Oney v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 1982
• Citation: 446 A.2d 389
• Parties: Milton Joseph ONEY, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 389

446 A.2d 389

Milton Joseph ONEY, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Dec. 7, 1981.

Decided May 6, 1982.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

John M. Sandy, Deputy Atty. Gen., Georgetown, for appellee.

Karl Haller, Asst. Public Defender, Georgetown, for appellant.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ.

HORSEY, Justice:

This appeal concerns the construction of our habitual criminal statute, 11 Del.C. § 4214 ¹ and whether defendant, three times previously convicted of a felony, was properly declared an habitual criminal under § 4214(a) following his fourth felony conviction.

I

On January 28, 1981 defendant, Milton J. Oney, Jr., was convicted in a jury trial in Superior Court of three charges of robbery first degree (11 Del.C. § 832) and three charges of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (11 Del.C. § 1447). Defendant had a prior criminal record of three felony convictions: assault with intent to rob; theft over $100 (at the time, a felony) and escape after conviction.

On the State's motion that defendant be sentenced as an habitual criminal, Superior Court, following a hearing in March, 1981, declared defendant to be an habitual criminal under 11 Del.C. § 4214(a). The following May, defendant was given a "life" sentence on his conviction of robbery one. (The State had elected that defendant be sentenced on only one of his three robbery offenses.) Defendant was also sentenced to two consecutive terms of ten years' incarceration for each of the two weapons offenses, with those terms to follow his service of his "life" term, with the first five years of each of the weapons offense terms not to be subject to probation, parole or suspension, as provided by statute. Following the Court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduction of sentence, defendant docketed this appeal.

II

Defendant asserts three grounds for reversible error: (1) that the evidence of defendant's three prior felony convictions was "insufficient" as a matter of law under 11 Del.C. § 4214(a) to declare him to be an habitual criminal; (2) that defendant's fourth felony conviction of robbery in the first degree was "insufficient" as a matter of law under 11 Del.C. § 4214(a) to "trigger" the subsection's application; and (3) that the admission into evidence, on the State's motion, of presentence reports was reversible error by reason of their privileged nature and protection from disclosure under 11 Del.C. § 4322(a). We take up defendant's contentions seriatim.

III

In contending that the evidence of his three prior felony convictions was "insufficient" to declare him an habitual criminal under § 4214(a), defendant relies upon the following underlined language of subsection (a) of § 4214:

"Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) of this section, under the law of this State, and/or any other state ... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal...."

Defendant argues that by reason of the underlined language, any prior conviction of a felony "specifically mentioned in subsection (b)" must be ignored in determining his qualification to be declared an habitual criminal as a four-time felon. Since one of defendant's three prior felony convictions was for "assault with intent to rob" (committed in 1972), an offense conceded to be equivalent to the current statutory crime of "assault in the first degree," ² defendant says the Trial Court unlawfully declared him to be an habitual criminal under § 4214(a)--for lack of three prior qualifying felony convictions.

Contending that the underlined language of subsection (a) of § 4214 is plain and unambiguous, defendant says it is "apparent that [the] felonies named in subsection (b) are not applicable to subsection (a)"; thus, the Legislature must be presumed to have "made [a] distinction between felonies"--based on the "relative seriousness of the offense."

The State disagrees with defendant's construction of subsection (a) of § 4214. The State construes § 4214 as providing, through subsection (a) and subsection (b), two independent "avenues" for repeat felons to be declared habitual criminals, with each subsection having different "threshold" requirements. The State also contrasts subsection (a)'s lack of specification as to the prior and subsequent felonies that apply to a four-time felon with subsection (b)'s specification of the felonies (prior and subsequent) that trigger its application. Further, the State argues that a "strict letter" construction of subsection (a) must not be permitted to "subvert" legislative intent where such construction would lead to "implausible" and, indeed, absurd results.

Reference to legislative history is a logical starting point in search for legislative intent; and we think it is helpful in this case. Delaware's first habitual criminal statute was enacted in 1953. It provided but one avenue for habitual criminal status. The statute applied only to four-time convicted felons and made no distinction as to seriousness of either the prior or the most recent felony conviction. 49 Del.Laws, c. 413 (enacted effective July 15, 1953) provided:

"Section 1. Chapter 1, Title 11, Delaware Code of 1953 is amended by adding the following new section:

§ 107. Habitual criminal; fourth offense; life sentence may be imposed

Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is hereby declared to be a habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted." ³

Thus, Delaware's initial habitual criminal statute (originally § 107, later § 109, and eventually § 3911 of Title 11), plainly provided that any person three times convicted of a felony (under Delaware law or any other law, state or federal) shall, upon being thereafter convicted of any subsequent felony of this State, be declared to be an habitual criminal. Hence, habitual criminal status in Delaware originally hinged solely upon the commission of any four felonies, without distinction as to the nature of either the three prior or the fourth triggering felony.

The Delaware habitual criminal statute, 11 Del.C. § 3911, remained unchanged until 1970 when § 3911 was rewritten by 57 Del.Laws, c. 585. Old § 3911 was redesignated subsection (a) of new § 3911, but restated to provide as follows:

"(a) Any person who has been three times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) hereunder, under the laws of this State, and/or any other State, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the Court in which such fourth or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may, in its discretion, impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted." (underlining added for emphasis.)

The underlined words represented new language not found in old § 3911. New subsection (b) provided in part:

"(b) Any person who has been two times convicted of a felony hereinafter specifically named, ... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, hereinafter specifically named, of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal...."

New subsection (b) represented new law applying habitual criminal status to a person three times convicted of specifically named felonies. Subsections (a) and (b) as enacted in 1970 have remained essentially unchanged to date and in their present form appear as 11 Del.C. § 4214(a) and (b), set out in full in footnote 1 above. ⁴ Thus, the contested language of subsection (a) of § 4214 (underlined above) has been the law of Delaware since 1970 but its meaning, apparently a question of first impression.

No legislative synopsis or commentary accompanied the 1970 enactment of the habitual criminal statute. However, the Commentary on then § 4213 which accompanied the 1972 revision of the Delaware Criminal Code is instructive. That Commentary reads as follows:

"This section [§ 4213] establishes a procedure for imposing a life sentence on a person who has previously been convicted three times of a felony, except in the case of certain specified felonies involving death, danger to human life where only two prior convictions are needed. In the latter case, probation and parole are specifically made unavailable."

The question then becomes this: whether the Legislature in rewriting the statute in 1970 to add a "3rd offender" felony provision also intended to re-define the retained "4th offender" provision to exclude from its operation the major felonies covered by the new third offender law. We think not.

First, defendant's construction of subsection (a), as applied to him, is at odds with what we perceive to be the general legislative intent of the habitual criminal statute. We interpret that intent to be to provide two separate and unrelated avenues for habitual criminal status, one applicable to a fourth felony offender and the other to a third offender convicted of felonies specified under subsection (b). Given this framework of § 4214, general legislative intent becomes apparent: the more serious felonies listed in subsection (b) may be subsumed into subsection (a) for purposes of meeting the three prior felony requirements for its application; otherwise, the obvious and consistent legislative goal of harsher punishment for repeat felons would be undermined. A determination of general legislative intent prevails over a literal...