Oquendo-Lorenzo v. Hosp. San Antonio, Inc.

• Citation: 256 F.Supp.3d 103
• Decision Date: 12 June 2017
• Docket Number: Civil No. 15-1413 (BJM).
• Parties: Jessica OQUENDO–LORENZO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HOSPITAL SAN ANTONIO, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

256 F.Supp.3d 103

Jessica OQUENDO–LORENZO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.HOSPITAL SAN ANTONIO, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15-1413 (BJM).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed June 12, 2017

Alberto J. Perez–Hernandez, Etienne Totti–Del–Toro, David Efron, David Efron Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Carlos G. Martinez–Vivas, Martinez–Texidor & Martinez–Vivas, Anselmo Irizarry–Irizarry, Matta & Matta PSC, Ponce, PR, Francisco E. Colon–Ramirez, Colon & Colon PSC, Gilda Del C. Cruz–Martino, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE J. McGIVERIN, United States Magistrate Judge

This case presents thorny statutory construction issues relating to a Puerto Rico statute governing the extent of liability in certain medical malpractice actions. Jessica Oquendo–Lorenzo, Rolando Lopez–Montanez, and their conjugal partnership (collectively, "Oquendo") allege medical malpractice in this diversity tort action, and seek seven-figure money damages from the Hospital San Antonio, Inc. ("Hospital" or "Hospital San Antonio"), Dr. Osvaldo Quiles–Giovannetti ("Dr. Quiles"), and their insurance carriers. Docket No. 22. The Hospital moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that a Puerto Rico statute caps any potential damages award. Docket Nos. 56, 61, 80, 96. And Dr. Quiles moved to dismiss the claims against him, contending that this same Puerto Rico statute grants him absolute immunity when a suit arises from the performance of his duties at the Hospital. Docket Nos. 59, 96. Oquendo primarily responds that the Puerto Rico statute cited by both the Hospital and Dr. Quiles does not entitle them to the relief they request. Docket Nos. 71, 72–1, 98. This case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket No. 47.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motions are DENIED.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "an adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim." Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). To do so, the complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary" for the action. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). When evaluating the complaint, the court first discards any " ‘legal conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.’ " Ocasio–Hernández , 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The remaining "[n]on-conclusory factual allegations" are fully credited, "even if seemingly incredible." Ocasio–Hernández , 640 F.3d at 12. The court engages in no fact-finding when considering the motion, and does not "forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits." Id. at 13. Rather, the court presumes that the facts are as properly alleged by the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm. , 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).

Summary judgment, on the other hand, is appropriate when the movant shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" only if it "is one that could be resolved in favor of either party." Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions" of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence" of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The court does not act as trier of fact when reviewing the parties' submissions and so cannot "superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon" conflicting evidence. Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. , 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, the court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs–Ryan v. Smith , 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). And the court may not grant summary judgment "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Because the resolution of the motions before the court turns on threshold issues of statutory construction, the same result follows regardless of whether the motions are evaluated under the rubric of the motion-to-dismiss standard or the summary-judgment standard. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am./Int'l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 959 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1992) ; BLE Int'l Reform Comm. v. Sytsma , 802 F.2d 180, 183 (6th Cir. 1986).

BACKGROUND¹

Oquendo was pregnant in early July 2013, and she visited Dr. Quiles for a prenatal examination on July 3, 2013. SUF ¶ 6; OSF ¶ 6. The Hospital, which is located in Mayaguez, granted Dr. Quiles (a surgeon specializing in obstetrics-gynecology) privileges to admit patients to the Hospital, and Dr. Quiles ordered Oquendo's admission thereto after the prenatal examination. SUF ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 9; OSF ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 9; Docket No. 59 ¶ 2. The following day, Dr. Quiles ordered, and participated in, a caesarean section

that led to the birth of Oquendo's daughter—J.L.O. SUF ¶¶ 10, 11; OSF ¶¶ 10, 11; Docket No. 72–6 at 3.

J.L.O., who was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit ("NICU") at the Hospital, suffered from various complications, and so she was transferred to the University Pediatric Hospital at Centro Medico in San Juan. SUF ¶ 12; OSF ¶ 12; Docket No. 72–6 at 1. Oquendo was discharged from the Hospital on July 8. SUF ¶ 13; OSF ¶ 13. J.L.O., on the other hand, remained hospitalized until January 2014. ASF ¶ 50 Docket No. 72–7 at 5. In August 2014, J.L.O. passed away after being admitted to the Hospital Menonita de Cayey. ASF ¶ 52; Docket No. 72–2 at 5–6. J.L.O.'s parents allege that various negligent acts of Dr. Quiles and the Hospital's medical staff resulted in J.L.O.'s birth injuries and subsequent death, and demand millions of dollars in compensation. SUF ¶ 1; OSF ¶ 1.

DISCUSSION

The Hospital contends that Article 41.050 of the Puerto Rico Insurance Code ("Article 41.050"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 4105, limits Oquendo's potential recovery of money damages from the Hospital to the amounts set by Puerto Rico Law 104 of 1955 ("Law 104"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3077. And Dr. Quiles contends that Article 41.050 immunizes him from suit in this medical malpractice action because the case arises from the performance of his duties at the Hospital San Antonio.

Under Puerto Rico law, which governs this diversity tort action, medical malpractice cases are governed by Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code ("Article 1802"). P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 ; see also Martinez–Serrano v. Quality Health Servs. of P.R., Inc. , 568 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir. 2009) ; Ramos Lozada v. Orientalist Rattan Furniture Inc. , 130 D.P.R. 712, 728 n.10 (1992). Article 1802 provides that "[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Article 1802 requires the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to establish "the duty owed, the occurrence of an act or omission constituting a breach of that duty, and a sufficient causal nexus between the breach and some resultant harm." See, e.g., Martinez–Serrano , 568 F.3d at 285. Article 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code ("Article 1803"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5142, "embodies the principle of respondeat superior, and provides, inter alia, that ‘[t]he obligation imposed by § 5141 of this title is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.’ " Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc. , 575 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2009) ; see also De La Cruz v. United States , 656 F.Supp. 575, 579–80 (D.P.R. 1987) (per Article 1803, "a hospital may be liable for the medical malpractice of its physicians under a theory of vicarious liability").

At this stage, neither the Hospital nor Dr. Quiles contend that Oquendo cannot meet the requirements of a medical malpractice action under Articles 1802 or 1803. Rather, the Hospital contends that Article 41.050 creates a statutory cap on money damages that may be recovered from the Hospital, and Dr. Quiles contends that this same statute grants him absolute immunity from suit in this case. To determine whether Article 41.050 grants either defendant the relief sought, it is necessary to employ the "traditional tools of statutory construction." See L.S. Starrett Co. v. FERC , 650 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) ("traditional tools of statutory construction" include "a consideration of the language, structure, purpose, and history of the statute") (quoting In re Hill , 562 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) ).

"Statutory construction in Puerto Rico begins with the text of the underlying statute, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous." In re Plaza Resort at Palmas, Inc. , 741 F.3d 269, 274–75 (1st Cir. 2014) ; see also Claro TV y Junta Regl. Tel. v. One Link , 179 D.P.R. 177, ––– P.R. Offic. Trans. –––– (2010) (courts "must first examine the text of the law because it ‘is the perfect expression of the legislative intent,’ provided that the lawmaker used ‘clear and unambiguous language’ "). After all, the Puerto Rico Civil Code provides that "[w]hen a law is clear and free from all...