Olympia Brewing Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1918
• Docket Number: 14651.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: OLYMPIA BREWING CO. v. STATE.

173 P. 430

102 Wash. 494

OLYMPIA BREWING CO. v. STATE.

No. 14651.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 4, 1918

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F. Wright Judge.

Action by the Olympia Brewing Company against the State. Judgment for the State, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

W. V Tanner, Glenn J. Fairbrook, and C. E. Arney, Jr., all of Olympia, for respondent.

MACKINTOSH J.

In the year 1915 the appellant was engaged in the brewing business in this state, and in order for it to continue to operate its business it was necessary to secure state liquor licenses which, under the law (chapter 194, Laws 1907), commenced with the fiscal year July 1, 1915. The appellant applied for the licenses desired by it and offered to pay for licenses which would expire January 1, 1916, at which time the prohibition law would go into effect, by force of which the appellant would be compelled to discontinue doing business. The state board of tax commissioners, which was the board vested with the authority to grant liquor licenses refused the tender made by the appellant, and demanded the entire annual license fees for licenses from July 1, 1915, to June 30, 1916. Thereupon the appellant paid, under protest, the amount demanded, and has begun this action to recover the amount of the fees collected for licenses for the last half of the term during which the licenses were unused. The appellant is also seeking to recover in this action similar amounts collected from various retail liquor dealers who have assigned their claims to the appellant. The payments made by these various assignors were made under the same circumstances as the payments made by the appellant itself, except that they were made without protest. The respondent contends in defense to this action that these payments were all voluntary payments, and therefore the appellant is not entitled to a recovery.

At the time the licenses were applied for by the appellant and its assignors they were engaged in a business which was lawful under the then existing laws of this state, and it continued to be a lawful business until January 1, 1916. It was a business in which the appellant had a large amount of capital invested, and the state had recognized, in the passing of the prohibition law, that an opportunity should be given to the appellant and those similarly situated to close out their businesses before the taking effect of that law. The fact that the fees were paid with or without protest is of no moment if their payment was made under compulsion, and it cannot be gainsaid that payments made to prevent the sacrifice of large capital investments are not voluntarily made, but are made as the result of compulsion. Rebertson v. Frank Bros., 132 U.S. 17, 10...