Olson v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, No. A03-1698 (MN 7/20/2004), No. A03-1698.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A03-1698. |
| Parties | Steven A. Olson, Appellant, v. The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 02-8021.
Charles T. Hvass, Jr., Russell A. Ingebritson, Kathryn M. Kohn, Ingebritson & Associates, LLP, (for appellant).
Patrick J. Sweeney, JoAnn C. Toth, Spence, Ricke, Sweeney & Gernes, P.A., (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Anderson, Judge; and Parker, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from summary judgment on his FELA claims, appellant contends the district court erred and applied the wrong standard for the statute of limitations, concluded that his neck and back injury claims were statutorily barred, and concluded that he failed to establish the element of duty necessary to his negligence claim for his lung injuries. Search Term Begin Because the statute of limitations was properly applied and appellant's neck and back injuries are statutorily barred, we affirm the district court's order on these issues. Because there are material fact issues as to respondent's duty on appellant's lung injury claim, we reverse and vacate the district court's order on this issue.
Olson argues that the district court erred when it applied the statute of limitations under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) 45 U.S.C. § 56. The district court stated that the FELA "three year statute of limitations begins to run when Plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence or cause of the injury that is the basis of the claim." (Emphasis added.) The three-year statute of limitations, however, begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence and cause of the injury that is the basis of the claim. U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122, 100 S. Ct. 352, 359 (1979); Lecy v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., Co., 663 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Minn. App. 2003) (emphasis added).
Even though the district court's order incorrectly stated the FELA standard for the statute of limitations, the district court correctly considered both elements of the standard, finding that Olson both knew he had knee and back injuries and knew that the cause of his injuries was work related.
Olson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment when it concluded the statute of limitations had expired because it was not until 2001 that Olson's injuries were permanent, thus triggering the running of the statute of limitations. Summary judgment is properly granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal from a summary judgment, this court determines whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred as a matter of law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
Olson argues that there is a question of fact as to when he knew he had permanentknee and back injuries and when he knew or had reason to know that his knee and back injuries were work related.
Where the evidence raises different inferences as to when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and its cause there are questions of fact for a jury to determine. Rogers v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 833 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Here, the record shows that: (1) Olson was diagnosed with arthritis in both knees by 1978, (2) by 1988, Olson complained his back ached all the time, (3) a 1988 CT scan showed degenerative changes in his back, and (4) a 1995 spinal x-ray showed evidence of further degenerative back disease. Thus, the factual evidence does not raise different inferences as to when Olson knew he had knee and back injuries and shows that his injuries were permanent by at least 1995.
To establish the date on which the causal connection between his injuries and work was established, Olson relies on his medical records for dates when such a connection was noted in diagnosis. But a medical diagnosis is not an exclusive prerequisite to the commencement of the limitations period. Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 621 F.2d 902, 904-05 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981). The period may, and often does, begin to run before any diagnosis. Fries v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990).
Olson stated in his April 2, 2003, deposition that at least by 1995, he had told his doctor and a coworker that his employment with respondent was the cause of his knee and back injuries. Olson's deposition testimony, independent of a medical diagnosis confirming his knowledge, is sufficient to show when he had knowledge of his injuries and when he knew his injuries were caused by work.
Olson knew about his knee and back injuries, knew that his knee and back injuries were work-related by 1995, and the statute of limitations had already run for both the knee and back injury claims when he filed his claims on March 9, 2001. Thus, there are no genuine issues of material fact. The district court did not err in concluding that Olson's knee and back injury claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Olson argues in the alternative that even if he knew of his injuries and knew that his injuries were work-related, his claims for damages from any "aggravations" of those injuries fall within the FELA statute of limitations and thus are not time-barred. In support of his argument, Olson relies on Fonseco v. Consol. Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 588-89 (6th Cir. 2001) (). But Olson's reliance is misplaced because
[a]n aggravation of an original injury that is claimed to have been caused by an employer's negligence is not a severable action under the FELA. . . . [T]he fact that an injury "has not reached its maximum severity . . . but continues to progress" does not relieve the plaintiff of the duty to use reasonable diligence to discover the original injury and its cause. Any "aggravation" of the original negligently caused injury would only affect the plaintiff's damages, and would not require a separate determination of liability or causation. Furthermore, a rule permitting severability of a claim that an original, continuing injury has been aggravated would contravene the purpose of the discovery rule . . . requiring Federal Employer's Liability Act plaintiffs to use reasonable diligence to discover the cause of an injury once the injury manifests itself.
Aparicio, 84 F.3dat 815.
Olson's injuries, diagnosed as arthritis in both knees and degenerative back disease, cannot be characterized as new injuries, but rather aggravations. Aggravations of injuries that have not reached maximum severity are not severable for the purposes of the FELA statute of limitations, thus, any aggravation of Olson's injuries are also time-barred.
Olson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment when it ruled that he failed to establish the element of duty necessary to his negligence claim for his lung injuries. "A railroad has a duty to provide...
To continue reading
Request your trial