Olson v. Shuler
| Citation | 210 N.W. 453,203 Iowa 518 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | 37309 |
| Parties | ANDREW B. OLSON, Appellee, v. HUGH M. SHULER et al., Appellants |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
REHEARING DENIED MARCH 22, 1927.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--HUBERT J. UTTERBACK, Judge.
Action to recover for services performed by plaintiff for defendants. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Carr Cox, Evans & Riley, for appellants.
Bradshaw Schenk & Fowler and W. Z. Proctor, for appellee.
ALBERT, J. DE GRAFF, C. J., and FAVILLE and MORLING, JJ., concur.
Appellee Olson had about thirty years' experience in the coal-mining business. The appellant Hugh M. Shuler, together with others, was interested in operating coal mines in Iowa. In 1919, appellee was employed by the Shulers to procure coal leases for them in the vicinity of Grimes, Iowa. As a result of such employment, 30,000 acres were contracted for, out of which 6,184 acres were accepted by appellants. Appellants paid appellee, to apply on services, the sum of $ 7,000. This action is to recover the claimed balance due for such services.
Appellee pleads his cause of action in three separate counts, which, of course, he is entitled to do, under the statutes.
The first disputed question before the court is whether or not any of these counts is based on an express contract, or whether each one states a cause of action based on a quantum meruit. We find, upon careful reading and comparison, that they do not state a cause of action based on an express contract. The appellee's action, therefore, is one on a quantum meruit, in which employment is alleged for services performed, without any express agreement for compensation therefor. This is the theory upon which the case was submitted by the court to the jury. Appellants' answer is a general denial.
In the trial of the case, however, it was the contention of appellants that the contract between the parties was other and different than that alleged by appellee. They further claim that, in accordance with the terms of the contract, as they said it existed, they had paid appellee in full.
In one of the instructions given by the court, the jury was told, in substance, that the burden was on the appellants to show that the contract was as they claimed and that they had paid in full for the services under such contract, in which event the verdict was to be for appellants.
We are furnished with a very able brief on both sides of the case, touching the questions, first, as to what can be proven under a general denial, and second, where the burden of proof lies in case of a claim for payment. The law cited on both sides, however, seems quite inapplicable to the situation, as it goes to the question of a plea of payment of appellee's contract. In other words, if appellants had answered admitting the contract, and pleading that the same was paid in full, we would have a situation where the authorities cited, pro and con, would be applicable; but, in the instant case, such is not the situation. Appellants deny the contract sued upon by the appellee, and say that there was a contract between them, but that it was other and different from that claimed by appellee, and that, in pursuance of the terms of the contract claimed by appellants, appellee was paid in full. The burden of proof was on appellee to establish his contract as he alleged it, and on failure so to do, he was not entitled to recover, regardless of the question of whether appellants, by their evidence, established their claimed contract, or whether they paid in full under the contract claimed by them. In other words, appellants were entitled to introduce any testimony which would defeat appellee's contract, but the burden still rested on appellee to establish his contract as he alleged it. The instruction above referred to put the burden on appellants to establish, by preponderance of evidence, the contract claimed by them, and also to establish payment of such contract. It is therefore apparent that this instruction is entirely inapplicable and erroneous. So, if by appellants' testimony they could create such a situation as that the appellee had not met the preponderance of evidence, appellants would be entitled to a verdict, and they need not establish their contention by preponderance of evidence.
Instruction No. 8 is attacked as inapplicable to the facts in the case. This instruction is based on the following section of the statute, Section 11275, Code of 1924:
"When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose the other understood it."
This instruction should not have been given, as the facts and situation in the case do not warrant it. Park v. Best, 176 Iowa 7, 157 N.W. 233.
Instruction No. 11 is also attacked as an incorrect statement of law. The only question involved is whether or not, if this appellee recovered, he was entitled to interest on the amount due him. The jury was instructed to allow such interest. Aside from our own cases, the general rule seems to be that, on unliquidated claims, interest is not allowed. 33 Corpus Juris 210, Sections 70-74. Iowa, however, has uniformly held otherwise. The rule as expressed in this state in damage cases is fully set out in Bridenstine v. Iowa City Elec. R. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 165 N.W. 435, where it is said that, when the damages are complete at a particular time, interest is allowable. The same is held in Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497; Chamberlain v. City of Des Moines, 172 Iowa 500, 154 N.W. 766; Black v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 122 Iowa 32, 96 N.W. 984; Moore v. Fryman, 154 Iowa 534, 134 N.W. 534.
While it is true that these cases are tort cases, at the same time logic and, to our minds, better reasoning warrant us in saying that the same rule should be applied in the present case. The equity is that, where one owes a debt and fails to pay it, and the holder is compelled to litigate, he is entitled to interest on the amount then due. Such we hold the rule to be.
A lease contract with one Carney, designated as Exhibit 171,...
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