Olmsted v. United States
| Decision Date | 01 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-3177-CV-S-RK-P,Crim. No. 16-03033-01-CR-S-RK |
| Citation | 426 F.Supp.3d 588 |
| Parties | Steven C. OLMSTED, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Steven C. Olmsted, Florence, CO, pro se.
Casey Michael Clark, United States Attorney's Office-Spgfd, Springfield, MO, for Respondent.
ORDER DENYING MOVANT'S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255, GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DISMISSING CASE
Movant, who is incarcerated at the USP Florence-High in Florence, Colorado, pursuant to a conviction and sentence entered in the above-cited criminal case, has filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Docs 1. Respondent has filed a response to Movant's motion. Doc. 5. Because this Court finds that the motion, files, and record conclusively show that Movant is not entitled to relief,1 Movant's motion is denied and this case is dismissed. Movant is granted a certificate of appealability.
On June 14, 2016, Movant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e). Crim. Doc. 20-25.2 Both the plea agreement and Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") listed the following felony convictions in Movant's criminal history:
Crim Doc. 23, pp. 4-5; Crim. Doc. 28, pp. 8-12.
Both the plea agreement and PSR acknowledged that Movant qualifies as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) due to his prior felony convictions, in that each of Movant's prior convictions for second-degree burglary in Missouri qualified as a "violent felony" under the "enumerated offenses clause" of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Crim. Doc. 23, pp. 1-2, 4-5; Crim. Doc. 28, p. 4. Accordingly, the plea agreement stipulated that Movant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months' custody, and the parties stipulated to a joint, non-binding recommendation of 192 months' imprisonment. Crim. Doc. 23, p. 11; Crim. Doc. 28, p. 17. The parties also agreed that the applicable Guidelines section for the offense of conviction was § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), which provided for a base offense level of 33, because Movant was subject to an enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal under § 924(e). Crim. Doc. 23, p. 10; Crim. Doc. 28, p. 4.
On February 3, 2017, Movant appeared before this Court for sentencing, whereupon this Court adopted the PSR without change and sentenced Movant to 192 months' imprisonment. Crim. Docs. 41, 42. Movant did not appeal. Movant now seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 1.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that an individual in federal custody may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his or her sentence. A motion under this statute "is not a substitute for a direct appeal and is not the proper way to complain about simple trial errors." Anderson v. United States , 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Instead, § 2255 provides a statutory avenue through which to address constitutional or jurisdictional errors and errors of law that "constitute[ ] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Sun Bear v. United States , 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hill v. United States , 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) ).
Movant raises one ground for relief, wherein he argues that his sentence is illegal, because his prior convictions for second-degree burglary in Missouri no longer qualify as "violent felonies" under to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), pursuant to United States v. Naylor , 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018). Doc. 1, p. 4. The Government agrees that Movant is entitled to be resentenced without the ACCA enhancement. Doc. 5. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, this Court finds that Movant is not entitled to relief.
Section 922(g) offenses generally carry a maximum punishment of 10 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). The ACCA, however, imposes a mandatory 15-year minimum prison term for an offender who has three prior convictions "for a violent felony or a serious drug offense[.]" § 924(e)(1). A prior felony conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" if it:
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Subsection (i) of this provision is known as the "force" clause; the phrase "burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives" is known as the "enumerated offenses" clause; and the closing phrase "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" is known as the "residual" clause. Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555-58, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). The Supreme Court in Johnson struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2557, 2563 (2015). Johnson announced a "substantive rule" that is retroactive to cases on collateral review. Welch v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016).
Here, however, Movant's ACCA enhanced sentence was not premised on the residual clause but rather on the parties' stipulation that Movant's prior second-degree burglary convictions in Missouri constituted violent felonies under the enumerated offenses clause. Crim. Doc. 23, pp. 1-2, 4-5; Crim. Doc. 28, p. 4. Therefore, to be entitled to relief, Movant must have established that his prior second-degree burglary convictions in Missouri do not fall within the ACCA's enumerated offenses clause.
"[T]he relevant background legal environment is ... a ‘snapshot’ of what the controlling law was at the time of sentencing[.]" Walker v. United States , 900 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Snyder , 871 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 2017) ). At the time of sentencing in February 2017, the Supreme Court had construed "burglary" in the enumerated offenses clause to mean "generic burglary."3 Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 577, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). The Taylor Court defined generic burglary for the purposes of the enumerated offenses clause as "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Taylor Court had also held that in deciding whether a prior conviction counts as generic burglary, a sentencing court should generally apply the categorical approach, looking only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. Id. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143. However, when the statute of conviction is broader than generic burglary, a sentencing court should apply the modified categorical approach, looking to a limited set of documents to determine the elements underlying the defendant's conviction. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (); see Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 261, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) (). A prior offense counts as ACCA burglary under the enumerated offenses clause if either under the categorical approach, its statutory definition substantially corresponds to, or is narrower than, the elements of generic burglary, or, under the modified categorical approach, the limited set of documents show the conviction actually involved findings of the elements of generic burglary. Id. ; Mathis v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016).
Here, the Missouri second-degree burglary statute defines burglary as "when [a person] knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.170.1.4 The statute defines "inhabitable structure" to include:
Id. § 569.010(2). The chart below shows a side-by-side comparison of the elements of Missouri second-degree burglary and the elements of generic burglary:
Elements of Missouri second-degree burglary...To continue reading
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