Olson v. Mohammadu

• Decision Date: 10 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18963.,18963.
• Citation: 310 Conn. 665,81 A.3d 215
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Marianne OLSON v. Fusaini MOHAMMADU.

310 Conn. 665

81 A.3d 215

Marianne OLSON

v.Fusaini MOHAMMADU.

No. 18963.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 25, 2013.

Decided Dec. 10, 2013.

John F. Morris, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Jon T. Kukucka, and, on the brief, Kathleen M. Grover, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

The question that we must resolve in this appeal is whether a trial court may properly deny a motion for modification of alimony and child support solely on the basis that a party's voluntary actions gave rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. The defendant, Fusaini Mohammadu, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to modify his alimony and child support obligations to the plaintiff, Marianne Olson. Olson v. Mohammadu, 134 Conn.App. 252, 39 A.3d 744 (2012). The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 262, 39 A.3d 744. This court granted certification to appeal on the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was not entitled to a modification of his alimony and child support obligations because his voluntary return to Connecticut to be closer to his son was an ‘unacceptable reason’ for his decreased income under Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 378 A.2d 522 (1977)?” Olson v. Mohammadu, 304 Conn. 930, 42 A.3d 391 (2012). We conclude that it did not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural history are set forth in the Appellate Court opinion. “The parties were married on June 7, 2001. During the marriage, the parties had one child together. In September, 2008, the plaintiff ... who resided in Connecticut with [the child], filed a dissolution of marriage action against the defendant, who at that time resided in Florida. On August 5, 2009, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. In its orders contained in that judgment, the court ordered joint legal custody of the minor child with primary physical custody to the plaintiff and reasonable visitation rights to the defendant in Connecticut. The court further ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff periodic alimony in the amount of $777 per week.... In addition, the court ordered the defendant to pay child support in the following amounts: $334 per week and 66 percent of day care, extracurricular activities and unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for the benefit of the minor child.” (Footnote omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, supra, 134 Conn.App. at 254, 39 A.3d 744.

The record reveals the following additional facts and procedural history. On April 14, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to modify the alimony and child support order. The defendant filed an amended motion to modify on June 18, 2010. As the grounds for his amended motion, the defendant alleged a substantial change in circumstances in that he had relocated from Florida to Connecticut and, consequently, had obtained new employment at a reduced salary. At the modification hearing, the court heard undisputed testimony that the defendant voluntarily left employment as a physician in Florida earning a salary of approximately $180,000 annually. The defendant testified that he voluntarily relocated to Connecticut in order to have a more meaningful relationship with his child.¹ As a result of the relocation, the defendant's salary was reduced to approximately $150,000 annually. According to the defendant's testimony, the $150,000 salary is standard pay for someone of his experience in a comparable position in Connecticut.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for modification. In denying the motion, the trial court stated in its memorandum of decision that it “relie[d] on the voluntary nature of the income change experienced by the defendant.” While the court acknowledged that the defendant's “stated motivation might have been a good parental decision,” the court concluded that the relocation was “a decision that ignored the realities of his financial obligation as set forth in the judgment issued just months earlier.” The defendant appealed from the trial court's decision to the Appellate Court.

While the appeal was pending at the Appellate Court, the defendant filed a motion for articulation of the trial court's decision. The defendant sought articulation on the following three issues: “whether the trial court considered the fact of the [d]efendant's relocation to Connecticut to be nearer to his son to be a substantial change in circumstances”; “whether the trial court considered the reduction of the [d]efendant's earnings upon his relocation to be a substantial change in circumstances”; and “the figures used by the trial court to determine the relevant incomes of the parties.” The trial court granted, in part, the motion for articulation and stated that “[t]he court did not consider the relocation to be a substantial change in circumstance[s] because the move was a voluntary action on the part of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Relying on Sanchione v. Sanchione, supra, 173 Conn. at 397, 378 A.2d 522, the court decided “not to treat [the defendant's] relocation and the change in income that resulted from that voluntary decision as a significant change in circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) The court declined to articulate how it calculated the incomes of the parties, stating that “its rulings on the first two questions ma[d]e the third irrelevant to the decision.”

Thereafter, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly determined that “a change in income resulting from a voluntary decision does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances.” Olson v. Mohammadu, supra, 134 Conn.App. at 261, 39 A.3d 744. The Appellate Court reasoned that “[although] the [trial] court noted that there might have been a good parental motivation underlying the defendant's relocation, the court was correct not to reach the defendant's motivation in its determination that the defendant failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances.” Id., at 260–61, 39 A.3d 744. According to the Appellate Court, evidence of the defendant's stated motivation in relocating to Connecticut would be relevant only if he had made a threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances. Id., at 261 n. 10, 39 A.3d 744. This appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that his voluntary action in relocating to Connecticut, regardless of his stated motivations, precluded him from establishing a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of his alimony and child support obligations. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court relied on a misconception of governing law under Sanchione. Specifically, he contends that an inability to pay that is “brought about by the defendant's own fault”; Sanchione v. Sanchione, supra, 173 Conn. at 407, 378 A.2d 522; is not necessarily synonymous with an inability to pay brought about by voluntary conduct. Therefore, he posits that the voluntary action giving rise to an inability to pay should not foreclose a threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances. The defendant also contends that if we agree with his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion for modification because of his voluntary relocation to Connecticut, we should reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and the case should be remanded to the trial court for a new hearing. We agree that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant's voluntary relocation and income change necessarily precluded him from establishing a substantial change in circumstances. We also agree that the case should be remanded to the trial court for a new hearing.

We begin our analysis with the standard of review. “The scope of our review of a trial court's exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 4, 495 A.2d 704 (1985). “In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 276 Conn. 491, 497, 886 A.2d 817 (2005). Nevertheless, we may reverse a trial court's ruling on a modification motion if the trial court applied the wrong standard of law. Id.; see also Morris v. Morris, 262 Conn. 299, 305, 811 A.2d 1283 (2003); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 740, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). ²

“[General Statutes §] 46b–86 governs the modification or termination of an alimony or support order after the date of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case, the disputed issue is alimony [or child support], the applicable provision of the statute is § 46b–86 (a),³ which provides that a final order for alimony may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party.... Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification bears the burden of demonstrating that such a change has occurred.” (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502, 927 A.2d 894 (2007). “To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party's relief, it is pertinent for the trial...