment Will Cause Undue Delay

The plaintiffs contend that this amendment will not delay the case because they filed the instant motion within six days of the removal of the lawsuit to federal court. Motion to Amend at 7. The plaintiffs further contend that the defendants have repeatedly delayed this action by filing multiple unsuccessful mandamus actions. Id. The defendants maintain that the plaintiffs were responsible for any delay by amending their petition and adding the CFAA claim. Response to Motion to Amend at 8. The defendants also urge that the removal does not constitute a delay because it was their right to do so. Id. Moreover, the defendants aver that this case was not ready for a November 2016 trial and it would be continued as a result of the state court judge's retirement. Id.

Here, the court finds that allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint will not result in undue delay. The plaintiffs promptly moved for leave to amend their complaint. Dueling v. Devon Energy Corporation , 623 Fed.Appx. 127, 131 (5th Cir. 2015) (looking to whether the plaintiffs moved promptly to amend their complaint). Moreover, it appears that the defendants have caused repeated delays in the state court by filing multiple unsuccessful mandamus petitions and five unsuccessful attempts to stay the litigation. See Motion to Amend at 7, Exhibits 4–6. The same day that the plaintiffs amended their petition to add the CFAA claim on August 12, 2016, the defendants sought a three month continuance of the trial setting. Id. , Exhibit 17. The trial court denied the defendants' motion on August 22, 2016. Id. , Exhibit 10 at 20–22. Then, the defendants waited over two weeks, until September 9, 2016, to remove the case. See Notice. The court also notes that the defendants waited an additional two weeks after the case was removed to file a motion to transfer. See Defendants' Motion to Transfer (docket entry 14). The actions of the defendants—not the plaintiffs—have delayed the case for several months through various procedural maneuvers. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of allowing amendment.

2. Whether the Plaintiffs' Amendment Prejudices the Defendants

The defendants insist that they are prejudiced because the plaintiffs' "stated purpose of the amendment is to deny Defendants a federal forum for Plaintiffs' lawsuit." Response to Motion to Amend at 6. Furthermore, the defendants argue that this amendment will prevent them from pursuing their CFAA counterclaim in a federal forum. Id. Here, the court finds that the defendants would not be prejudiced by the plaintiffs' amendment. First, there will be one less claim for the defendants to defend against. Moreover, there is no...