Opinion to the Governor, In re
| Decision Date | 19 November 1959 |
| Citation | 90 R.I. 135,155 A.2d 602 |
| Parties | In re OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Coleman B. Zimmerman, Edwards & Angell, Charles P. Williamson, John V. Kean, Providence, Walter I. Sundlun, Providence, amicus curiae.
We have received from Your Excellency a request for our written opinion in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of article XII of amendments to the constitution of this state upon the following question:
'Does the Rhode Island Industrial Building Authority have the right, under the provisions of Chapter 91 of the 1958 Public Laws of Rhode Island, to insure the payment of a mortgage loan within the limitations of the aforesaid Chapter 91 for a proposed project hereinafter described, if said Authority should determine that the proposed new building project (a) would tend to provide gainful employment for the people of Rhode Island, (b) increase the tax base of the economy, and (c) diversify and expand industry?'
Your letter further describes such proposed new building as follows:
'Function Rooms (for banquets and conventions--accommodations for 500 people).
'Formal Dining Room (accommodations for 150 people).
'Coffee Shop (accommodations for 58 people).
'News Stand and Gift Shop, Barber Shop and Beauty Parlor.
'Parking facilities for approximately 170 cars.
'The hotel recreational facilities will consist of a swimming pool, cabanas, children's play area, boat dock, formal gardens.
'The maintenance of the project will require approximately 125 employees to constitute a permanent staff.'
Our consideration of the question has been delayed pending the receipt of a brief in support of an affirmative answer by counsel for the Rhode Island Industrial Building Authority which Your Excellency requested us to consider. We allowed such brief to be filed and also another of like view by counsel for certain interests who are contemplating the erection of a sports stadium primarily for major league baseball. Thereafter we granted permission to counsel for the Business Development Company of Rhode Island, a private corporation organized to develop and advance the business prosperity and economic welfare of the state, to file a brief in support of a negative answer. The delay occasioned by the granting of those requests has been amply compensated for by reason of the assistance we have received from such briefs. The question propounded is one of importance and therefore is deserving of the deliberate and mature consideration that customarily results from the advocacy of adversary views.
Chapter 91 is novel legislation. It borders closely, if it does not actually trespass, upon a field of enterprise which the state ordinarily refrains from invading. That field is normally left open to the free interplay of private forces. Only in the most unusual circumstances and in order to safeguard the economic welfare of the state should the legislature venture the public revenue in such enterprise by directly or indirectly pledging the credit of the state. In this instance it has done so with the express approval of the electors given at the general election on November 4, 1958 as is required by article XXXI, section 1, of amendments to the constitution of the state.
In our opinion legislation of this character must be construed strictly. By that constitutional provision the people have demonstrated in no uncertain terms their jealous regard for the power to pledge the state's credit. Whenever they relax that jealousy and permit the general assembly to exercise such forbidden power it may be lawfully done only within the strict letter of the legislative act referred to the people for their approval.
One of the provisions of P.L.1958, chap. 91, sec. 7, which was thus submitted to the people reads as follows:
How shall that language be construed? There is no doubt that it is subject to two possible constructions. One, as contended for by counsel for the Authority, is that by reason of the use of the disjunctive 'or' the legislature intended to vest the Authority with unlimited discretion to apply the act to 'any new building' regardless of its intended use,...
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