Oliver v. US

• Decision Date: 29 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-CO-434.,95-CO-434.
• Citation: 682 A.2d 186
• Parties: Edwin T. OLIVER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

682 A.2d 186

Edwin T. OLIVER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 95-CO-434.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued May 14, 1996.

Decided August 29, 1996.

Charles I. Cate, San Francisco, CA, appointed by the court, for appellant.

Eumi Choi, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before STEADMAN, SCHWELB, and KING, Associate Judges.

KING, Associate Judge:

Edwin T. Oliver challenges his criminal contempt¹ conviction, contending that the trial court erred in considering test results showing that he had violated the court's order to refrain from illegal drug use while on pretrial release. In particular, he contends that his motion to suppress the drug test results should have been granted on either of two grounds: (1) pretrial drug testing is not a statutorily permissible condition of release pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1321 (1996 Repl.); or (2) mandatory pretrial drug testing is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that the trial court did not exceed its authority under the statute or the constitution when it ordered drug testing as a condition of pretrial release. There being no basis on which to suppress the results of Oliver's drug tests, we affirm.

I.

On July 30, 1994, Oliver was arrested on drugs and weapons charges.² On August 1, 1994, the court released Oliver on his personal recognizance under the conditions that he report to the Pretrial Services Agency ("PSA") for placement in a drug treatment program and that he refrain from using controlled substances. During his arraignment on August 29, 1994, the trial court modified, without objection, Oliver's release order to include a condition that he report to PSA for weekly drug testing, which requires the giving of a urine sample for analysis.

Based on a December 1994 PSA report that Oliver was again³ testing positive for illegal drug use, the trial court ordered him to show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt for violating the conditions of his release. During a hearing on December 28, 1994, Oliver's counsel filed a written motion to suppress the results of his drug tests. The trial court, noting that a new PSA report indicated that Oliver had tested negative for illegal drugs since the order to show cause was issued, discharged the order, released Oliver on the same conditions, and dismissed as moot his motion to suppress.

In March of 1995, PSA notified the trial court that Oliver tested positive for illegal drug use on five separate occasions after the December 28 hearing. At a March 16, 1995 hearing, Oliver's counsel "renewed" his motion to suppress the drug test results. The trial court heard brief argument from Oliver's counsel, but did not rule on the motion, and scheduled a show cause hearing for March 20, 1995.

At the March 20 hearing, Oliver's counsel, orally and in a new written motion, again argued that the drug test condition violated Oliver's constitutional rights. The trial court rejected Oliver's argument, and, after considering his numerous positive drug test results, found Oliver in criminal contempt of court.⁴ This appeal followed.

II.

In 1992 the Council of the District of Columbia ("Council") enacted amendments to the Bail Reform Act. D.C.Code § 23-1321(a) (1996 Repl.). Pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1321 as amended, the trial court, when presented with a person charged with an offense other than first-degree murder or assault with intent to kill while armed, has a number of options, including the one taken here. If the court determines that unconditional release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the arrestee as required, or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community, the court imposes conditions of release to protect public safety and minimize the risk of flight. See id. The Council provided a nonexclusive list of possible conditions of release, including that the arrestee

report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial services agency, or other agency; ... refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance without a prescription ...; undergo medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency . . .; or satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary.

Id. § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(ix)-(xiv) (emphasis added).

A.

Oliver contends that, because the Bail Reform Act does not specifically authorize drug testing as a condition of pretrial release, such a condition may not be imposed. See id. § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(i) — (xiv). We disagree.⁵

"All courts, absent some specific statutory denial of power, possess ancillary powers to effectuate their jurisdiction ... and do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its judgments and mandates." Morrow v. District of Columbia, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 169, 417 F.2d 728, 737 (1969) (citation and quotation marks omitted). More recently, we have recognized, as has the Supreme Court, the inherent equitable authority of a judicial tribunal to draw upon common law principles and to order a party to take action not specifically prescribed by statute. See Ramos v. District of Columbia Dep't of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 601 A.2d 1069, 1073 (D.C.1992) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991), but declining to extend Chambers to administrative agencies).

We are satisfied that the trial court had discretionary authority — implied by authority expressly granted under D.C.Code § 23-1321 — to condition Oliver's release on his submission to drug testing. The Bail Reform Act specifically authorizes a trial court to impose pretrial release conditions requiring an arrestee to "refrain from ... any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance without a prescription," D.C.Code § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(ix), and to undergo treatment for drug dependency, id. § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(x). The Council has thus determined that prevention of drug use may be a significant factor in preventing pretrial criminality or nonappearance in court. Id., § 23-1321(c)(1). If a court may order abstention from illegal drug use, id., and may punish a violation of its order by invoking the contempt power, see D.C.Code § 11-944 (1995 Repl.); Super.Ct.Crim.R. 42 (1996), it must necessarily have the authority to test compliance with that order through drug testing. See Ramos, supra, 601 A.2d at 1073. Without such testing, the court ordinarily would have no reasonable means to determine whether the defendant has complied with the condition of his release proscribing use of unlawful drugs. See In re Scott, 517 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1986) (where the trial court stated that drug testing was the only immediate, clear way to determine whether a witness was abusing drugs, as the witness's credibility about her own drug use would be suspect).

Moreover, as discussed below, we conclude that drug testing may be a "reasonably necessary" condition for monitoring the express condition that the arrestee refrain from drug use. Because, pursuant to the statute, the trial court was expressly authorized to impose "any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community," the drug testing condition is permissible. D.C.Code § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court did not violate the statute in imposing a condition requiring drug testing.

B.

We also reject Oliver's contention that the pretrial drug testing condition violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁶ We conclude that the condition imposed is reasonable and, accordingly, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

"The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (citation omitted; emphasis added). The reasonableness of a particular type of search or seizure depends upon the strength of the governmental interests in conducting the intrusion, balanced against the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's liberty interests. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496-97, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plurality opinion); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642-43, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).

In In re York, 9 Cal.4th 1133, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804 (1995), the Supreme Court of California upheld mandatory random pretrial drug testing against a statutory and constitutional challenge. The court affirmed the decision of the California Court of Appeals' holding that a court may condition pretrial release upon a defendant's agreement to submit to random drug testing, if a court has made an individualized determination that such conditions are warranted. See id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d at 310-11 n. 3, 892 P.2d at 806-07 n. 3.⁷

The court held, however, that the imposition of pretrial release conditions "must be reasonable under the circumstances," id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d at 319 n. 10, 892 P.2d at 815 n. 10, and that the drug testing condition was reasonable.⁸ In so concluding, the court relied upon numerous other decisions⁹ in which, in the context of probation, courts concluded that the intrusiveness of the government conduct authorized by the condition was outweighed by the strength of the government's interest in enforcing compliance with probation. Id.

Similarly, the governmental interest here outweighs the minimal...