Oliver v. Polson
Decision Date | 21 October 1921 |
Docket Number | 16449. |
Citation | 201 P. 289,117 Wash. 385 |
Parties | OLIVER et al. v. POLSON et al. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.
Action by Angus J. Oliver and others, associated together as the Glacier Coal Company, unincorporated, and another, against Alex Polson and another. Judgment for plaintiffs against the named defendant, and the latter appeals. Affirmed.
Kerr, McCord & Ivey, of Seattle, for appellant.
Flick & Paul and Peters & Powell, all of Seattle, for respondents.
In February, 1920, plaintiffs, Angus J. Oliver and others, as owners, entered into a miner's lease of certain portions of sections 16, 17, 20, and 21, township 39 N., range 7 E. W M., with defendant Alex Polson, for a term of years. For the purpose of this case the conditions of the lease were substantially, a cash payment (which was made) with the right of entry for the purpose of coal mining and the making of any and all improvements on and means of transportation on any and all of the lands as might be necessary or convenient for searching for, working, getting, preparing, carrying away and disposing of the coal to be got from the lands. The lessee was given the right to the use of water, water power, timber, rock, stone, and so forth as found necessary or convenient in mining and transportation operations. Section 4 of the lease provides:
Section 6 of the lease provides:
Section 10 provides:
'The party of the second part shall begin the development of the coal deposits upon said lands hereinbefore described within nine months from the date hereof, and shall thereafter prosecute the same with reasonable diligence and shall mine and market the coal from said lands as rapidly and extensively as the conditions and the market for coal shall permit.'
The parties bound their heirs, representatives, assigns, and successors in interest, jointly and severally, with permission to assign the lease as a whole to any party desired by the lessee, he being responsible, nevertheless, for the performance of the conditions and terms of the lease.
The lease was assigned by the lessee to the Washington Development Company, a corporation, of which the lessee is president and principal stockholder. Immediate possession was taken of the property, and thereafter, for a number of years, a large amount of money was spent in prospecting and attempting to develop the coal prospects on the lands and other lands adjacent thereto under the control of the lessee and his assignee, within the so-called coal field. At the expiration of several years the lessee, claiming to be satisfied by his investigations and the advice of competent geologists, coal mining engineers, and experts that the lands were destitute of merchantable coal in quantities sufficient to be profitably mined, abandoned the field, including the lands involved in this section, and gave his lessors notice accordingly. The owners, having received no pay other than the cash consideration at the date of the contract, commenced this action against the defendants, Alex Polson and the Washington Development Company, on December 16, 1915, to recover $20,000 as minimum royalties for the years May 1, 1911, to May 1, 1915, and the further sum of $100,000 for failure of the defendants to properly prospect the lands for coal and put them in producing condition alleging the lands contained valuable deposits of coal capable of production in such quantities that royalties would far exceed $4,000 per annum during the term of the lease.
On November 5, 1917, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint containing two causes of action separately stated, the one to recover $28,000 claimed due under the contract for minimum royalties at $4,000 per annum from May 1, 1911, and the other to recover $120,000 damages for the failure of defendants to open and develop the coal mine or mines on the lands alleged to have been available and sufficient in quantity and quality to warrant large profits in the market as conditions then existed, and to have reasonably furnished an output of $400 tons daily, which would have made an average of 25 cents per ton royalty under the terms of the lease. To the amended complaint the defendants interposed a motion to require the plaintiffs to elect as between the first and second causes of action, on the ground, as claimed by the defendants, that they were inconsistent. The court required the plaintiffs to elect, and thereupon they chose their first cause of action, comprising the annual minimum royalties. In the amended answer to the amended complaint, it is admitted that the defendant, Washington Development Company, is a corporation, that the lease between the parties, a copy of which was set out in the complaint, was entered into by the parties thereto, that it had been assigned by Alex Polson to the Washington Development Company, and that he is president and principal stockholder of the corporation. All other essential allegations of the amended complaint were denied, and affirmatively it was alleged that at the date of the lease, and at all times since, no coal in merchantable quality and sufficient quantity existed in the lands; that no consideration existed for the execution of the lease; that there has been a total failure of consideration for the lease; that royalties were to be paid only in the event coal existed in sufficient quantities to be profitably mined; and that no royalties in any sum whatever have accrued or have been owing from defendants or either of them to the plaintiffs.
The reply denied the affirmative allegations in the amended answer.
There was a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $28,000. By consent of plaintiffs in open court the defendant the Washington Development Company, a corporation, was dismissed from the action. From a judgment on the verdict with interest defendant, Alex Polson, has appealed.
1. The principal controversy in this case depends upon the construction of the lease, and consequently upon which side the burden of proof rested in the trial of the case. The jury was instructed that the burden of proof was upon the defendants to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that they made reasonable search and exploration of the lands in question for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of coal, and to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that merchantable coal in sufficient quantities to be profitably mined does not exist upon such lands. Appellant claims the instruction was erroneous, and that the burden was on plaintiffs, who were not entitled to recover anything until they fairly met the burden. Elaborate arguments have been made and many authorities cited by respondent's counsel upon this subject. It would be unprofitable to write with attempted clearness upon all such authorities.
In the annotation, page 1078, L. R. A. 1917E, following the decision in the case of Bennett v. Howard by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it is said:
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GEJ CORPORATION v. Uranium Aire, Inc.
...(1910); Wilson v. Beech Creek Cannel-Coal Co., 161 Pa. 499, 29 A. 100 (1894); Watson v. O'Hern, 6 Watts 362 (Pa.1837); Oliver v. Polson, 117 Wash. 385, 201 P. 289 (1921).1 The court's finding to the effect that appellants did not sustain their burden of proof presents a question of fact. In......