Cottone v. Jenne, 02-14529.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-14529.,02-14529. |
| Citation | 326 F.3d 1352 |
| Parties | Richard COTTONE, as personal representative of the Estate of Peter Anthony Cottone, Jr., Peter Cottone, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Kenneth C. JENNE, II, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Joseph D'Elia, George Williams, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff and/or Correction Officer of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, Patrick Tighe, individually and in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Department of Detention, Broward Sheriff's Office, Dwight St. Claire, Delores Watson, Barbara Law, Defendants-Appellants, Broward County Sheriff's Office, John Does, individually and in their official capacity as Directors and/or supervisors of the North Broward Detention Center, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Christine M. Duignan, Michael Ross Piper, Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke & George, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Barbara Ann Heyer, Heyer & Associates, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HULL, MARCUS and FARRIS*, Circuit Judges.
In this § 1983 suit, defendants Joseph D'Elia, George Williams, Patrick Tighe, Dwight St. Claire, Delores Watson, and Barbara Law, all in their individual capacities, appeal the district court's order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss raising the defense of qualified immunity. After review and oral argument, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity for defendants D'Elia and Williams, and reverse its denial of qualified immunity for defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law.
This appeal involves the death of Peter Cottone, Jr. ("Cottone") while he was detained in the North Broward Detention Center. Given the Rule 12(b)(6) posture of the case, we first review the allegations of the amended complaint as if all the allegations contained therein were true.1
On March 9, 1999, Cottone was involved in a physical altercation with his father, Peter Cottone, Sr. As a result of this violent incident, Cottone involuntarily was transported to Memorial Hospital in Broward County, Florida under Florida Statute § 394.467, for observation and evaluation.2 On March 14, 1999, Cottone was moved to the Broward County Jail and was booked, assessed, and classified. As a result of the assessment and classification, Cottone was transferred from the Broward County Jail to Unit 1 of the North Broward Detention Center, which houses mentally ill inmates.
At the time of Cottone's detention, the Broward County Sheriff, employees working at the jail, and the Broward County Board of Commissioners were subject to a consent decree stemming from Carruthers v. Cochran, Case No. 76-6068-CIV-HOEVELER (S.D.Fla.), which was intended to ameliorate unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Broward County jail system. The consent decree prescribed, inter alia, requirements for classification, separation, housing, and monitoring of inmates, as well as acceptable use-of-force levels, minimum medical care requirements, and availability of recreational activities.
On March 1, 1999, Widnel Charles ("Charles") was arrested. Prior to his arrest, Charles had been detained involuntarily under Florida Statute § 394.467 on numerous occasions due to his violent tendencies and a history of schizophrenia. While in the booking area of the Broward County Jail on March 1, Charles struck another inmate. Both a deputy sheriff and a nurse in the booking area observed and documented Charles's outburst. Charles originally was placed in the general population at the Broward County Jail. On March 6, however, he was reassessed and transferred from the Broward County Jail to the North Broward Detention Center.
On April 1, a staff psychiatrist at the North Broward Detention Center determined that Charles was mentally stable and reduced the psychotropic medicine to be administered to him. On April 6, Charles was placed into Unit 1 of the North Broward Detention Center with Cottone and Albert St. Hubert, the third and only other inmate in Unit 1. Although there were three separate cells in Unit 1, the doors to the cells remained unlocked, allowing the three inmates to interact with each other.
On April 7, guards D'Elia and Williams were summoned to Unit 1 by inmate St. Hubert. When D'Elia and Williams arrived, they found Cottone unconscious on the floor with ligature marks around his neck. During a schizophrenic episode, Charles allegedly strangled Cottone with shoelaces. After Charles's attack, Cottone was taken to North Broward Medical Center, where he died.
The amended complaint alleges that Charles's mental condition and the risk of serious harm that Charles posed to the other inmates was known by D'Elia and Williams. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that prior to the murder incident, Charles was violent, out-of-control, and experiencing a schizophrenic episode and that Charles's mental condition would have been obvious to D'Elia and Williams if they had been watching the monitor. The amended complaint further alleges that D'Elia and Williams did not monitor the inmates housed in Unit 1 that day but were watching computer games, as follows:
Surveillance cameras mounted in the Day Room of Unit 1 were aimed at the three cells, however, they were not being monitored at the time of the incident.
At the time of the incident, a computer game was observed on the screen of the computer in the control room where the Defendants D'ELIA and WILLIAMS were stationed.
Amended Complaint, para. 50-51.
Plaintiffs Richard Cottone, on behalf of the Estate of Peter Cottone, Jr., and Peter Cottone, Sr. brought this § 1983 action against numerous defendants, including defendants D'Elia, Williams, Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law in their individual capacities as a result of Cottone's death while he was detained in Unit 1 of the North Broward Detention Center.3 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege two separate claims against the defendants. First, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants D'Elia's and Williams's reckless indifference toward a substantial risk of serious inmate harm at the North Broward Detention Center, which led to Cottone's death, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4 Second, the plaintiffs allege that defendants Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law have supervisory liability for Cottone's death due to their failure to train and to supervise deputy sheriffs and corrections officers under their control.
On April 18, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding, inter alia, that the defendants in their individual capacities are not entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal.5
We review de novo a district court's denial of qualified immunity. See Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994); Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir.1990). The determination of whether a complaint sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation also is a matter of law reviewed de novo. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998). In reviewing a complaint, we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir.1997).
A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim. Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc). "Once the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is advanced ... [u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent such allegations, "[i]t is ... appropriate for a district court to grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage." Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, if the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified immunity, then their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be granted and the plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed.
"The defense of qualified immunity completely protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002). To receive qualified immunity, a government official first must prove that he was acting within his discretionary authority. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234 (citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346). In this case, it is clear-and undisputed-that defendants D'Elia, Williams, Tighe, St. Claire, Watson, and Law were acting within their discretionary authority.
Once a defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346. The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine the applicability of qualified immunity. "The threshold inquiry a court must...
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