Opinion of the Justices

• Decision Date: 13 July 1962
• Citation: 344 Mass. 770,184 N.E.2d 353
• Parties: OPINION OF THE JUSTICES to the Senate.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 353

184 N.E.2d 353

344 Mass. 770

OPINION OF THE JUSTICES to the Senate.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts July 13, 1962.

To the Honorable the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit these answers to questions in an order adopted by the Senate on July 6, 1962, and transmitted to us on July 10, 1962. The order recites the pendency before the Senate of a bill entitled, 'An Act providing that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may enter into a compact with any of the New England States to provide for the control, development and execution of programs of co-operation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders,' and printed in House No. 14, a copy of which is transmitted with the order.

No extended summary of House No. 14 is necessary as a basis for our answers to the questions stated in the order. The title of the bill describes its general purpose. Section 2 enacts the New England interstate corrections compact 'into law' and provides that the compact is 'entered into by this state with any other of the hereinafter-mentioned states legally joining therein in the form substantially as' set forth in § 2. Then follows the 'New England Interstate Corrections Compact,' art. I of which defines its purpose and policy in part in the following terms, 'The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the parties states to provide such facilities and programs on a basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human and material resources.' Article II contains definitions. 'State' means one of the six New England states. "Sending state' means a state party to this compact in which conviction or court commitment was had.' The term '[r]eceiving state' means a party state 'to which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or court commitment was had.' 'Inmate' means an 'offender * * * confined in' an 'institution, except county houses of correction and jails' (emphasis supplied). "Institution' means any * * * correctional facility * * * in which inmates * * * may lawfully be confined.' Article III permits '[e]ach party state * * * [to] make * * * contracts with any one or more of the party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within receiving states.' This article prescribes the general character of the contends of such contracts. Article IV provides in considerable detail, which need not be stated, for the confinement of inmates, committed in one party state, in the institutions of another party state, under arrangements in which the receiving state shall 'act * * * solely as agent for the sending state,' and under provisions by which inmates 'shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state' and be assured of due protection of their rights under the law or that state. Article V provides that '[a]ny decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state,' subject to an exception which need not be stated. Article V also governs the subject of inmates who may escape. Other articles provide for the acceptance of Federal aid (art. VI); that the compact shall become 'effective and binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted * * * by any four [New England] states' (emphasis supplied; see art. VII); for withdrawal of any state upon notice (art. VIII); and for certain other matters (arts. IX and X). By § 3 the commissioner of correction 'subject to the approval of the governor and council' (emphasis supplied) is directed to carry out the compact.

Examination of the statutes of the other New England states reveals that this compact has already been adopted in each of such states. Conn.Pub.Acts, 1961, No. 326, §§ 1-4. Maine Pub.Laws, 1961, c. 197. N.H.Laws, 1961, c. 101:1-101:2. R.I.Pub.Laws, 1960, c. 90, §§ 1-4. Vt.Pub.Acts, 1961, No. 213, §§ 1-4. The compact authorized by each such statute appears substantially like that in each other statute and in House No. 14 prior to the amendments by the Senate discussed in our answer to question 3. There is one minor omission in the New Hampshire statute from art. III(b) of the last sentence, and some trivial variations in form among the statutes exist. Vermont, however, in adopting its statute, included a special provision, see § 3(a), designed to insure that any inmate committed in Vermont would not be transferred to an institution outside Vermont, except with such inmate's consent, and that each inmate would be subject to the control of the Vermont courts in various respects. This provision is discussed in connection with the answer to the third question.

The questions are these:

'1. Does the interstate compact proposed in said bill require the consent of Congress?

'2. Has Congress consented, under the provisions of 4 U.S.C. § 111, to said compact?

'3. If the text of the compact authorized in any state differs materially in substance from the text of the compact authorized in another state, would there be an effective compact in force between such states?'

1. Article I, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States provides, 'No State shall, without the Consent of Congress * * * enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power * * *.' In Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-521, at p. 519, 13 S.Ct. 728, at p. 734, 37 L.Ed. 537, it was suggested that the 'prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.' See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 725-726, 9 L.Ed. 1233; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16-17, 20 S.Ct. 251, 44 L.Ed. 347; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 246-248, 21 S.Ct. 73, 45 L.Ed. 162; United States v. Tobin, 195 F.Supp. 588, 605-606 (D.D.C.). See also Zimmerman and Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 21-26; Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 694-695, 749-754; Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U.S.L.Rev. 557, 560-562; Hinkle, Interstate Cooperative Institutionalization--A Modern Device for Rehabilitation, 8 Journ.Pub.Law 509, 519; note, 35 Harv.L.Rev. 322, 325. Cf. Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers, 2 Minn.L.Rev. 500. Although there may be interstate compacts which do not require the consent of Congress, because concerned wholly with local matters and because of the complete absence of any effect upon Federal interests, some later decisions may indicate the propriety of Congressional approval of all interstate compacts. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601-602, 38 S.Ct. 400, 59 L.Ed. 1272; West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27-28, 71 S.Ct. 557, 95 L.Ed. 713. See also note, 31 Yale L.J. 635, 636-637. Cf. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 586, 73 S.Ct. 468, 97 L.Ed. 567; Henderson v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm., 362 Pa. 475, 484-486, 66 A.2d 843, cert. den. 338 U.S. 850, 70 S.Ct. 94, 94 L.Ed. 520. The matters dealt with in the proposed compact appear to be solely of local concern and to have no effect upon Federal interests. The compact thus appears to be within the principle suggested in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-521, 13 S.Ct. 728, 37 L.Ed. 537, and requires no Congressional consent unless the later decisions must be taken as requiring Congressional consent to all compacts. Whether this is so, however, is not now important. As indicated in the discussion below of question 2, we are of opinion that Congress has given advance consent to this compact relating to the prevention and punishment of crime. Consequently, no further Congressional consent is required. In view of our answer to question 2, we answer question 1 in the negative.

2. Congress in 1934 (38 Stat. 909; see 18 U.S.C. [1946] § 420) enacted a general consent to compacts between states for cooperation in law inforcement. This provision now appears in 4 U.S.C. (1958) § 111, amended by Pub.Law (87th Cong.) No. 406, 76 Stat. 9. In respects here pertinent § 111(a) reads, 'The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more States to enter into * * * compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such * * * compacts.' The House Judiciary Committee report on the 1934 bill (H.Rep.1937, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; see Sen.Rep.No.1007) shows that Congress intended a broad consent to interstate 'compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention and punishment of crime' (emphasis supplied) and to the establishment of 'whatever joint agencies may seem desirable * * * to make effective such * * * compacts.' The specific purpose behind § 111, as it now stands, to give Congressional consent to the very type of compact now under consideration is made plain by the House report (H.Rep. 434, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., May 25, 1961) on Pub.Law No. 406, adding Guam to the list of states and areas which under § 111(b) might enter...