Operation Unification, Inc. v. Gnesee Cnty. Municipality
| Decision Date | 16 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-13779,18-13779 |
| Parties | OPERATION UNIFICATION, INC., CHARLES YOUNG GROUP, CHARLES YOUNG, JR. LELA McGEE-HARVEY, Plaintiffs, v. GNESEE COUNTY MUNICIPALITY, GENESEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, GENESEE COUNTY EMPLOYEES, GENESEE COUNTY TREASURER, GENESEE COUNTY SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Before the Court is Defendant Genesee County, Genesee County Circuit Court, and Genesee County Treasurer's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #7], which has been referred for a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)91)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' claims under the principles set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).1 Further, I recommend that Plaintiffs' claims forinjunctive relief be barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C § 2283, and the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Alternatively, Plaintiffs Charles Young Group, Charles Young, Jr., and Lela McGee-Harvey should be dismissed for lack of standing under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12(b)(1).2
On December 6, 2018, Operation Unification, Inc., Charles Young Group, Charles Young, Jr., and Lela McGee-Harvey ("Plaintiffs"), filed suit in this Court alleging constitutional violations pertaining to Plaintiff Operation Unification Inc.'s ("Operation Unification's") alleged inability to procure real estate development contracts, and constitutional violations occurring during the course of an ongoing 2013 Genesee County Circuit Court case brought by the City of Flint against Operation Unification. Docket #1, pg. 16, Pg. ID 17. Genesee County Circuit Court, Case no. 13-101075-CK.
By way of background, Plaintiffs allege that as of 2008, Plaintiff Operation Unification "was the first minority Developer with a Community Housing Development Organization status, granted by [the Department of Housing and Urban Development]" ("HUD"). Complaint, pg 7. Plaintiffs allege that the contracts were awarded to Operation Unification on the basis that African American males within the corporation had "critical positions." Id. Plaintiffs alleged that in 2010, Operation Unification "received the largest[c]ontract that any African American Developer had ever received relative to Government Federal Dollars." Id. Plaintiffs allege that subsequently, the emergency manager appointed by the Governor of the State of Michigan "seized" the contract and removed the Flint administrator "who had opened the doorway for minorities to finally compete in Flint and Genesee County." Id. Plaintiffs allege that in 2010, Charles Young Jr. ("Young") and Lela McGee-Harvey ("McGee-Harvey") were "warned" by then Flint City Manager Gregory Eason ("Eason") that the Charles Young Jr. Group's ("Group's") status as a developer within Flint was imperiled. Id. at pg. 8, Docket #1, Pg. ID 60, Affidavit of Gregory Eason.
Plaintiffs' exhibits show that Flint filed the Genesee County Circuit Court action against Operation Unification on August 21, 2013. Docket # 1, Pg ID 16. On September 6, 2014, Operation Unification filed a counterclaim, including allegations of breach of contract and the failure to adhere to HUD guidelines in removing Operation Unification as a developer. Pg ID 46-57.
Plaintiffs allege that the presiding judge, Genesee County Circuit Court Chief Judge Richard Tuille, is not "fair, impartial, [or] non-discriminative." Complaint at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege that they have been "willfully denied" their right to trial.3 Id. Plaintiffs request "immediate physical and business protection by the federal courts" in protecting their First Amendment rights, protection from Chief Judge Richard Tuille, and "all of Genesee County employees and affiliates;" the right to be free from discrimination; and protection from "physical [and] vocal threats, intimidation" and the "misuse and abuse of laws" by Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2. They request "a change of venue" to this Court. Id. at ¶ 4.
Challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction are brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The party opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion "bears the burden of proving jurisdiction." EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010). Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate where a plaintiff lacks standing. Ward v. Alternative Health Delivery Systems, Inc., 261 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2001).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint "for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, and asks whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2001).
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S 544 (2007), the Court, construing the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), held that although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Id., at 555 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). Stated differently, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombley, at 570.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court explained and expanded on what it termed the "two-pronged approach" of Twombley. First, it must be determined whether acomplaint contains factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678, citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555. Second, the facts that are pled must show a "plausible" claim for relief, which the Court described as follows:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'shown[n]"-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
Defendants argue first that Plaintiffs Charles Young Group, Charles Young, Jr., and Lela McGee-Harvey lack standing to bring the present action. Defendants' Brief, 4-5, Docket #7, Pg ID 88. Standing requires a showing that a plaintiff suffered (1) "'an injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized, and is actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
Defendants are correct that to the extent that Plaintiffs allege improprieties regarding Genesee County Circuit Court Chief Judge Richard Tuille's oversight of the state action, Plaintiffs Charles Young Group, Charles Young, Jr., and Lela McGee-Harvey lack standingto bring the present suit. First, Plaintiffs concede that the Charles Young Group withdrew its counterclaim in the state action. Complaint at ¶ 11. Further, while Plaintiffs' response to the present motion states that Charles Young Jr. and Lela McGee-Harvey were "founders" of Operation Unification, they do not dispute that they are neither Defendants or Counter-Plaintiffs in the state action and provide no rationale for the failure to raise claims in that forum. Response, 4, 20, Docket #8, Pg ID 106. The fact that Operation Unification is a litigant in the state action is not sufficient to confer standing on either Young or McGee-Harvey "A plaintiff may assert his 'own legal rights and interests,' but generally, a litigant may not sue to protect the constitutional rights of a third party." Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board, 847 F.3d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 2017)(citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004)). Neither Plaintiff has alleged a "hindrance" preventing him or her from raising claims in the state action. Id. (citing Kowalski at 543 U.S. at 129-30, 125 S.Ct. 564). Further, while Plaintiffs Young and McGee-Harvey allege that they were "warned" by then Flint City Manager Gregory Eason ("Eason") that the Charles Young Jr. Group's status as a developer within Flint was imperiled prior to the inception of the state action, Complaint at ¶ 5, Docket #1, Pg. ID 60, Affidavit of Gregory Eason, this allegation (divorced from the claims of improprieties resulting from the state action) fails to state a plausible claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs Charles Young Group, Charles Young, Jr., and Lela McGee-Harvey must therefore be dismissed for lack of standing.4
Defendants also argue that the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiffs' claims under the principles set forth in Younger v. Harris, ...
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