Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 31125
| Decision Date | 01 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 31125,31125 |
| Citation | 134 So.2d 241 |
| Parties | OOLITE ROCK COMPANY, and New Amsterdam Casualty Company, Petitioners, v. Edward Claude DEESE and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Welsh, Cornell, Pyszka & Carlton and Errol S. Cornell, Miami, for petitioners.
Steve M. Watkins, Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, Smith & Poole, Miami, Burnis T. Coleman and Paul E. Speh, Tallahassee, for respondents.
Edward Deese was grievously injured in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. His wrists and right femur were broken and his skull was so fractured that three operations were required, one to remove a blood clot and two to stop the flow of spinal fluid into his nostrils. The optic nerves of both eyes were damaged to the extent that peripheral vision was destroyed. Because of the loss of brain matter his mentality was reduced to that of a six-to eight-year-old child.
The impairment of the claimant's body and mind rendered him incapable of taking care of his simplest needs and some one must attend him during all waking hours, about 16 hours a day. In fact, it is conceded by the carrier and employer that he is totally, permanently disabled.
The carrier paid the wife $60 weekly to look after the claimant, then discontinued the payments 25 February 1960. Later, 25 April 1960, the claimant sought resumption of the compensation of the wife for her nursing services. Upon hearing, the Deputy Commissioner declared the claimant wholly unable to pursue any occupation or even to care for himself and ordered the carrier to resume the weekly payments of $60 to the wife. The order of the Full Commission affirming this action is the one now being reviewed by certiorari.
The position of the petitioners that there is no occasion to fasten upon them the duty to pay the wife for her care of the husband is based mainly on the assertion of the fact that she did not give up any regular employment for the purpose. In support of the contention we are referred to Sec. 2004(m), 10 Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Text where the author quotes from the decision in California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, et al., 84 Cal.App.2d 417, 190 P.2d 990.
When the cited case is scrutinized it affords small comfort to the petitioners. Although the District Court of Appeal, Div. 1, First District, announced agreement with the 'rule that where services are rendered without knowledge of the insurance company and are not of an extraordinary nature, * * * a member of the family should not be permitted to claim a right to compensation,' the court rendered the pronouncement valueless by the following statement: '[b]ut that is not this case.' (Italics supplied.) Furthermore, it is not the situation with which we deal as will be clearly seen by a comparison of the facts we have recounted and the language we have italicized. It is necessary only to say that the insurance company was not ignorant of the services the wife had rendered, and that those services were not of an ordinary kind, such as a wife would perform for a husband, because of the unusual severity of the injury chargeable to industry.
The petitioners also direct us to the case of Graf v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797, which they claim the Full Commission overlooked when they adopted the statement in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law appearing in Sec. 61.13 of Volume 2.
An examination of the Section discloses that the author referred to early cases holding that a wife would not be allowed compensation for nursing her husband inasmuch as she would do nothing more than that expected of an affectionate spouse, while later cases held that the allowance was proper because she would, in the absence of such service furnished by the employer, be doing much more than her regular household duties required. The cited case appears to hold contrary to the latter rule. Incidentally, our opinion in Brinson v....
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Spiker v. John Day Co.
...has also allowed a wife compensation for nursing her husband, although "she did not give up any regular employment." Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241 (Fla., 1961). The court there stated that: "The position that the wife could not be compensated in such an extreme case, though the pe......
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Carbajal v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
...marital relationship." A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252, 255 (1962); see, e.g., Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241, 243-44 (Fla.1961). Those courts have considered a number of factors in determining whether spousal care is compensable including: whether ......
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Carbajal v. the Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.
...the usual marital relationship." A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 177 A.2d 252, 255 (Md. 1962); see, e.g., Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241, 243-44 (Fla. 1961). Those courts have considered a number of factors in determining whether spousal care is compensable including: whethe......
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Jackson Manor Nursing Home v. Ortiz
...medical necessity, just as would the award of any other medical services under the Workers' Compensation Act. See e.g., Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So.2d 241 (Fla.1961) (claimant incapable of taking care of his simplest needs required someone to attend him during his every waking hour); P......