Oliver v. Price
Decision Date | 02 May 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-CV-2187-VEH-JHE |
Parties | MICHAEL DARNELL OLIVER, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN CHERYL PRICE, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation on February 28, 2017. (Doc. 70). The magistrate judge recommended that defendants Iliff and Clum-Cordingley's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical claims be construed as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and that the motion be granted and the claims dismissed without prejudice. (Id.). The magistrate judge further recommended that the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC") defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and the following claims be dismissed with prejudice: (1) the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical claims against defendants Sanders, Eads, Nath, Washington, and Barber; (2) the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Miree, Baldwin, White, Snelson, Steed, and Voyles; (3) the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims against defendants Nath, Eads, Sanders, and Steed; (4) the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims against defendants Price, Miree, and White due to his placement in dry/reduced content cell status from September 10, 2014 to December 16, 2014; (5) the plaintiff's First Amendment access to courts and free speech claims against defendants Price and Miree; and (6) the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants Nath, Steed, and Miree. (Id.). On March 21, 2017, the court received the plaintiff's objections to the report and recommendation. (Doc. 73).
Before the court engages in its own analysis, it is important to emphasize that the magistrate judge is not making any final factual determinations or rulings on summary judgment, but rather only providing recommendations. Instead, the undersigned has reviewed de novo those portions of the record that relate to the parties' objections and separately and independently determined the correctness of any objected-to findings and recommendations.
This accepted process is set forth statutorily in 28 U.S.C. § 636, which states in part that:
28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis by underlining added).
Regarding the de novo review requirement in particular, the district court's obligation is to independently review those portions of the record to which objections are made, as opposed to reviewing the entire record. See, e.g., Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 1981) ();1 id. ( )(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).2
Additionally, it is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may have regarding a magistrate judge's findings contained in the report and recommendation, as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue even if such matter was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., United States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360, 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) () (emphasis added).
All defendants assert that qualified immunity bars the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims brought against them in their individual capacities. "The defense of qualified immunity completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonableperson would have known.'" Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003)). "To receive qualified immunity, a government official first must prove that he was acting within his discretionary authority." Id.
This is a two-part test. Under the first step, "the defendant must [prove that he or she was] performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen within his legitimate job description." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). Next, the defendant must prove that he or she was "executing that job-related function." Id. at 1267. "Once a defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358.3
Until 2009, the Supreme Court had required a two-part inquiry to determine the applicability of qualified immunity, as established by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001), modified in application by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S. Ct. 808, 813, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) ( ). Under the Saucier test, "[t]he threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2513,153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002).
If, under the plaintiff's allegations, the defendants would have violated a constitutional right, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156). The "clearly established" requirement is designed to assure that officers have fair notice of the conduct which is proscribed. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S. Ct. at 2515. This second inquiry ensures "that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S. Ct. at 2158.
The "unlawfulness must be apparent" under preexisting law.4 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097-98, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986)). Therefore, a temporal requirement exists related to this inquiry. More particularly, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable public officer would not havebelieved her actions to be lawful in light of law that was clearly established at the time of the purported violation. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S. Ct. at 3038 () (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S. Ct. 596, 599, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004) () (emphasis added); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198, 125 S. Ct. at 599 ()...
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