Oneale v. Long

• Decision Date: 01 February 1807
• Citation: 2 L.Ed. 550,8 U.S. 60,4 Cranch 60
• Parties: ONEALE v. LONG
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

8 U.S. 60

4 Cranch 60

2 L.Ed. 550

ONEALE v. LONG.

February Term, 1807

ERROR to the circuit court of the district of Columbia, sitting in Washington, in an action of debt upon four joint and several bonds, signed and sealed by Mary Sweeny as principal, and William Oneale, I. T. Frost, and Lund Washington as sureties, conditioned that she should prosecute her appeal upon four several judgments rendered against her by a justice of peace in Maryland. William Oneale, the defendant below, pleaded non est factum, and upon the trial of that issue took a bill of exceptions, because the court below (two judges only being present, and divided in opinion) did not, at his request, instruct the jury, 'that if they should be satisfied by the evidence that the bonds were signed, sealed and delivered by Mary Sweeny as principal, and I. T. Frost and the defendant as her sureties, and were afterwards presented to C. C. (the justice who had rendered the judgments) for his approbation and acceptance of the securities, and were by him refused and rejected, and after such rejection were interlined, without the license, privity and knowledge of the defendant, by inserting the name of Lund Washington as a co-obligor, who on the succeeding day, without the privity, knowledge and consent of the defendant, signed, sealed and delivered the bonds, which were afterwards approved of by the justice, that then such interlineation and execution of said bonds by Lund Washington rendered them void as to the defendant, and the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit.'

By the act of Maryland, 1791, c. 68. § 5. no execution upon a judgment of a justice of peace shall be stayed by an appeal, unless the person appealing, or some other in his behalf, 'shall, immediately upon making such appeal, enter into bond, with sufficient sureties, such as the justice by whom judgment shall be given shall approve of, in double the sum recovered, with condition,' & c.

P. B. Key, for the plaintiff in error, contended that the deeds were void,

1st. By reason of the interlineation.

2d. By the rejection of them by the magistrate.

1. The alteration of the deeds by the interlineation was in a matter essential; it made them the deeds of four, when they were only the deeds of three persons.

It is immaterial whether the alteration is for the benefit of the obligor; the only question is, whether it substantially vary the deeds. Esp. N. P. 223, 224. Cro. Eliz. 626, 627. Markham v. Gonaston. Moore, 28, pl...