Oquendo v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-cv-00698-MMD-PAL |
| Parties | EVIE OQUENDO, Plaintiff, v. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
(Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment - dkt. no. 26)
I. SUMMARY
Before the Court is Defendants' Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") and Officer Derek Colling's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. no. 26.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND1
This case involves the use of deadly force by LVMPD Officer Derek Colling against the deceased, Tanner Chamberlain. On September 22, 2009, 15-year-old Chamberlain and his mother, Evie Oquendo, got in an argument because Oquendo would not let Chamberlain go over to a friend's home. Oquendo later testified that Chamberlain became extremely angry with her, and that he repeatedly struck Oquendo before the police arrived on the scene. Chamberlain had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder but was not taking medication before the altercation. However,after the violent altercation with his mother, he took ten pills from his mother's prescribed anti-anxiety medication. At this point, Chamberlain's rage subsided, and Oquendo called her sister, a retired law enforcement officer, to inform her about the fight. The sister in turn called a family friend, who called 911 and reported the situation at 5:13 PM. After calling her sister, Oquendo and Chamberlain took a walk outside. Chamberlain brought a knife with him on the walk. Chamberlain's knife was a black, folding knife with a three and one-half inch blade. (See dkt. no. 27, "LVMPD000429.") The blade on the long-edged side was jagged and the back side at the top was partly edged and had a hook coming to a sharp point. (See id.)
LVMPD placed a call for service after receiving the family friend's call. The call was broadcast to the police as a fifteen-year-old bipolar male threatening his mother with a knife. The Crisis Intervention Team ("CIT") was requested, and Officer Steven Mauri, a CIT officer, was assigned to the case. Officers Derek Colling and San Martin were on patrol together that evening, and riding in their vehicle near Oquendo's apartment when the call was broadcast. Officers Colling and Martin were assigned to the call along with several other units.
The time between the LVMPD's first encountering Chamberlain and Officer Colling shooting and killing Chamberlain is less than a minute, and several events occurred in short succession. Colling and Martin2 were the first two officers to make visual contact with Chamberlain in the middle of his apartment complex. When the police officers arrived and began advancing towards Chamberlain, Chamberlain took hold of his mother with a knife in his hand. The parties dispute whether the knife point was ever at Oquendo's throat, or whether Chamberlain held the knife in his hand, but not at or near Oquendo's neck or face. In either scenario, Chamberlain held the knife in his hand while forcibly pulling his mother in front of him, using her as a shield from the police. Officer Martin gave a series of commands to Chamberlain to drop the knife.Chamberlain did not comply, but did not verbally respond or make any verbal threats. Several other officers, including Officer Mauri, arrived on the scene. However, after Officer Colling yelled "crossfire," the officers moved out of Officer Colling's line of fire. At approximately this point, Officer Martin drew his TASER and Officer Colling drew his service weapon. Chamberlain backed away and pulled Oquendo, trying to conceal his head behind hers. Chamberlain and Oquendo appeared to stumble as Chamberlain forced Oquendo backward and, according to Defendants, raised his knife to her head and face. Officer Mauri, who had also arrived on the scene, told Chamberlain, "Let me talk to you, let me talk to you." (Ex. 7 at 83.) Oquendo shouted at the police not to shoot her son. Chamberlain looked to his left toward Officer Mauri, and raised his right hand (the hand holding the knife) upward, exposing himself to a shot from Officer Colling. Officer Colling then fired his weapon, striking Chamberlain in the head and killing him. The last ten seconds of the encounter was captured on video with a camera attached to Officer Martin's TASER gun.3 Officer Colling shot Chamberlain within one minute of the officers arriving on the scene.
After the incident, Officer Martin took Oquendo from the scene. He walked her to the parking lot and handed her to another officer. Detective McNett obtained a voluntary statement from Oquendo at 7:07 PM. Oquendo asserts that she was wrongfully detained by the LVMPD for over three hours after her son's shooting, after which point she was transported to a nearby hospital.
Plaintiffs Oquendo and the Estate of Tanner Chamberlain ("Estate") filed suit on May 2, 2011. Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants LVMPD and Colling for violations of Chamberlain's civil rights to life and security of person and violation of Oquendo's civil right to familial relationships, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also bring onecount of municipal liability under Monell, alleging that the LVMPD perpetuated a policy, practice, or custom of tolerating and ratifying the use of excessive force and engaging in negligent hiring and supervision. Plaintiffs also raise several state law claims, including wrongful death, negligence, and negligent supervision and training. Finally, Plaintiff Oquendo sues Defendants in her individual capacity for an alleged unconstitutional seizure and false imprisonment, for allegedly being detailed without consent for an extended time during the investigation of the shooting.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court. Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits "show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). "In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a mechanism for the private enforcement of substantive rights conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Here, Plaintiffs rely on substantive rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment.
An objectively unreasonable use of force violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2011). To prevail on an excessive force claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the use of force at issue was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment as determined by "a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at...
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