Opinion to the Senate, In re, 1365-M

Decision Date18 March 1971
Docket NumberNo. 1365-M,1365-M
Citation108 R.I. 302,275 A.2d 256
PartiesIn re Advisory OPINION TO THE SENATE of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. P.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Edward D. Feldstein, Providence (Amicus Curiae brief submitted in behalf of the Board of Regents for Education).

To the Honorable, the Senate of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations

We have received from the Honorable Senate a resolution requesting, in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of article XII of amendments to the constitution of this state, our written opinion upon the following question of law:

'Can the general assembly or the budget officer, prior to the end of the fiscal year, reduce or withdraw unexpended balances of appropriations from the department of social welfare and the board of regents for education?'

It appears from the resolution by the adoption of which the Honorable Senate requested our written opinion, as aforesaid, that the request was motivated by the pendency before your honorable body of an act enumerated S190 and entitled 'At Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the State for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1971.' From an examination of said pending legislation, it further appears that the act in question proposes to amend P.L.1970, chapter 138, article I, section 1. This latter act represents the annual appropriation bill for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1970 and ending June 30, 1971.

Further, the specific amendment proposed would reduce the general appropriation for the Board of Regents from $103,024,734 to $102,024,734 and for the Department of Social Welfare from $84,157,496 to $83,157,496 for the 1970-1971 fiscal year.

We note at the outset that correlative to the inquiry regarding the General Assembly's prerogative in the premises, the question as posited also inquires into the possible standing of the budget officer to 'reduce or withdraw unexpended balances' from the general appropriations to the department concerned. The scope and nature of that officer's duties and jurisdiction are set forth in G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) chapter 3 of title 35, and nothing therein either directly or by necessary implication can be construed so as to authorize the budget officer to 'reduce or withdraw' from appropriations made for the departments here involved.

The question as it relates to the right of the General Assembly to repeal the appropriation bill in the manner proposed by S190 is not so readily resolved. It is clear beyond question that the Legislature has the right to alter or amend any act by it adopted, including acts appropriating monies, unless such right is expressly or by necessary implication restrained by provisions of the constitution by the adoption of which the Legislature was itself created, or provisions of the Federal Constitution made binding on the states. State ex rel. Board of Regents of Normal Schools v. Donald, 163 Wis. 145, 157 N.W. 782; City and County of San Francisco v. Beideman, 17 Cal. 443 (1861); Lee v. City of Decatur, 233 Ala. 411, 172 So. 284; In re Continuing Appropriations, 18 Colo. 192, 32 P. 272; Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Renner, 59 Wyo. 437, 143 P.2d 181; McConnel v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 386, 6 P.2d 143 and Carr v. Frohmiller, 47 Ariz. 430, 56 P.2d 644.

Thus, of immediate significance to the question at issue are the provisions of section 12 of article I of the constitution of this state and section 10 of article I of the Constitution of the United States. These sections expressly prohibit the General Assembly from adopting any act which has as its consequence the impairment of contracts. See Stokes v. Rodman, 5 R.I. 405 and Morley v. Lake Shore and M.S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162, 13 S.Ct. 54, 36 L.Ed. 925 (1892). Consequently, appropriations made to the Board of Regents and to the Department of Social Welfare by the adoption of P.L.1970, chapter 138, may now be repealed only to the extent that such appropriations have not been expended or otherwise pledged to a binding executory contract entered into by the agencies involved.

However, to what extent expenditures have been made or funds so pledged as to be constitutionally binding is a question of fact. Hence, before there can be a valid repeal by the General Assembly of funds theretofore appropriated, there must be a factual determination of what remains in the general appropriation that is subject to recoupment. Moreover, such determination requires at least two approaches. It is well settled that when the Legislature makes a general appropriation, the agency involved enters into a contract with another, and the question of whether such contract is constitutionally protected is to be determined by the terms of that contract and not by the provisions of the act of appropriation. Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 64 S.Ct. 1072, 88 L.Ed. 1346.

Moreover, although some states have held as in State ex rel. Board of Regents of Normal Schools v. Donald, supra, that the state like any individual can declare its intention to repudiate contracts, wholly or partially executory, leaving the other party to his right of recovery for damages, states so holding have a standing statute granting their consent to be sued. We find no such general consent statute to be the law of this state. Thus, in Rhode Island, one allegedly sustaining damages as a result of this state's repudiation must seek special legislation giving the right to sue. Whether the General Assembly would grant such right in a given case is conjectural and this conceivably restricts the General Assembly from repealing an appropriation which the Board of Regents and/or the Department of Social Welfare have already allocated to a contract which, by its terms, may not constitutionally be impaired.

Furthermore, there is a conceivable problem in achieving an effective withdrawal or reduction of funds appropriated in connection with continuing appropriations so-called. See In re Continuing Appropriations, supra. Annual appropriations of this nature are made by reason of a...

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    ...other than in tort. See State ex rel. Division of Administration v. Oliff, 350 So.2d 484 (Fla.App.1977); In re Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 302, 275 A.2d 256 (1971).4 This text states:"Section 234(c) of Pub.L. 90-248 provided that: 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after June ......
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