Olsen v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 01 June 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 38420,38420 |
| Citation | 115 N.W.2d 734,263 Minn. 1 |
| Parties | T. Joseph OLSEN, Respondent, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under comprehensive zoning ordinance of city of Minneapolis enacted pursuant to Minn.St. 462.18, city is bound to comply with terms, provisions, and classification of property in such ordinance, subject only to exception that if there is evidence that a nuisance will result from a commercial use authorized therein, in a particular neighborhood, city may deny application for permit for such use.
It may not deny such permit merely because it may disagree with some prior council in its determination that a certain classification of property under zoning ordinance was justified.
2. This court has held that a gasoline filling station is not a nuisance per se, or of a questionable nature in itself, but on the contrary is of a useful character and necessity in these days of heavy automotive traffic.
3. Where claim that gasoline station proposed for plaintiff's property would constitute a nuisance in neighborhood is not raised; and where proposed plans and mode of operation planned therefor are indicative that no nuisance will result from its operation; and where other evidence submitted is adequate to support court's finding to such effect, Held such finding must be sustained on appeal.
Evidence that city has approved special permits for a large number of gas stations within its boundaries, many of which were in near vicinity of schools, playgrounds, and residences, Held indicative that here city acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiff's application for special permit because of proximity of plaintiff's property to school, playground, and residences.
4. On appeal from district court, this court must consider findings in the light of evidence submitted most favorable to prevailing party. Such findings will not be reversed unless manifestly contrary to evidence. Rule in Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363, followed.
5. Testimony of witnesses and evidence submitted at trial considered and held adequate to support court's finding that construction and operation of gasoline filling station on property classified for commercial purposes under comprehensive zoning ordinance would not result in traffic, fire, or safety hazards.
6. Classification of property under comprehensive zoning ordinance must govern and may not be restricted except where it is shown that nuisance will result from use of property permitted thereunder. City may not nullify and destroy definite and valuable interests in real property by arbitrarily placing restrictions thereon greater than those provided in comprehensive zoning ordinance. Exercise of police power does not authorize arbitrary intermeddling by city with private ownership of property though its acts be labeled for preservation of health, safety, or general welfare.
Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., D. J. Shama, Paul T. Aitken, Asst. City Attys., Minneapolis, for appellant.
Josiah E. Brill, Jr., Brill & Brill, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Action by T. Joseph Olsen to compel the city of Minneapolis to grant his application for a permit for the erection and maintenance of a gasoline filling station on his property on the southwest corner of 58th Street and Penn Avenue South in Minneapolis.
The court made findings and ordered judgment in effect requiring the city to grant the application described. Defendant's subsequent motion for amended findings or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied. This appeal by the city is from the judgment entered and from the order denying defendant's motion for amended findings or a new trial.
The city contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that it had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying plaintiff's application; and that it had thereby deprived plaintiff of property and property rights without due process; and that the court was without jurisdiction to enjoin defendant from interfering with plaintiff's erection of the gasoline filling station on the plans and specifications approved by the building inspector of the city, and from interfering with the use thereof by plaintiff and his assignees, in the operation of such gasoline filling station. In substance, it contends that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the council had acted reasonably in denying plaintiff's application for the permit in that such evidence clearly indicated that traffic hazards, fire hazards, blight, devaluation of property, hazards to children, and detriment to the general health, safety, and welfare would result from the operation of a gasoline filling station on this property. With respect to such issues, the trial court found as follows:
'That ever since the 7th day of April, 1924, there has been in force and in effect in the City of Minneapolis a comprehensive zoning ordinance, by virtue of which the property of the plaintiff hereinbefore described was classified and zoned within the 'commercial' district, which classification permits the erection and operation of a gasoline filling station, in addition to many other commercial uses.
'That shortly prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff had prepared complete plans and specifications for the erection of such a building for the purpose of engaging in the retail gasoline filling station business. That he submitted the same to the Building Inspector of the City of Minneapolis, a person duly authorized by law to determine whether or not such plans and specifications complied with the building ordinances of said City, and on the 14th day of January, 1960, the said Building Inspector, through one of his duly authorized representatives, approved said plans and specifications but refused to issue a permit for the erection of said building unless and until the City Council of the City of Minneapolis granted a Special Council Permit therefor required by the ordinances aforesaid.SU 'That at or about the same time, the plaintiff submitted said plans and specifications to the Fire Marshal of the State of Minnesota for approval pursuant to State statutes governing such matters and the same was duly approved by said Fire Marshal.
'That at or about the same time, said plans and specifications were duly submitted by the plaintiff, pursuant to ordinance, to the Minneapolis Fire Department, Fire Prevention Bureau, and the same were duly approved.
'That at or about the same time said plans and specifications were submitted by the plaintiff, pursuant to ordinance, to the department of the City Engineer of the City of Minneapolis and the same was duly approved with respect to the matters of traffic and sidewalks.
'That said plans and specifications comply in all respects with all statutory and ordinance provisions applicable to such matters.
'That, at the time plaintiff made application for a Special Council Permit, the manner of delivery and storage of inflammable liquids, including gasoline and oil, was fully regulated by the Statutes of the State of Minnesota and under such statutues by the order of the Fire Marshal, and his determination that the plans and specifications of the plaintiff complied with statutory requirements is conclusive between these parties on the question of possible fire hazard.
'That under circumstances substantially the same as those under which plaintiff's application was denied, the City Council of the City of Minneapolis has heretofore granted a great many Special Council Permits for the erection and operation of gasoline filling stations in the City of Minneapolis; there had been arbitrary and capricious discrimination between plaintiff and other applicants to whom such permits were granted, thereby denying plaintiff equal protection under the law as required by the State and Federal Constitutions.
'That many, if not all, of the commercial uses (other than gasoline filling stations) that are permitted under the zoning ordinance would create problems more serious with respect to traffic than those problems, if any, which would exist if a gasoline filling station is permitted at this location. * * *
'That the erection of a gasoline filling station on the premises herein involved would increase the traffic to a negligible degree * * * and * * * any such increase would be less than the increased traffic brought about by many other types of commercial uses authorized under the zoning law; * * *.
'That the use of said premises for a gasoline filling station would not materially increase the hazard to school children or to pedestrians, nor to vehicles or to persons in vehicles.
'That the erection and operation of a gasoline filling station of the type set forth in plaintiff's application for a Special Council Permit and as described by the testimony of witnesses in this action will not constitute a nuisance.
'That the effect on the market value of adjoining property resulting from the erection of a gasoline filling station on the premises herein involved would be of a very minimum character * * * no more than should justly be expected by one erecting a residence in a commercial district or immediately adjacent thereto.
'That the denial of said application by the City Council * * * was arbitrary, unreasonable, invalid and in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights for the following reasons:
'(b) That the use of said land for such purpose would not be harmful to the health, morals, safety or public welfare of the community;
'(c) That it would not constitute a fire hazard or a traffic hazard to have said land used for such purpose;
'(d) That in actual practice the said City Council * * * has * * * over a period of years granted Special Council Permits for the erection and operation of retail gasoline filling stations in the City of Minneapolis under circumstances substantially the same...
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