Olson v. Linster

• Decision Date: 16 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 37933,37933
• Parties: Manfred G. OLSON, Respondent, v. Aloys A. LINSTER, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 49

107 N.W.2d 49

259 Minn. 189

Manfred G. OLSON, Respondent, v. Aloys A. LINSTER, Appellant.

No. 37933.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 16, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where in prior action for wrongful death under Minn.St. 573.02 plaintiff in present action appeared as trustee for those having demands for funeral expenses of decedent, as well as for decedent's next of kin, which included plaintiff trustee and a daughter, Held verdict and judgment in prior action would not constitute bar to plaintiff in present action which is for personal claims not included in prior action.

King & MacGregor, Minneapolis, Thomas J. Burke, St. Paul, for appellant.

Dorsey, Owen, Barber, Marquart & Windhorst, Arthur E. Weisberg and Edward J. Schwartzbauer, Minneapolis, for respondent.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Action for personal injuries and damages arising out of an automobile accident which occurred April 10, 1957, when plaintiff, Manfred G. Olson, while driving his automobile on a public highway in Minneapolis with Agnes E. Olson, his wife, a passenger therein, collided with an automobile driven by defendant, Aloys A. Linster. As a result of the collision, Agnes E. Olson suffered injuries causing her death on April 24, 1957.

Subsequently, plaintiff, as trustee of the heirs of Agnes E. Olson, commenced suit against Aloys A. Linster for her wrongful death and for expenses incurred in her funeral as provided by Minn.St. 573.02. The heirs included plaintiff, as her surviving spouse, and a daughter, Kathryn N. Olson. This action did not relate to plaintiff's personal injuries or damages. Issues relating to the negligence of Olson and Linster were presented and submitted to the jury upon special interrogatories. In answering them, the jury determined that both Olson and Linster were negligent but that Olson's negligence alone was the proximate cause of the accident. His loss was fixed at $4,200 and Kathryn N. Olson's at $500, but, on the basis of the special interrogatories, the court ordered judgment in defendant's favor.

Subsequent to the expiration of the time for appeal from that judgment, plaintiff, in his individual capacity, instituted the present action against Linster for his personal injuries and damages. In his answer, as a separate defense, Linster alleged that, by virtue of the jury's determination, and the judgment entered in the prior action, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were res judicata. Upon the pleadings, an affidavit of defendant's attorney setting forth the results of the prior action, and all pleadings and files therein, defendant moved for summary judgment in the present action. On August 4, 1959, the trial court made its order denying this motion. In a memorandum attached thereto it stated:

'* * * My first impression was that the distinction between this case and the prior one tried in my court related to form rather than substance and that the motion should be granted. However, after consideration of Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, and other cases cited by counsel, it has been decided that the motion should be denied.

'The question has been certified as important and doubtful * * * and * * * if the parties so desire, they may have a determination by the Supreme Court before incurring the expense of another trial.'

Upon appeal defendant contends that, because plaintiff was chief beneficiary in the prior action, the jury's finding therein that he was negligent and that his negligence alone was the proximate cause of...